Tag Archives: freedom

Pause for Commercial

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My book, A Conservative’s Manifesto: A Brief Discussion of some Principles, has been published, and it can be found, among other places, at Amazon.com (paperback, Kindle, or hardcover) and at Barnes & Noble (paperback, Nook, or hardcover). Links also can be found nearby in the column to the right and on the newly added Books page.

The book lays out, in so many words, a set of (modern) Conservative principles that are tied back to the 18th Century Liberal principles that guided our Founding Fathers in developing our American social compact.  I begin with a description of those 18th Century Liberal principles and continue with a description of our drift away from them over the last 80 years, beginning with FDR’s administration.  I also describe a modern Conservatism that is those 18th Century Liberal principles brought forward to today, and I apply those principles to a number of critical aspects of American life: faith, citizenship, the nation, our economy, and our government.  I close by contrasting modern Liberal/Progressive concepts with these modern Conservative concepts and offering a path back to those modern Conservative tenets that made our country so exceptional and so great.

I hope you find it both enjoyable and useful.

A Risk to Federalism

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It always starts from the best of intentions.  The Senate is unhappy with the lack of uniformity of driving laws governing teenage drivers across the States, so it wants to impose national standards.  Specifically, the Senate wants to use a two-year, $109 billion highway bill currently under consideration as the, umm, vehicle for imposing national standards for teenager cell phone use while driving and for teenage driver licensing requirements, among others.  The thinking seems to be that the Feds got away with this concerning minimum drinking ages, so they can do it again in this area.

But the Feds didn’t, entirely, get away with it concerning drinking ages.  In South Dakota v. Dole, the case concerning the imposition of a national minimum drinking age, the Supreme Court ruled (not entirely correctly) that

[T]he relatively small financial inducement offered by Congress here – resulting from the State’s loss of only 5% of federal funds otherwise obtainable under certain highway grant programs – is not so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.

Thus, to comply with the Court’s ruling, the Senate’s use of the spending bill—or any other means—to obtain State acquiescence with the Feds’ national standard must be done carefully.

I claimed above that the Court got Dole only partially right.  Under the Federalism structure of our nation, the Federal government cannot (not just may not) force the States, individually or as a group, to do very much at all.  This is clear from Article I, Section 8; Article I, Section 10 [sic]; and the 9th and 10th Amendments.  Mandating national standards for matters that are internal to the States (vis., the rules by which a State’s citizens might drink, or drive, or etc. within that State) is prohibited by our Constitution.  The Court plainly understood this with its Dole ruling.

However.

The Court’s understanding falls short, as demonstrated by that phrase pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.  It waffled on where to draw that line.  It had to waffle, because that line cannot be drawn.  It is the nature and purpose of “pressure” to get the target of the pressure to comply.  The first iota of pressure has as much compulsory content as the last iota that pushes to total over that line to a compulsion that even a Supreme Court can recognize.

The President can use his bully pulpit quite legitimately—and Presidents often do, beginning with Teddy Roosevelt—to jawbone with his target audience to get this or that issue handled “his way.”  So can the Senate, or the House, or the Congress as a whole.  There is, though, a not very fine line between remonstrating, on the one hand, and forcing (or “pressuring” for) compliance—compulsion—on the other.  Putting such jawboning into legislation goes far beyond mere argument and becomes an attempt at compulsion, albeit with a cotton glove.

The greater risk is not to our teenagers, or fellow travellers, from their driving habits, but to the Federal nature of our nation from a central government imposing uniformity on things that properly are within the…province…of our States.  That greater risk includes the risk to our teenagers’ welfare.

On the other hand, this might be a fine opportunity for the States to set a powerful precedent.   This might be the place for the States to start saying, “Done and done.  Keep your Federal highway dollars.  We no longer wish to have your Federal hands in our State pockets.”

Freedom, Competition, and Education

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It seems that Georgia wants to improve its educational system, but those wedded to the status quo like the way things are and are trying to block the improvement.

Under current law, local school boards have veto authority over whether charter schools could be licensed in their districts.  That’s like letting existing neighborhood grocery stores decide whether or not a new grocer could set up business in their neighborhood.  Predictably, the school boards routinely rejected charter school applications.  In response, the state created the Georgia Charter Schools Commission, and that body began approving charter schools over the local boards’ objections.  The state’s Supreme Court ruled that illegal, and in turn, the state legislature now is debating an amendment to the state’s Constitution that would allow the state to create its own K-12 system, parallel to the local systems, and using the same pool of Georgia taxpayer funds that the public school systems use.  This will be, essentially, the GCSC process written into the state’s constitution, if the amendment gets through the legislature and onto the November ballot, and then is voted up by the Georgia voters.

The Professional Association of Georgia Educators objects to this.  Tim Callahan, PAGE’s Director of PR, Membership & Publications, had this to say:

The Georgia Constitution says local boards control where local dollars go, so if a charter school only gets state approval and not local approval, no way can they receive local funds.  They can only receive state funds.  The people who are putting this constitutional amendment on the ballot are trying to do that in our Senate right now—are really trying to do a run-around the Supreme Court ruling.

Let me see if I understand this argument: a constitutional amendment, which by its nature addresses the state Supreme Court’s concerns, is a run-around of the State Supreme Court.  Have I about got his argument surrounded?  How, exactly, does this represent a run-around?

State Congressman Ed Lindsey (R, ATL) offers this response:

Charter schools are part of an overall tool in the tool box for education reform.  It, along with the myriad of other programs, is extremely important in terms of giving parents and students a greater choice in what is the best education for a particular child, and it encourages education achievement and success along the way.  It creates innovation.

It’s come down to this, as Lindsey also points out:

In the education reform battle, often times things boil down to a turf battle, and that’s what we have here.  We have some local school systems that are worried that by virtue of having state charter schools that some of their turf is getting interfered.  But it’s about the children and the choice.  It’s a control issue, and it always has been.

Competition is an excellent means of improving the quality of the children’s education.  One effect of competition is a more efficient allocation of taxpayer money, because if schools aren’t producing quality students, they don’t need to continue collecting that money.  Certainly, it’s in our interest nationally, and in Georgia’s interest and in the interest of the local communities, to have an education system that produces well-educated students capable of critical reasoning, but that interest mandates no particular structure to the system.  Competition will spur the necessary improvements—with a beneficial side effect of that improved funds allocation.  What is there to fear?

On Affirmative Action

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I’ve written before on some of the aspects of affirmative action.  Here are the views of our Attorney General, Eric Holder, on affirmative action.

Affirmative action has been an issue since segregation practices.  The question is not when does it end, but when does it begin … When do people of color truly get the benefits to which they are entitled?

What’s Holder getting at?  On a couple of minor notes, he apparently views benefits as entitlements, rather than things to be earned, at least insofar as “people of color” are concerned.  Moreover, he’s simply ignorant of recent history.  Affirmative action only developed in the 1970s—some 100+ years after emancipation, segregation, and the development of his party’s Jim Crow laws.

He considers that affirmative action must never end—it’s always to be kept in play.  Yet there’s that stigma of affirmative action, whether or not justified: did the individual get the position because he was the best qualified, or because he best filled a political square?  This is fair to “people of color,” how, exactly? Or to “people of no color?”

He exposes a breathtaking blindness to the segregation that is affirmative action.  Groups always will be segregated—and so always actively barred from joining the mainstream—as long as they’re singled out for special treatment, such as affirmative action inflicts.

This is one of the especially corrosive aspects of such policies.

A Ruling on the 2nd Amendment

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US District Judge Benson Everett Legg (Maryland District), in a Monday ruling has said that Maryland residents are not required, as a Marayland had had it, to convince authorities that they have a “good and substantial reason” to own a handgun.

Judge Legg wrote, among other things,

…the Court finds that the right to bear arms is not limited to the home. The signposts left by recent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law all point to the conclusion that Woollard‘s ―claim to self-defense—asserted by him as a law-abiding citizen…—does implicate the Second Amendment, albeit subject to lawful limitations.

He went on [emphasis mine]:

A law that burdens the exercise of an enumerated constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be considered “reasonably adapted” to a government interest, no matter how substantial that interest may be.  Maryland‘s goal of “minimizing the proliferation of handguns among those who do not have a demonstrated need for them,”…is not a permissible method of preventing crime or ensuring public safety; it burdens the right too broadly.  Those who drafted and ratified the Second Amendment surely knew that the right they were enshrining carried a risk of misuse, and states have considerable latitude to channel the exercise of the right in ways that will minimize that risk.  States may not, however, seek to reduce the danger by means of widespread curtailment of the right itself.  “[E]ven the most legitimate goal may not be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner.”

At bottom, this case rests on a simple proposition: If the Government wishes to burden a right guaranteed by the Constitution, it may do so provided that it can show a satisfactory justification and a sufficiently adapted method.  The showing, however, is always the Government‘s to make.  A citizen may not be required to offer a “good and substantial reason” why he should be permitted to exercise his rights.  The right‘s existence is all the reason he needs.

Maryland’s Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Fader, says he’ll appeal, saying “we” disagree, and taking note of the “very important implications of the ruling for public safety.”  He’s wrong, though, on two counts: in the first place, the public safety is maximized by hewing to the Constitution, not by deviating from it.  In the second place, he apparently wasn’t paying attention to the Legg’s ruling:

States may not, however, seek to reduce the danger [of misuse] by means of widespread curtailment of the right itself.

Judge Legg has the right of it.