Too Big to Handle

I’ve written before about the morality of government welfare as a first resort.  Here’s a practical reason for cutting back: it’s too big to manage effectively.  Here are some failures from that too big to handle:

A postal worker who ran marathons found her race times improved after she began drawing federal disability checks for an alleged back injury.

Another disabled federal employee went scuba diving, skied in Switzerland and did flips on a trapeze.  She spent part of her $193,000 in disability payments on a boat named “Free Ride” before she was caught.

A Justice Department lawyer collected $90,000 in annual disability checks after claiming the stress of his job kept him off the job.  Apparently the cable TV show he began hosting while drawing disability pay wasn’t so stressful.

And

15,000 recipients are 66 or older.  Six of them are over the age of 100—well past retirement age.

The Federal government compounds this by being disinterested in controlling the failures and the resulting waste of taxpayer wealth being redistributed.

funding for all agencies—about $3 billion per year—is automatically appropriated and run through the Department of Labor.

And

the federal [disability] program does not require employing agencies to order a second opinion. The claimant can pick his own doctor.

If his claim is rejected, he can file for a different disability, as often as he likes.

And

The Department of Labor, which administers FECA for 70 federal entities, doesn’t track fraud referrals and convictions[.]

The program is too large to be properly controlled, and it needs drastic paring back for economic and legal reasons as well as moral.

A Whistleblower

I offered this first as a comment to a Spiegel Online article.  Here it is with slight modifications to support its stand-alone status here.

Edward Snowden, of Verizon metadata and PRISM outing fame, thinks of himself as a whistleblower, and so do many who agree with him that the US’ PRISM program and its program for collecting metadata from cellphone providers are terribly wrong programs.

I agree that the programs are anathema to individual liberty.  However, the programs are legal under US law.  The only question here is whether the programs’ limits and checks are being honored–and that’s a matter of trust, since the programs and its procedures are secret.  That secrecy and the need for that blind trust in Government (not just the Obama administration, but any Government) form a large part of my dismay over the programs.

However, the programs’ legality mean Snowden cannot be a whistleblower; he’s simply a man who has illegally revealed classified data to the public.

What about civil disobedience, then?  Is he practicing this honorable means of protest of a government behavior to which he objects?

There are many legal avenues of calling legitimate attention to these flawed programs, including, for instance, any of the several formal whistleblower and Inspector General facilities to which he could have taken his case.  Given the damage already done by these programs (stipulating arguendo that damage to individual liberty has been done) any additional damage done through the delays of going through these legitimate programs would have been quite trivial.  Yet Snowden eschewed these programs and went directly public.  From within a foreign country.

Were this an act of civil disobedience, it would have had to satisfy two criteria: he would have had first to exhaust his legal remedies.  As I noted, he chose not to do so.

Secondly, he would have to have been willing to face the consequences of his actions.  It is, after all, those consequences and their absurdity in the face of the disobedience and the thing over which the disobedience is occurring that give force and credibility to the disobedience.  Snowden’s reason for being in Hong Kong, as stated by him, is to avoid facing those consequences.

If Snowden truly believes that what he has done is just, he must return to the US and face the outcomes of his actions in open court.  Let him make his case in front of the American people (where he’ll find no small measure of support) and convince our representatives in that court case–the jury of his peers–that his act was justified.

Of course he risks not being supported by our representatives, that jury, as there also are a large number of Americans who disagree with what he has done.

Snowden’s flight and so far refusal to return indicates he’s unwilling to take that risk, that he does not have the courage of his convictions.  In that case, Snowden did not commit an act of civil disobedience; he is simply a small man who is placing his ego above justice.

Another Overt Harassment

This is just starting to come out, even though it occurred in early April.  The Examiner is reporting that Tom Francois got a visit from President Barack Obama’s Secret Service.  Francois had been a cabinet maker of some duration and skill until the Panic of 2008 did his business in.  Since, he’s been an active critic of the Obama administration via various social media.

From his critiques, the Secret Service paid him a visit, followed by a visit to his daughter and to his ex-wife.  They also demanded to see his weapons and threatened to confiscate them if he “stepped over the line.”

Had he crossed that line yet?  No, according to the agents.  Then why are you visiting me?  [mumble]

The agents justified their…visit…on the basis of the Twitter following Francois has accumulated, and “the things I said could be acted upon by some nut case out there.”  Sure.

The agents also pulled out an image of Air Force One and asked Francois whether he had posted that image.  Francois wanted to know where the rest of the image was along with his copyright mark, since he always signs his work and asserts his copyright when he posts it.  The agents had no answer.

Here’s the offending image, below the added post-visit caption:

Keep in mind that this April visit occurred before the IRS and DoJ had been caught harassing large numbers of Americans and American groups who disagree with Obama and his administration.

Hmm….

Progressive Government Run Amok

In no particular order, we’ve had in just the last few months the following:

1.  The State Department leaving Benghazi consulate personnel to die, with too little security and no effort to help real-time; a President who absented himself from the situation in favor of a political campaign; and subsequent lies and cover-ups by both about events surrounding that.

2.  The Department of Justice targeting our free press and individual members of it in order to suppress reporting of the secret doings of our government.

3.  The Internal Revenue Service targeting American conservatives.  The low-level IRS staffers now are testifying before the House that they weren’t just ordered to target those who disagreed with the present administration, they were given the specific subjects and questions to be used and to forward specific cases to their bosses for further “treatment.”

And there’s this little IRS gem:

On May 23, Michigan Senator Carl Levin (D, MI) dropped the bombshell that his subcommittee has been in constant contact with the overseers of the IRS political-targeting scandal since it started, and even discussed the applications of “certain” specific groups.

4.  The secret metadata collection program, consisting of the gathering up of the phone calling records of millions of Americans who use Verizon (and presumably of the other American phone companies, also; we don’t know yet because the whole thing is…secret).

5.  The reading of all of our emails, text messages, video down/uploads, and so on via the Internet through another secret program, this one called PRISM.

6.  The government justifying the spying on Americans by claiming it to be a

critical tool in protecting the nation from terror threats.

And

The information “allows counterterrorism personnel to discover whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, particularly people located inside the United States,” a senior Obama administration official said Thursday.

This in light of the fact that DHS has already labelled (deliberately and overtly, early on) American military veterans and those who oppose the Obama administration as extremists and threats.  Thus, it’s important to note that the information, as broadly swept up as it is, also allows a Progressive government to surveill known or suspected persons who disagree with the government’s policies and to hinder their activities.

Some Thoughts on the PRISM “Fact Sheet”

DNI James Clapper, over the weekend, declassified and released a Fact Sheet on the just revealed PRISM project.  PRISM is represented as an internal government IT program whose purpose is to gather

foreign intelligence information from electronic communication service providers under court supervision, as authorized by Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act….

under which

All such information is obtained with FISA Court approval and with the knowledge of the provider based upon a written directive from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.  In short, Section 702 facilitates the targeted acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning foreign targets located outside the United States under court oversight.

As some might expect, I have some thoughts on the program as described in the Sheet.

The Fact Sheet first addressed in general terms the collections themselves.

The “provider” (Yahoo!, Facebook, et al.) is required to provide the data, but the source of the requirement is confusing to me.  FISA Court approval (I’ll elide how we know, given the secrecy of the Court and associated proceedings, that the Court approved, or under what parameters), but direction of the AG and the DNI, is my point of confusion here: is the requirement a Court order requested by the AG/DNI, or is it an order by the AG/DNI that is merely sanctioned by the Court?  In the open world of police work and prosecuting attorneys, neither the police nor the prosecutor can direct a man to submit to a search that has been sanctioned by a court.  The search has to be pursuant to a warrant explicitly issued by the court, albeit in response to request for one by the police/prosecutor—and supported by a showing of probable cause.

Next, must the AG and the DNI jointly request/order delivery of the information, or can either do this?

On the matter of targeting (there’s that term…) individuals:

The Government cannot target anyone under the court-approved procedures…unless there is an appropriate, and documented, foreign intelligence purpose for the acquisition (such as for the prevention of terrorism, hostile cyber activities, or nuclear proliferation) and the foreign target is reasonably believed to be outside the United States.

What level of proof must be offered the FISA Court to support an allegation of a foreign intelligence purpose?  Just the bald claim?  Probable cause (which must underlie that other search warrant)?  Some other standard?

Next, what is the definition of “reasonably believed?”

On the matter of oversight:

[T]he notion that…activities are not subject to internal and external oversight is similarly incorrect. Collection of intelligence information…is subject to an extensive oversight regime, incorporating reviews by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.

How do we know the degree or efficacy of the oversight?  It’s secret.  Note, though, that the dishonesty of the present administration only emphasizes this concern.  It’s government secrecy here that raises the question, not Obama “transparency.”

The Fact Sheet then moved on to the FISA Courts.

All FISA collection…is overseen and monitored by the F ISA Court, a specially established Federal court comprised of 11 Federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States.

It’s a Federal court whose judges are not vetted and approved by the Senate, as Constitutionally provided.  They seem, then, not to be Article III judges.  How, then can they be Federal judges?

No risks here.

On “targeting” approvals:

The FISC [FISA Court] must approve targeting and minimization procedures…prior to the acquisition of any surveillance information.

How do we know the limits are being honored?  It’s a secret process.

On those minimization procedures:

Minimization procedures [require that] the dissemination of information about US persons is expressly prohibited unless it is necessary to understand foreign intelligence or assess its importance, is evidence of a crime, or indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm.

Whose judgment of necessity?  Is the FISA Court involved in this subsequent determination, or are these judgments left to the Intelligence community?

The Fact Sheet then moved to the other government branches’ involvement.

On Congress’ involvement:

The DNI and AG provide exhaustive semiannual reports assessing compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures.

How do we know the reports are truthful?  The underlying data are classified.  Moreover, given the blatant stonewalling of this administration concerning the provision of data and testimony concerning the IRS, Fast and Furious, the free press attacks, the Benghazi disaster, and so on, on what basis do we conclude the underlying data would be available to a classified Congressional hearing in a timely manner?  Note that the stonewalling of the present administration only emphasizes this concern.  It’s government secrecy here that raises the question, not Obama “transparency.”

On the Executive Branch leadership involvement:

The Executive Branch, including through its independent Inspectors General, carries out extensive oversight…which includes regular on-site reviews of how…authorities are being implemented.

We’ve seen the…effectiveness…of two of the Executive Branch’s Inspectors General: State’s vis-à-vis Benghazi and Treasury’s vis-à-vis the IRS.  Moreover, on what basis do we believe that IG reports on a classified operation or series of operations will be readily available, even to a classified Congressional hearing?

The Fact Sheet concluded with a short series of claimed successes under PRISM (without providing any substantiation for the claims).  Suppose, though, the claims are true.  See this for some thoughts on surveillance vs freedom.

In the end, though, it comes down to trust, since some activities must be carried out at the expense of individual liberty—those search warrants, for instance—and some activities must be done in secret in order to avoid tipping off the enemy.

Trust is a terrible thing to have wasted.