A Sort of Start on a Student Loan Fix

Department of Education Secretary Linda McMahon has proposed a series of steps to correct our nation’s student loan miasma.

• mov[e] roughly 1.8 million borrowers into repayment plans and restart collections of loans in default
• in some cases wages would be automatically garnished
• push colleges to be responsible and transparent

That last is especially curious. McMahon does not say how she defines “responsible and transparent,” nor does she say what constitutes her “push,” how hard she will push, or what consequences—concrete, measurable, and publicly accessible—she will apply for noncompliance, or how promptly.

These steps need to be taken, but by themselves they can be only stopgap, and they are wholly inadequate. What’s really necessary is to get the Federal government completely out of the student loan business: no Federal student loan guarantees, no Federal student loan-supporting programs whatsoever.

Because money is fungible, that must include drastically curtailing the range of student grants and scholarships originating from Federal programs. The same reasoning for getting rid of DoEd altogether applies to any sort of Federal involvement in education.

McMahon can do these things from within DoED while she’s setting the stage for Congress’ elimination of the Department (note: not merely defunding the department; eliminate it altogether). However, for the complete solution, Congress needs to act:

• statutorily require colleges and universities to publish the average, median, and range of income at the five years employment mark for their graduates in each of the major fields offered
• statutorily require student loans to be originated by private lenders or colleges and universities
• statutorily require colleges and universities to guarantee at least 50% of each loan granted their students
• statutorily allow current and future student loans to be discharged in “ordinary” bankruptcy proceedings

Only when private lenders and colleges and universities are the only ones with skin in this student loan game will those loans and their borrowers be carefully screened for repayment risk. That will prove optimal for the student borrowers and for us taxpayers.

What Cold War?

The press continues to pretend obliviousness to what’s been going on between the People’s Republic of China and the United States for many years. The headline and second sentence of a recent Wall Street Journal article lays out the sham ignorance quite clearly.

Breakdown in US-China Relations Raises Specter of New Cold War

Today, with economic relations between the two careening off the rails, China and the US are headed toward what could be a Cold War….

The fact is the PRC has been inflicting a cold war on us for 15 or more years, and we’re only just starting to respond to it. For instance,

• The PRC has coerced intellectual property and proprietary technology transfers to PRC businesses and companies as a condition of doing business with them or within the PRC
• The PRC has coerced partnering with PRC-domiciled companies as condition of doing business inside the PRC to facilitate those transfers
• The PRC has demanded placement of party apparatchiks into company management
• The PRC has demanded backdoors be installed into company operating software to allow PRC officials—those apparatchiks or others—to monitor company behavior and to copy data of interest
• outright theft of intellectual property and proprietary technology
• cyber espionage, data theft, sabotage of data, entry into cyber, energy, water network nodes, demonstrations against several of those nodes

Some of those actions the PRC claims to have discontinued or never implemented, but we have only the word of PRC government officials on that, or the word of company managers desperate to have access to the PRC domestic market.

It isn’t credible that the august publishers and news writers and commentators really haven’t recognized this, even as they cite examples from the long standing cold war. The news writer at the above link mentioned a couple in passing:

• data, call logs, and other information it [PRC] gathered from years of intrusions into computer networks at US ports, water utilities, airports, and other targets
• PRC acknowledgment of a series of cyber assaults on US infrastructure

The question, then, is why these members of the press have insisted on turning a blind eye toward this cold war of some duration, “worrying” about it only since President Donald Trump (R) has begun fighting back.

Something is Missing

James Mackintosh had a piece in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal concerning President Donald Trump’s moves to reduce our nation’s trade deficit, particularly our deficit in the goods trade. In his piece, he delineated what he believes must happen in order for the deficit to come down the way Trump wants it to.

Trump’s obsession is the goods deficit—and there are two ways it can come down.
The first is that the overall goods-and-services deficit remains unchanged, but services—about which Trump doesn’t seem to care and in which the US runs a surplus—are sacrificed for manufacturing. … This, though, would need shifts in domestic tax and regulation.
The second way for the goods deficit to shrink is to reduce the overall trade deficit. That will mean less foreign money coming in (remember, the balance has to balance). Combine that with more investment in manufacturing—because imported goods are made less competitive by tariffs—and it will mean America has to provide more of the savings to finance new assembly plants, clean rooms, and sweatshops.

Stipulate Mackintosh is correct. That’s from a purely fiscal perspective, though. Regarding his first way, Trump and the Republicans in Congress are working in that direction, albeit for broader reasons than just changing the trade emphasis on services.

It’s the second way that matters here, and related to that is this: Mackintosh claims to not understand—that no one can understand—Trump’s policy. I claim that there’s more to our national weal than just the fiscal.

It’s a Critical Item that we revive our manufacturing base, including sourcing its critical inputs from ore to components for finished goods to finished goods—not just build more assembly plants. That manufacturing base, too, must include making large goods like automobiles and weapons systems, it must include small-to-tiny goods like medicines, and it must include cheap energy sources to power all the factories we need in our new economy and to fuel those automobiles and weapons systems. Those autos can be powered, sort of, with batteries, but the weapons systems and factories—and the electricity needed to recharge those batteries—need cheap, reliable oil for the weapons systems, and cheap, reliable, always on oil, natural gas, nuclear power, and coal for the power generating systems.

See pre-WWII Japan and WWII Germany for the outcome of depending on other nations, enemy or not, for those Critical Items. That’s what’s missing in Mackintosh’s lack of understanding.

Paying higher prices for restarting and maintaining at least a core manufacturing base that can surge production and expansion in a crisis generated by an enemy nation, which we likely will, is simply part of the price of maintaining a defense establishment capable of answering that crisis on terms favorable to us. It’s the other side of the coin used to pay directly for the development and acquisition of those weapons systems.

It’s just barely possible that this is Trump’s policy goal.

A Start

Thomas Duesterberg, a Hudson Institute Senior Fellow, proposed five steps for our Federal government to take to address the People’s Republic of China’s economy and growing technological prowess. They form the foundation for a good start in countering that nation’s rise against us.

• tighten export controls on technology and expertise related to AI or national defense. …also coordinate export controls with allies on semiconductor production and equipment

This should be expanded to include sourcing the raw materials, intermediate processed components, and finished products of any type from sources outside the PRC.

• work with Congress to limit Chinese access to US financing, with stronger outward investment controls and limited access to listing on American stock exchanges

This should include enforcing existing requirements that any company, foreign or domestic, must meet to be listed on an American exchange. Chief among these are that those listed must subject themselves to stringent American accounting practices and audits. The current requirements vis-à-vis PRC-domiciled companies listed or seeking listing are under discussion with the PRC; however, there is nothing to discuss here: either those companies satisfy, or they must be delisted or cannot be listed in the first place.

• impose sanctions on Chinese banks. Washington has largely not pursued them, though reporting indicates Chinese banks have facilitated and financed illicit commerce such as technology transfer to Russia, drug trafficking, and money-laundering, as well as the purchase of sanctioned Iranian and Russian oil

• show Chinese tech companies reciprocity. China effectively bars most American firms from its markets by either forbidding them or making entry contingent on ridiculous requirements, such as revealing source code. Washington should bar firms tit-for-tat, especially in response to intellectual property transfers demands from China

Not tit-for-tat, as that would work in both directions: were the PRC to reduce or drop those restrictions, we would then need reciprocate. The mistakes here are two: one is that the PRC cannot be trusted to stop its parallel…sub rosa…thefts of our companies’ source code, intellectual property, technologies. The second mistake is that we should be doing no economic business with the PRC in the first place.

• enlist allies in the fight. The administration has competing foreign-policy priorities, but limiting China’s ability to compensate for losing the US market would measurably enhance success

President Donald Trump’s (R) protectionist tariffs against friends and allies and others work at cross purposes with his foreign policy tariffs against the PRC (and against Russia, Iran, and northern Korea, albeit for these three the moves primarily are sanctions). Leaving aside the broader counterproductive nature of protectionism, such tariffs are counterproductive by reducing or eliminating the targeted nations’ incentive to work with us against the PRC, even with the PRC’s inimical practical and operational moves toward those friends and allies, and others.

In fine, more is needed for Duesterberg’s proposals. The PRC is an avowed—by it—enemy nation, committed to overcoming us economically, militarily, and so politically. The sort of steps proposed by Duesterberg need to be broadened in reach to address the entirety of the PRC economy, which would directly limit that nation’s military growth and improvement as well as its technology growth and improvement, which would indirectly limit its military. That, in turn, would limit its ability to overcome us politically.

There is, though, only so much our government can do by itself. Our private enterprises, small, medium, large, and international, need also to recognize the enmity the PRC has toward us and to recognize how much their own interactions with the PRC and with PRC-domiciled companies facilitate the PRC’s effort to dominate us. They need to move apace in withdrawing from those interactions and find non-PRC related sources for their production, from ores to processed ores to components for assembly to finished products. They need also to stop aiding and abetting the PRC through helping it develop its own technology base.

Yet Another Thought

President Donald Trump’s (R) moves against regulations regarding our showerheads, dishwashers, stoves and ranges, and other household appliances has triggered a thought in me regarding regulation and Congressional delegation.

As we all know, Congress has delegated rule-making to the Executive Branch agencies and Departments, and many of us think Congress has over-delegated. Congressmen have shown themselves loath to wholesale claw back that delegation and write their own regulations to give concrete effect to Congress’ statutes. Here’s an easier move Congress could make regarding that delegation and rule-making.

Let the agencies and Departments conduct their rule-making in the current way, with the requirement for a comment period, the regulators required to take seriously the public’s comments during that period, and the writing of the “final” rule. The added steps are these, and they are few:

1. The agency/Department is barred from implementing the rule at any time in draft form, including via “guidance” letter, before it takes formal, legal effect
2. When the agency/Department has finalized its rule, it must submit the rule to Congress for approval
3. Each house of Congress must approve the rule via floor debate and majority vote—this is the step that gives the rule legal effect, not agency/Department finalization
4. Each house of Congress must approve the rule within 10 calendar days of its submittal to Congress
5. If both houses do not approve the rule within 10 calendar days, the rule is deemed disapproved, and it cannot take effect
6. If the rule is disapproved, whether by overt disapproval or by failure to approve within 10 days, the rule and no rule similar to it can be brought up again for six years

That last rule is especially important: it allows for the possibility of a complete turnover of the House of Representatives three times, it allows for the possibility of a complete turnover of the Senate, and it allows for the possibility of a complete turnover of the White House and, by extension, of the leadership of those agencies and Departments.

NB: I posted the gist of this to DOGE’s Regulations.gov, which is DOGE’s call for, and Web site for receiving, suggestions for rule changes and rescission by us ordinary Americans.

Because when I got to the head of the line, they were all out of humility, so I made up for it with an extra helping of hubris.