Venture Capital

The Department of Energy’s Loan Guarantee Program—its green energy loan program—is a money loser, according to the GAO.

The Government Accountability Office says the DOE’s oft-touted $28 billion loan program will cost taxpayers $2.21 billion over the lifetime of the loans. Not only that, the costs to taxpayers for green loans has risen about $500 million as “the result of loan guarantee defaults” from companies like Solyndra and Abound Solar.

That’s not bad by itself; the sorts of projects and companies being loaned to via this, essentially, venture funding program are high risk, losses are normal, and for a venture capital effort to lose money overall isn’t at all unusual.

What makes this particular program and its losses bad, however, is that it’s a government program. True venture capital entities, whether they fund through lending or any other method, are private companies. The participants in a private venture capital enterprise are voluntary participants who know, or have the opportunity to learn, beforehand the risks entailed in such a thing and who commit their own money to the effort.

When government gets involved in venture capitalism, the participants—the taxpayers—are not voluntary, they’re dragooned into the effort by the government’s commitment of those taxpayers’ money; the taxpayers have no opportunity to evaluate, before their money is irrevocably committed, the risks being run; and government is committing OPM to the enterprise, not its own money (indeed, the government has no money of its own to commit; it has only those taxpayers’ money).

Government has no legitimate role in the venture capital market.

Regulation and Inflation

Here’s one example of how regulation drives inflation, in the milieu of corporate CEO compensation. Charles Murray, at AEIdeas, provides it.

On multiple occasions the SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] amended its rules to increase the disclosure of compensation data and to force boards to explain their rationale for the amounts. That, combined with the influence of the arbiters of corporate governance, created an inviolable requirement for compensation committees to be advised by consultants. A perfect recipe for increasing compensation.

Thusly:

In 70’s and even the 80’s the compensation of the CEO seemed to be mostly a matter arrived at between the board and the CEO that resulted from discussions and negotiations and the public disclosure was a matter of a few pages. But there was then nothing like the pressure to conform to best practices backed up by the reliance upon the advice of consultants and the concomitant availability of market data that there is today.
…
You can guess how it works. No board that isn’t about to fire its CEO really wants to admit that their CEO is a less-than-average performer by paying him or her less than average. But if the lowest-paid CEO’s are always being brought up to the average, then the average increases every year. Then for the high performers to be paid well, their compensation needs to be increased, but that raises the average…and so on every year. And the compensation committee and the board always have this market data before them, the recommendations of their consultants and “best practices” to adhere to. These influences are not easily resisted. You see the result.

It’s hard to believe the enormously intelligent regulators didn’t see this coming from the jump. The apparent abuse—that obscene CEO compensation—seems just another excuse to justify their jobs.

Global Trade

Governor and Ambassador, and currently Chairman of the Atlantic Council, Jon Huntsman had some thoughts in a weekend Wall Street Journal.

Expanded exports and open markets were central to our economic-security efforts to reconstruct Europe and Japan and keep lower-income countries free from communism.

Indeed. Such free trade imperatives remain central to freedom, to helping lower-income countries escape despotism generally, and to mutual and widespread prosperity. Huntsman went on:

Whereas today the world economy is replete with far-flung supply chains for manufacturing physical goods, it will be the free flow of designs and ideas that will increasingly constitute the economic linkages of the future.

True enough. The global economy, spurred on by that globalization, is evolving. Actually, the evolution will take a number of unexpected turns and paths, but Huntsman’s guess is as good as any.

But then Huntsman went astray.

….proliferation of empowered megacities and centers of creative innovation will challenge geographic borders, making it hard for capitals to call the shots.

The subhead of Huntsman’s piece emphasizes that basic problem.

Trade will be more important than ever 30 years from now. And a lot more complicated to regulate.

No. It’s not complicated at all to not regulate, and governments don’t need to—shouldn’t—call the shots. It’s not very much more complicated to not regulate very much. A free market doesn’t need very much regulation, and a free market global economy, for all the individual nations’ domestic laws may not be overly free, is the most prosperous global economy. Those who don’t want to play by free market rules when they enter that economy can’t force other nations to trade with them. That’s a free market decision.

Time Warner and Comcast

The merger has gone bust, harassed into being discarded by the FCC and DoJ. The latter, for instance,

…said it had significant concerns that the merger would make Comcast “an unavoidable gatekeeper for Internet-based services that rely on a broadband connection to reach consumers.”

This is an…ironic…concern, given that DoJ’s partner in the merger’s destruction had only recently arrogated that gatekeeper role to itself with its Net “neutrality” rule recently announced.

Unfortunately, with this FCC and this DoJ, we can’t know whether the cancelation of the merger was a good idea or a bad one. And that’s bad for business and bad for American consumers.

Get Off My Lawn

The union looking to organize workers at Boeing’s South Carolina plant has put its plans in a holding pattern, claiming workers are so opposed to signing up that they chased labor leaders off their porches at gunpoint.

Poor babies. That’s private property you’re trespassing on. Get off. Stay off until you have the owner’s permission. How is that so hard to understand? Even by a union hack.

More importantly, though: how did those union hacks get these workers’ home addresses? Who gave up that private information without the workers’ permission?

It also appears the union is making all of this up. The police say they’ve received no reports of any such behavior either in North Charleston, the location of the plant, or in the surrounding areas.

The hacks did go crying to their momma though.

The union filed an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations Board in which it alleged that “two organizers were threatened at gunpoint and others reported hostile and near-violent confrontations,” according to a union press release.

It’ll be interesting to see President Barack Obama’s NLRB make the case that ejecting trespassers from private property is somehow unfair.