Tariffs and Economic Disaster

There has been, so far, no economic disaster. In fact, Gerald Baker, in his Monday Wall Street Journal op-ed, put his finger on the longer term outcome of tariffs insofar as they lead to a decrease in the globalization of trade. Here’s his penultimate paragraph:

What difference does it make? An important one: If we see deglobalization not as a catastrophic act of self-harm but as a choice—even a rational one—we can position ourselves better to deal with its consequences. We know the costs of throwing sand in the gears of frictionless trade, but there are opportunities too: more-secure supply chains, a chance to nurture high-end domestic manufacturing and reduce our financial dependency on the rest of the world, and new attention to reducing the vast economic inequalities in the U.S. that globalization, with its incalculable rewards for the most advantaged, has exacerbated.

That’s on the right track. Also needed, though, is [ahem] some necessary parallel actions:

requirement that the “protected” industry companies use the large majority (60%-75%, say, just to have a starting point for discussion) of the increased revenues accruing from the increased sales at their immediately pre-tariff prices to achieve the following:

 

    • increase market share via their largely unchanged price
    • increase spending on innovation
    • increase spending on capital plant maintenance, improvement, and expansion
    • increase spending on line worker wages
    • increase spending on line worker hiring

And one more fillip: a hard expiration date of the protectionist tariff, in the range of 5-10 years, that cannot be extended except by Congressionally enacted statute.

Occupying Gaza

Israel has developed a plan to do this as a necessary step to finally destroying Hamas. Israel had done that some decades ago, but it was an incomplete occupation, and so it ultimately was a failure. One of the reasons for the failure  was that Israel intended only on controlling Gaza with no intent to destroy Hamas, hence it was an incomplete occupation.

The current plan has that as the goal and purpose of the planned occupation. I think the plan could work and not even be very long-term, if a couple of additional factors are included (and I have no idea whether they are or are not).

The IDF would need to completely isolate Gaza along its borders and seacoast to keep the terrorists from escaping out the sides and back. If they can do that, then occupying successively seized territory, whether contiguously seized or in separate chunks as the tactics and real-time situation require, then the Israel wouldn’t need to maintain the occupation of all of Gaza for any longer than it would take to satisfy themselves that all the arms and supply caches have been seized, the tunnels plugged, and Hamas functionally exterminated rather than leaked away.

The other factor is the formation of an Abraham Accord collection of Arab states plus Egypt that would emplace a governance function in Gaza. At that point, Israel could withdraw from the strip.