Category Archives: Courts

In Which the Florida Supreme Court Gets One Right

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Police in Florida aren’t allowed to use a cellphone to track someone’s movements according to a sweeping new ruling from the Florida Supreme Court.

The court by a 5-2 vote ruled Thursday that authorities in Broward County had no right to stop and arrest Shawn Tracey for possession of more than 400 grams of cocaine.

The police had a warrant to tap his cell phone calls, but that warrant didn’t include authorization to use his cell phone to track him.

This is entirely appropriate. If the police want to invade a citizen’s privacy, they need either to convince a court that they have probable cause for that, or they need to actually and overtly invade: in the present context, to assign a cop to follow him around.

One of the two dissenting justices, Charles Canady, though, misunderstands the concept of privacy. He cited the US 5th Circuit as follows:

Because a cell phone user makes a choice to get a phone, to select a particular service provider, and to make a call, and because he knows that the call conveys cell site information,…he voluntarily conveys his cell site data each time he makes a call.

Canady added under his own thinking,

Given the known realities of how cell phones operate—realities understood and accepted by all but the most unaware—…cell phone users have neither a subjective expectation of privacy nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the cell site information generated by their cell phones.

Of course the cell phone user does, on both counts. Notice, as Canady apparently does not, that the voluntary conveyance of the information is to a private enterprise, not to a government entity. We citizens can, and we do, have a very strong expectation of privacy regarding any information we surrender to a private entity as a necessary requirement for that entity to provide the service for which we’re paying it.

Notice further, that the caller expects that private enterprise to safeguard our private information, whether it’s surrendered so that the enterprise becomes able to provide the contracted service or whether it’s surrendered more voluntarily as a non-necessary adjunct to that service. This is made clear by the public’s—us people’s—hue and cry over such trackings, by any entity, commercial or otherwise.

If a government entity wants to invade a man’s privacy, it must convince a court of sufficient probable cause as to get a warrant authorizing the invasion. As the police understood in the present case, when they got the warrant to tap Tracey’s cell phone calls—and chose not to get a warrant to collect his location data.

The Court’s ruling, including Canady’s dissent, can be seen here.

Born in Jerusalem Means Born in Israel?

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There is a case on the Supreme Court’s docket this session (which began Monday) that can be summarized thusly:

Born in Jerusalem: The case of an American born in Jerusalem who wants his passport to list his birthplace as Israel underlies a major dispute between Congress and the president, with Middle Eastern politics as the backdrop. The United States has never recognized any nation’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, believing the city’s status should be resolved in peace negotiations. The administration says a 2002 law passed by Congress allowing Israel to be listed as the birthplace of Jerusalem-born Americans would in essence be seen as a US endorsement of Israeli control of the city.

This should be a no-brainer, and it never should have reached this point.

“The Administration” signed the bill into law; it wasn’t merely “passed by Congress.” If the President didn’t like the way it would be perceived by foreign nations, he should have vetoed it, instead.

The courts cannot rule on American domestic law on the basis of how foreign nations might perceive the thing. The courts can only rule on what the law says, in its context—which is domestic. Even at that, what the law says must be primary.

Perceptions of the law by foreign nations are matters of politics not of law, as the separate existences of Articles I and III in our Constitution make clear. The courts have nothing to say on matters of politics.

Finally, if the present administration—or the present Congress, come to that—no longer believe this law to be appropriate in any way, including because of foreign nations’ perceptions, those two should work together on this purely political matter to alter or rescind it. Resorting to the courts is inappropriate and a waste of judicial (and Congressional and administration) resources.

(Aside: that neither Congress nor the President should worry overmuch about foreign opinion when considering American laws is a separate matter.)

Another summary of the case, which gives an outline of its legal history, is here. In my view, the district court, as summarized by this link, erred in both of its rulings. Having held originally, the matter was a non-justiciable political question, the judge should have required State to follow the law. The court was not equipped to rule otherwise, since it had not found the law “illegitimate,” which is to say unconstitutional.

The judge’s second error, when told (correctly) by the Supremes to quit waffling and make a decision, was to rule the relevant section of the law to be an unconstitutional interference with the President’s sole authority to recognize foreign states. Of course, the section does no such thing; it merely accepts that Jerusalem is a part of Israel. The President’s recognition power is unaffected.

A Thought on Gerrymandering Congressional Districts

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This is triggered by a summary of a case that’s before the Supreme Court in the just-started Court session.

Alabama redistricting: Democrats and black lawmakers contend that Republican leaders in Alabama drew a new legislative map that illegally packed black voters into too few voting districts to limit minority political power. Republicans say they complied with the law by keeping the same number of districts in which black voters could elect candidates of their choice.

This question should be irrelevant today.

Instead, we should have square districts, except where the district abuts a state border (perhaps, also, where a small part of a district would be on the other side of a natural barrier, like a river, with no nearby path across/around the barrier). Political districts should be drawn without regard to the population encompassed.

There should be no special treatment for one group of Americans over another; this accomplishes nothing beyond harming the groups denied the same special treatment. There should be no differential treatment under law for one group of Americans compared to any other; this accomplishes nothing beyond harming the groups denied that same differential treatment. The 14th Amendment makes this clear, as if it’s not morally so, already.

Especially, there should be no special political district shapes carved to accommodate, or to disaccommodate, one group or another. We each have one vote, of equal value to each other vote, regardless of our skin color or ethnicity. We are, after all, each equal to another before God and law. We are, after all, each of us Americans; in this this political, legal, religious context, there are no relevant distinctions among us. Full stop.

As a Supreme Court Justice already has recognized, the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.

Interstate Commerce and Chicken Eggs

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A federal judge has dismissed a lawsuit challenging a California law that requires all eggs sold in the Golden State to come from hens housed in roomier cages.

State Attorneys General from Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Alabama had sued to block implementation of the law on the grounds that it unconstitutionally interfered with interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.

They said farmers would have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars overhauling farms to ensure they would have access to the California market….

US District Judge Kimberly Mueller of the Eastern District of California disagreed.

The only citizens who may have to spend $120 million to comply with California’s legislation are the egg farmers who intend to participate in California’s egg market[.]

Intend to participate. Not required to participate. That raises a question in my pea brain: which will cost those farmers more, modifying their enclosures or not selling their eggs in California?

In Which another Federal Judge Gets it Right

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Recall Halbig v Sebelius, the case wherein plaintiffs objected to subsidies being paid to Obamacare plan purchasers when the those plans were bought through ObamaMart, the Federally run health plan exchange, instead of through State-run health plan exchanges. The text of the Obamacare law allows the latter and bars the former. The DC Circuit agreed with plaintiffs and struck down the subsidies. (The current status of that ruling is that it’s been stayed pending review of Halbig by the DC Circuit sitting en banc.)

US District Judge Ronald White, of the Eastern District of Oklahoma, has ruled on a similar case that came up in his district, a part of the 10th Circuit. I won’t go into the specifics of Pruitt v Burwell, White’s case; the cases are very similar, and the point I want to make here is slightly different, anyway. I will note that plaintiff Pruitt is Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, and defendant Burwell is Sylvia Mathews Burwell, HHS Secretary (sitting in for Kathleen Sebelius under an arcane Federal rule that allows such things). I will note further that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew also was a defendant in this case, and leave things there.

White ruled for the plaintiff, which means he also held that the subsidies paid to Obamacare plan purchasers who bought them through ObamaMart are illegal.

Here’s where things get interesting.

In his conclusion, White wrote [citations omitted, emphasis mine]

Other judges in similar litigation have cast the plaintiffs’ argument in apocalyptic language. The first sentence of Judge Edwards’ dissent in Halbig is as follows: “This case is about Appellants’ not-so-veiled attempt to gut the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‘ACA’).” Concurring in King, Judge Davis states that “[appellants’ approach would effectively destroy the statute….” Further, “[w]hat [appellants] may not do is rely on our help to deny to millions of Americans desperately-needed health insurance….”

And

Of course, a proper legal decision is not a matter of the court “helping” one side or the other. A lawsuit challenging a federal regulation is a commonplace occurrence in this country, not an affront to judicial dignity. A higher-profile case results in greater scrutiny of the decision, which is understandable and appropriate. “[H]igh as those stakes are, the principle of legislative supremacy that guides us is higher still…. This limited role serves democratic interests by ensuring that policy is made by elected, politically accountable representatives, not by appointed life-tenured judges.”

And

This is a case of statutory interpretation. “The text is what it is, no matter which side benefits.” Such a case (even if affirmed on the inevitable appeal) does not “gut” or “destroy” anything. On the contrary, the court is upholding the Act as written. Congress is free to amend the ACA to provide for tax credits in both state and federal exchanges, if that is the legislative will. … “But in the last analysis, these always-fascinating policy discussions are beside the point. The role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written – even if we think some other approach might ‘accor[d] with good policy.’“

Finally, quoting from a ruling by his own 10th Circuit appellate court,

In reviewing statutes, courts do not assume the language is imprecise…. Rather, we assume that in drafting legislation, Congress says what it means.

And that’s the deal. A law says what Congress—the People’s directly elected representatives—says it says. A judge, or any appellate court at any level of our judicial hierarchy, can only apply that law to the case before him. Most especially, he cannot rewrite the law or “creatively interpret” it into something more agreeable to his personal philosophy.

Oh, and just to saucer and blow the thing, White formally ruled pretty clearly:

The court holds that the IRS Rule [allowing those subsidies] is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law, pursuant to 5 USC §706(2)(A), in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right, pursuant to 5 USC §706(2)(C), or otherwise is an invalid implementation of the ACA….

Judge White’s ruling can be seen here.

 

h/t Jonathan Keim of the National Review Online