Deterrence and the Need for It

In the present…negotiations…between the US and Iran, the US wants

…Iran’s nuclear programs eliminated, regional proxy forces disbanded, and ballistic missiles dismantled. Iran is seen as unlikely to agree to the last point, because it doesn’t have much of an air force and relies on missiles as its main deterrent.

Iran won’t agree to eliminating its nuclear programs, most especially its nuclear weapons development and (future) production programs, either. Nor will it agree, in practice, to disbanding its proxy terrorist entities, no matter how much the mullahs and their negotiating representatives might lie about agreeing to do in any agreement.

The bit about deterrence is what’s important in this post, though. One component of this failure to agree is on the US’ negotiators. Iran has no serious fear of attack by its neighbors, and so no real need of deterrence, since Iran has nothing in the way of resources, either in raw materials or in production output, that any nation might want that can’t be gotten far more cheaply and far more beneficially for both that (those) nation(s) and for Iran through freely achieved trade agreements than from invasion, conquering, and occupation. Not even from putative adversaries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Pakistan. Not even in tit for tat, blood for blood honor vengeance attitudes in the Middle East.

The US needs to make this case directly. President Donald Trump (R) already is hinting at it with his trade deal commentary, but he needs to be bluntly explicit about it.

A Proper Response

People’s Republic of China’s President Xi Jinping is looking to bully President Donald Trump (R) into stopping arms sales to the Republic of China in order to ease Xi’s coming invasion of the RoC. Xi has ordered the PLA to be ready for the invasion by 2027, and the arms sales to the RoC are critical in forestalling that invasion or defeating it should it come.

As the Wall Street Journal‘s editors note,

giving in to Mr Xi’s threats on Taiwan would send a dangerous signal about America’s reliability as an ally. The Taiwan Relations Act obligates the US to supply defensive weapons to the island. If Mr Trump abdicates on that obligation, China will immediately use it to tell the Taiwanese people that America can’t be trusted to defend them. Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines will also get the message that Mr Trump’s priority in the Pacific is China, not their mutual defense.

It also would tell Xi that the US is a paper tiger, easily cowed, and his pressure on us would only increase.

The proper responses to Xi’s bullying attempt are two. One is to increase the sales of weapons—including offensive weapons, now—and to greatly accelerate their delivery. The other is to increase our own combat suites in and around the South China Sea and the island of Taiwan, with particular attention here to the Taiwan Strait. Every time Xi waxes angry and threatening, we should up the ante further, each time much more than the prior increase.