Tag Archives: courts

Mores and the Patent and Trademark Office

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The Supreme Court has taken up the case of Iancu v Brunetti and heard oral arguments Monday.  Erik Brunetti wanted a copyright on the label for a clothing line of his that he’d named FUCT, an acronym for Friends U Can’t Trust.  Iancu is Andrei Iancu, who is duel-hatted as Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  Wearing that second hat, Iancu and his fellow USPTO bureaucrats said they were scandalized and morally offended, and they denied Brunetti’s copyright application.  The Wall Street Journal, at the link, said

On [last] Monday the Justices will consider whether to broaden First Amendment protection to trademarks that offend moral sensibilities.

More correctly, though, whether the Justices recognize this or not, they’ll be considering whether to protect trademarks that offend the particular sensibilities of a few Government bureaucrats.

What constitutes scandalous is inherently subjective and depends on cultural mores….

This, on the other hand, is overbroad. Again, what constitutes scandalous behavior (what is scandalism?) in Government permitting doesn’t depend on cultural mores so much as it depends on the mores of a few Government bureaucrats and on how those bureaucrats choose to interpret what they personally view as the nation’s cultural mores.

It’ll be instructive if Brunetti doesn’t get a unanimous favorable ruling.

Blue about Blue Slips?

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For a long time—nearly a century, according to Senator Dianne Feinstein (D, CA)—the Senate had a tradition (not a rule) that Senators from the home State of a judicial nominee had to approve that nominee—send forward a “blue slip” before that nominee could be considered, or even sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

The administration of President Donald Trump has tended to disregard that tradition.  In fact, he’s sent seven—according to Feinstein, again—appellate court nominees to the Senate over “the objection of home-state Democrats” and—the horror—gotten them confirmed, including a number to the California-based 9th Circuit.

Feinstein’s latest peeve concerns Ken Lee and Dan Collins, whom Trump has nominated—to the 9th Circuit.  Both Feinstein and her California colleague, Senator Kamala Harris (D) withheld their blue slips for both of these two judges.

Feinstein is pretending to object on the basis of tradition, which itself cynically holds tradition to be inviolate, no matter the circumstances.

Democratic senators have made and continue to make good faith efforts to find consensus picks for the circuit courts.
As Senator Harris and I have made clear, we’ve been willing to work from the start with this president to choose consensus, mainstream nominees to the 9th Circuit….

Except that they have not. These two nominees, along with the other Trump nominees—and confirmations, including to the 9th—are textualists: they hold that the Constitution (and laws) mean what they say; they are not open to reinterpretation according to a judge’s view of the “needs” of society.  It doesn’t get any more mainstream than that. Indeed, any lack of consensus just shows how out of touch with our supreme Law, how out of the mainstream, modern Liberal judges are.

But the fact is, Feinstein and her fellows are not objecting on the basis of tradition.  They’re objecting on the basis of the loss of their ability to dictate who they will permit to be nominated, their ability to avoid open debate on the fitness of a nominee.

We’ve seen, too, the quality of the “faith” with which Feinstein and her fellows have been willing to work from the start with this president on judicial nominees.  These Progressive-Democrats made that clear with their smear campaign on then-Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh.

The blue slip policy is a tradition the Progressive-Democrats have badly abused to the point of its partisan destruction.

Religious Freedom

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Germany doesn’t appear to have the same strong belief in it that Americans (or most of us, anyway) do.  The Federal Labor Court has objected to a Catholic clinic terminating a doctor because he violated Church teachings, specifically, he both divorced and then remarried.

The doctor insisted—successfully, it turns out—that he was fired for being Catholic; colleagues of different faiths could divorce and remarry without consequence.

Never mind that the clinic was Catholic and the Catholic doctor violated the clinic’s Catholic requirements, requirements it could not impose on its non-Catholic employees without imposing on their religious freedom.  The situation illustrates the complexities of religious freedom in the work place, but if this ruling is allowed to stand, it will have serious implications for the employability of persons whose religious faith—or agnosticism or atheism—is different from the employer’s religious tenets—or agnosticism or atheism.

Privacy in a Technological World

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In a ruling rejecting an application for a search warrant, Magistrate Judge Kandis Westmore, operating in the Northern District of California, had this remark in particular.

Citizens do not contemplate waiving their civil rights when using new technology, and the Supreme Court has concluded that, to find otherwise, would leave individuals “at the mercy of advancing technology.”

Encouragingly, this remark also cited (via the quote in the remark above) a Supreme Court ruling, Carpenter v United States [citations omitted]:

We have kept this attention to Founding-era under-standings in mind when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools.  As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to “assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” For that reason, we rejected in Kyllo a “mechanical interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment and held that use of a thermal imager to detect heat radiating from the side of the defendant’s home was a search. Because any other conclusion would leave homeowners “at the mercy of advancing technology,” we determined that the Government—absent a warrant—could not capitalize on such new sense-enhancing technology to explore what was happening within the home.

The Founders wrote our Constitution to be technology agnostic, and in fact there is no mention of technology qua technology in it.

Westmore’s ruling can be read here. Carpenter can be read here (it’s long).

A Magistrate Judge Gets One Right

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Of course, the Magistrate Judge Kandis Westmore’s ruling can be overturned on appeal by a District judge in the Northern District of California in which she operates, or on appeal on the ruling’s way up the appellate chain.  Nevertheless, her ruling stands, for now.

In its essence Westmore ruled that, even with an otherwise valid search warrant, a person cannot be compelled to unlock a digital device like a cell phone with that person’s biometrics—a fingerprint, a face, or an iris, for example.

There was a technicality that itself would have invalidated the warrant: it was overbroad.  It requested authority to unlock and search any device found inside the otherwise legally searched premises, including those owned or controlled by anyone happening to be present at the time of the search, and Westmore found that request to be neither limited to a particular person nor a particular device as the 4th Amendment requires.  That’s a 4th Amendment failure of the warrant.

The larger principle, though, flows from a 5th Amendment bar against forced self-incrimination violation. Westmore ruled that biometrics, when used in the context of a search—vis., to unlock a personal digital device—is no different from a personal passcode, and personal passcodes have already been ruled inaccessible to the government, even with a search warrant.  That would be forced testimony against oneself.  The owner of the device must voluntarily give up the passcode, and he cannot be “compelled” to volunteer [citations omitted].

The Court finds that utilizing a biometric feature to unlock an electronic device is not akin to submitting to fingerprinting or a DNA swab, because it differs in two fundamental ways. …the Government concedes that a finger, thumb, or other biometric feature may be used to unlock a device in lieu of a passcode. In this context, biometric features serve the same purpose of a passcode, which is to secure the owner’s content, pragmatically rendering them functionally equivalent.
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It follows…that if a person cannot be compelled to provide a passcode because it is a testimonial communication, a person cannot be compelled to provide one’s finger, thumb, iris, face, or other biometric feature to unlock that same device.

And especially this, as I’ve argued elsewhere.

That the Government may never be able to access the complete contents of a digital device, does not affect the analysis.

Government convenience must never be allowed to override the individual liberty of an American.

In the end,

The Government may not compel or otherwise utilize fingers, thumbs, facial recognition, optical/iris, or any other biometric feature to unlock electronic devices.

It matters when, and why, biometrics are used.  The outcome here, should it survive appeal, is a stout blow in favor of individual privacy and a firm limit on Government’s authority to invade an American’s person[], houses, papers, and effects.

The magistrate judge’s ruling can be read here.