Two Views of the Saudi Purge in Progress

One is that

the “purge” is not about removing political rivals who threatened MBS’s [Mohammed bin Salman, the newly anointed Crown Prince] position as heir apparent but rather about sending a message to political and economic elites that their entitlement to extreme wealth and privilege, and their impunity, is coming to an end.

Indeed,

With the exception of Minister of the National Guard Prince Mutaib bin Abdallah, the detainee list is made up entirely of individuals who had no capacity to challenge the succession.

The other view is that

Despite his youth and inexperience, he [MBS] has risen rapidly through the ranks, amassing previously unimaginable powers for a single royal. This, and his refusal to govern through consensus—as is customary—has caused deep resentment, jealousy and anger. His most prominent critics and rivals were therefore carted off on corruption charges.

So, maybe a purge after all—but of whom?  Apparently not threats to his political power:

[T]he wider significance of this can only be fully understood in conjunction with events in Israel. The Jewish state is hardly a natural ally for Saudi Arabia, but they have long shared a common enemy: Iran.
…
So the two have been working together: close diplomatic cooperation, intelligence sharing and perhaps more.

And the possibility of an actual alliance may be growing.  The purge, thus, could be a clearing of the decks in anticipation of an Iranian-backed anti-Saudi Arabia program (expanding its Yemen program—recall the Houthi launch of an Iranian-supplied IRBM against Riyadh—supporting another client’s efforts against Saudi Arabia, …) if not an overtly fought military action.

Nor are the two views mutually exclusive, and they could be entirely independent of each other.  Overt dispute with Iran or not, the Saudi economy in the post oil-only economy can prosper only with corruption in government and other high places eliminated or at least greatly reduced.  On the other hand, Iran seems intent on taking over the Middle East, and that has negative implications for both Israel and Saudi Arabia.  With Iran’s view of how to run things, too, the implications would seem to be no less catastrophic for the Saudis, regardless of the degree of corruption.

Overstating the Case

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, on the occasion of his visit to the DMZ separating the Republic of Korea from northern Korea, had this to say, among other things:

North Korean provocations continue to threaten regional and global security….

We shouldn’t be feeding Baby Kim’s ego by puffing up the level of influence northern Korea has on security.  We should stick to “regional security,” and leave off references to “global,” even if the real impact might be global.

A Mistake

Would a partitioned Iraq be a better pawn for Iran?  Or would a freed-up, independent Iraqi Kurdistan serve as a buffer to mitigate Iranian influence in the area—and an impediment to an Iranian road to Damascus and on to Latakia and Tartus on the Mediterranean Sea?  And an impediment to that road, passing as it would, right by Israel via Hezbollah?

An Iraq weakened by the partition would be easy prey for Iran?  No, that’s a wash for the weakened Iraq that’s already in Iranian sway, via all those Shiite “militias” that are funded and armed by Iran’s terror support organ, the Iranian Republican Guards Corps.

Recall two things: one is the Peshmerga and their courage and battlefield skill and tenacity in rescuing Yazidis from a mountain “island” during the initial Daesh barbarians’ rout of the Iraqi “army,” in stopping the barbarians’ rush east into Kurdish Iraq, in helping clear Mosul, and other events and campaigns.

The other thing is that all of this was done without support from Baghdad, done even with active Baghdad obstruction of US arms going to the Kurds so they could better fight the Daesh, who already were armed with American heavy weapons, courtesy of the Iraqi “army” which had abandoned all of that as they abandoned their duty and ran south before the Daesh, like grains of sand on a desert wind.

Now President Donald Trump is professing American neutrality as Baghdad, supported by Iranian forces (those “militia”) and Iranian weapons, moves into territories liberated by the Kurds from the Daesh and seeks to subjugate the Kurds, once again, to Baghdad’s diktat.

We don’t like the fact that they’re clashing.  …  We’re not taking sides.

And: what is the stability in the region before Iran’s advances with Iraq riven by civil war rather than stabilized by a settled Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan?

Where would an Iraqi Kurdistan, or even a subjugated Kurdish region, be regarding its policy toward the US were we to betray them in the present situation, as we betrayed them after the first Gulf War, implying they should revolt against a surviving Saddam Hussein government only to stand by while he gassed them into submission?

And there’s this bit from a Wall Street Journal editorial:

A central tenet of the Trump foreign policy, a work in progress, has been that the US would rebuild its relationship with America’s allies.

Who are the Kurds, if not an American ally?  Who are the Kurds, if not one of the staunchest allies we’ve had?

Shortsighted

President Donald Trump is, IMNSHO, misunderstanding the role of diplomacy in a shooting conflict. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said,

He’s (Trump) not seeking to go to war.  He has made it clear to me to continue my diplomatic efforts…until the first bomb drops.

Of course, war should be a last resort, not a never resort, and Trump understands that.  But to say that diplomacy ends when the shooting starts, is mistaken.  Diplomacy doesn’t only shape the coming battlefield during a prior period of peace and during the runup to the fight.  It also shapes the battlefield during the fight: both directly with its (however minimal) impact on the enemy belligerents, but also on the periphery and the far field surrounding the battlefield through its impact on our allies, our enemy’s allies, and on neutrals.

It’s that diplomacy that affects the fight itself and, at least as importantly, sets the stage for post-fight actions.

Tillerson, again:

Rest assured that the Chinese are not confused in any way what the American policy towards North Korea (is) or what our actions and efforts are directed at[.]

Ongoing diplomacy maintains that clarity, as well as clarity of consequences, during and after the fight, both with our enemy’s allies (the People’s Republic of China in this case) and with our own allies (the Republic of Korea and Japan, for instance), as well as with neutrals like the EU, Vietnam, et al. (and make no mistake: the EU has shown itself neutral in the present matter of northern Korea with its own timidity of action).

Threats

The German government now is stooping to naked threats in an effort to keep President Donald Trump from not renewing certification of Iran’s compliance with ex-President Barack Obama’s (D) Executive Agreement with Iran on the latter’s nuclear weapons program.

The threat begins with the distortion that decertification constitutes withdrawal from the EA—of course it does not, and the members of the German government know that full well.  The threat, though, is made naked by German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel:

It’s imperative that Europe sticks together on this issue.  We also have to tell the Americans that their behavior on the Iran issue will drive us Europeans into a common position with Russia and China against the USA.

If we don’t coddle an enemy, Germany will side with other enemies of ours.

Some friend.  In the event, the denial of certification went through, anyway.

And there is no withdrawal from the JCPOA; although Trump did remind folks that he had the authority to do so, and he warned that if Congress didn’t act, he would.