A Free Speech Ruling

The Federal trial judge got this one right, even though the Arkansas law had been on the books for 35 years.  The question concerned whether the State could restrict political speech by robocall with the mechanism of banning political robocalls.  The same statute did not ban other political calls, only robocalls, and the judge called them on that logical conflict.

The statute is underinclusive. Banning calls made through an automated telephone system in connection with a political campaign cannot be justified by saying that the ban is needed to residential privacy and public safety when no limit is placed on other types of political calls that also may intrude on residential privacy or seize telephone lines.

There’s a larger question here, too, though.  Once we begin limiting political speech, where does it stop?  What’s the limiting principle?  What naturally limits the thing, without relying on government forbearance?  One such limit mentioned in the ruling concerns signs containing political speech.  The signs cannot be banned, but their placement can be restricted based on safety concerns (for instance, visually blocking views of crossing traffic at intersections).  Robocalls, irritating as they are, don’t present themselves as usefully limitable, given the importance of free political speech and (incumbent) government attempts to restrict it, other than an Arkansas averred

prevent[ion of] the seizure of phone lines, which could interfere with emergency calls being placed or received.

However, as the judge noted,

The Attorney General fails to explain why automated calls other than commercial calls and those made in connection with political campaigns—for example, calls encouraging individuals to contact a member of Congress regarding a bill or to attend a townhall meeting regarding a public issue—using automated dialing systems do not trample upon the state’s interests in residential privacy and public safety.

The State’s safety claim doesn’t hold water.

And so, again I ask, when it comes to government limiting speech, particularly political speech, where does it stop?  What’s the limiting principle?  Safety certainly can be one such limit, but Arkansas’ law doesn’t—didn’t—apply it.

The judge’s opinion can be seen here.

Another Out of Control Agency

…that’s overcome with its own self-importance.  I’ve written before about how the Securities and Exchange System abuses its own system of in-house judges for SEC purposes rather than for the public’s interest.

The Federal Trade Commission is another such agency that’s showing it’s outlived its usefulness and for the same reason.  In 2008, LabMD was “found” to have inadvertently exposed a file containing personally identifiable patient information.  I write “found” because the company that “found” the exposure then tried to use their discovery to peddle its data security services to LabMD.  The FTC brought a case against LabMD over the exposure, but last year an FTC in-house judge ruled against the FTC and tossed the case.

That judge, D Michael Chapell, tossed the FTC’s case last year because the commission could not identify any consumers who’d been harmed by LabMD’s allegedly weak security practices. Because no one had been harmed in the seven years since the patient file was exposed, it was unlikely that anyone would be harmed in the future, Judge Chappell concluded.

Wrong answer, Judge.

The FTC, which has the authority to review the rulings issued by its administrative court, said Friday the judge used an incorrect legal standard that was too stringent.

The ruling, being inconvenient to the FTC’s narrative, was rejected out of hand.

Here is the usefulness of an in-house system of judges.