Tag Archives: economics

10-Year Notes, Coupons, and Yields

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The Fed cut its benchmark rate last week, and the stock market spiked up in response. Whether that’s a long-term response or just a sucker’s sandbag is yet to be seen. The effect on interest rates in the private economy in which most of us operate is…inconsistent. And it will continue to be for a long time, regardless of any subsequent Fed moves.

Yields on longer-term US Treasurys have ticked higher since the Fed approved a 0.5 percentage point rate-cut last week. The yield on the benchmark 10-year US Treasury note, which helps set interest rates on everything from mortgages to corporate bonds, settled Friday at around 3.73%, up from 3.64% the day before the Fed’s move.
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[R]ates on a lot more debt are driven primarily by swings in Treasury yields. Those are set by where investors think the Fed’s short-term rates will go in the future, rather than where they are now.

“Investors” are speculating with that, and banks IMNSHO contribute to the speculation by setting their rates on short-term costs and incomes rather than taking the longer view (banks aren’t the only ones, and financials aren’t the only industry, where this short-term, or perhaps shortsighted, prevails) of setting their longer-term rates based on the longer-term incomes of the actual coupons those longer-term instruments pay.

The speculation is made possible by the difference between yield and coupon. A 10-year Treasury Note (for instance, the following definitions apply to all debt instruments that are bought and sold) has a market price, a (market) yield, and a coupon. The Note, once sold, has a coupon, which is the amount of interest the Note issuer (here, the Fed) commits to pay the Note holder (who won’t necessarily be the original buyer) each period for the entirety of those 10 years (in our example). That interest rate, that coupon rate will be paid at the appointed time regardless of the market price of that Note at the time the payment comes due.

The Note, once sold, also has a yield that is separate from the coupon, and that yield is created by the Note’s market price, and that price is driven by short-term trader investors’ aggregated speculation of where interest rates will be tomorrow and by long-term investors’ aggregated speculation of where interest rates will be by the end of those 10 years. In either case, if the aggregated speculation is that interest rates will be higher, then the next-issued Note will have a commensurately higher coupon—guaranteed interest payout rate. To make current Notes, issued with those smaller coupons, marketable, those Notes’ market prices must fall, raising their coupon rates relative to their market prices to match that next-issued coupon. The opposite happens if the next-issued Note is expected—from those aggregated speculations—to have a smaller coupon.

That price variation, and the associated yield variation, is good for debt instrument traders and speculators, but it does little for interest rate stability, which is important for those who depend on fixed income instruments, like Notes (and Fed bonds, which have even longer lifetimes), for their income. Those folks include more than just the retired or the stereotypical widows and orphans, and they comprise no small fraction of us Americans.

Scrambling for pennies by trading on yield—by trading on the instrument prices, which move in the opposite direction of yield (and which movement is the core of the speculation and the creator of the associated yields)—granted those pennies accumulate, lend to volatility in a milieu that would benefit greatly from more stability.

Such coupon-based stability might facilitate more than yield-based relative volatility the ability for banks to avoid mis-matching short-term risk with long-term risk mistakes of the sort a bank in California and another in New York made not so long ago that cost them their existence and severely damaged their depositors.

A Misapprehension

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This one is, surprisingly, on the part of The Wall Street Journal‘s editors. In an otherwise cogent editorial with several sound points regarding former President and Republican Party Presidential candidate Donald Trump’s offers of specially targeted tax cuts, the editors closed with this mistake:

Mr Trump is now proposing to narrow the base, so [tax] rates will have to be higher.

Not at all. Alternatively, and far more optimally, with a narrower tax base, spending will have to be lower. That’s universal, too. With reduced (tax) revenues for any reason, spending would need to be lower. With current government spending, in fact, even with flat revenues, spending badly wants reduction.

It seems the august editors have lost sight of the cause of our nation’s deficits and debt, the cause extant throughout our history.

Tax Deductions

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Progressive-Democrat Vice President and Party Presidential candidate Kamala Harris wants to expand the start-up business tax deduction from $5,000 to $50,000 [sic].

However, in typical Party duplicitous fashion, she gives with one hand and takes away far more with the other. She wants to raise taxes on us citizens and our businesses so much that that deduction increase would disappear in the flood.

  • Increase the corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%
  • Increase the corporate alternative minimum tax introduced in the Inflation Reduction Act from 15% to 21%
  • Quadruple the stock buyback tax implemented in the Inflation Reduction Act from 1% to 4%
  • Make permanent the excess business loss limitation for pass-through businesses
  • Further limit the deductibility of employee compensation under Section 162(m) [currently limiting public companies’ tax deduction for compensation of covered executives to $1 million per individual]
  • Increase the global intangible low-taxed income tax rate from 10.5% to 21%, calculate the tax on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, and revise related rules
  • Repeal the reduced tax rate on foreign-derived intangible income

How about cutting out the intrinsic contradictions of deductions here and tax rate increases there to pay for them? How about, instead, simply lowering tax rates across the board—begin, say, with a rate reduction equal in effect to the sum of all the subsidies and credits—Harris’ latest small business “deduction,” for instance and both Harris’ and Trump’s child tax credit, along with the myriad welfare subsidies?

Let the resultant vast growth in activity in the private economy pay for the tax rate decrease. The Jack Kennedy large tax rate deduction, the Reagan nearly as large tax rate reduction, and the Trump tax cuts all led to economic expansion that produced a net increase in revenues to the Federal government—all those cuts were paid for by the responding expanded economic activity.

But Progressive-Democrats are incapable even of saying the words “tax rate reduction.”

Mistaken “Tradition”

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It is a Federal Reserve “tradition” to not adjust its benchmark interest rates in the final months before an election.

The Federal Reserve has historically left interest rates alone in the months before a presidential election. …
Since 1990 the Fed has cut rates in the final two months of a presidential campaign only three times. Each case shows why rate cutting in the homestretch of the political season is exceptional.

Call it two elections, since two of those three cuts occurred during the same election end game. Still, in these 34 years there are nine Presidential elections. Twice in nine opportunities works out to be a skosh under a quarter of the time, or a skosh over a fifth, depending on one’s perspective. That’s a pretty weak tradition.

More important is this remark by then-Dallas Fed chief Robert McTeer:

[W]e’re within a month of the election…it was conventional wisdom we weren’t supposed to act so close to an election.

Except that a decision to not act is an action itself, and choosing not to act on interest rates when the situation otherwise calls for action has its own influence on an upcoming election.

The Fed should make its interest rate moves when the economic environment says it should, regardless of the politics of the moment. Otherwise, the Fed isn’t acting independently on economics, as its DOC requires it to do, but in active response to politics.

Fed Rate Cut

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The Federal Reserve is at a fork in the road, and a great American philosopher once said that, having arrived at one, it’s necessary to take it. Unfortunately, the Fed is at the wrong fork, so no matter what it does, it’ll be in the longer term counterproductive, even if it’ll near-term benefit stock or bond traders, depending on which fork it takes.

The fork: cut rates tomorrow by a quarter point or a half. Greg Ip favors the latter, without recognizing where the Fed, or he, is.

The case for a bigger cut starts by examining why the Fed’s short-term rate target is now 5.25% to 5.5%, the highest since 2001. The Fed pushed it there last summer because underlying inflation was well above 3% and, with the labor market overheated, the Fed was afraid it would get stuck there. It was willing to cause a recession to prevent that.
Fast forward to today, and some key underlying measures of inflation are below 3%, some within range of the Fed’s 2% target. The labor market is cool, if not actually cold. A recession now serves no useful purpose.

The Fed’s rationalization for boosting its benchmark to 5.25% to 5.5% ignores the fact that ever since the dotcom panic and especially the Panic of 2008, the Fed has artificially suppressed interest rates—all the way to nearly 0% after the Panic, only allowing them to rise slightly off that low. It’s been only in the last couple of years that the Fed has raised its benchmark to its current level. For all of those 20+ years, including the last couple, the Fed has ignored market forces regarding the cost of money (interest rates lenders charge businesses in the latter’s quest for operating capital and capital for other uses) and continued to try to manipulate those forces.

That’s entirely appropriate when our economy is in extremis, as it was immediately after the dotcom bust and again in late 2008 through early 2009. After those two brief periods, though, with those suppressed interest rates, our economy was denied its normal rapid recoveries, with declining real wages, slow growth, and high unemployment that only slowly recovered to pre-Panic (much less to pre-Wuhan Virus Situation) levels. Those re-Wuhan Virus Situation levels, in fact, were the first time our economy was growing soundly, with increasing real wages, even a narrowing wealth gap, since that prior bust.

The fork the Fed should be taking is the decision whether to lower its benchmark rates at all or to stand pat.

With the Fed saying that its target inflation rate is nearly reached (I argue that the difference between current inflation and those 2% is just the noise of normal market fluctuation), it’s time for the Fed to say further that it’s going to leave its benchmarks in their current 5.25%-5.5% range, that it’s going to leave its benchmarks there for the foreseeable future, and that it’s then going to sit down and be quiet.

The current benchmark levels are historically consistent with 2% inflation, albeit it’s a noisy relationship. That noisiness, though, is the normal operation of an open and free market, and it’s time for this instrument of the Federal government to get out of the way of our open and free market. Inflation will bounce around in a range, and interest rates, if left alone, will bounce around commensurately as the two, along with other forces in the market, all work to correct each other back to this rough level.