Category Archives: foreign policy

Deterrence and Responses

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Russian President Vladimir Putin can destroy NATO with a simple move, goes the intro. The simple move would be a minor incursion into Poland, perhaps, or seize some Baltic Sea islands, or (my own speculation) enter Lithuania from the Suwalki Corridor in a claimed need to widen it and then watch the NATO nations dither and not respond, which would demonstrate to the world, to Putin, and to those NATO member nations just how worthless and timid and uninterested in defending each other, much less themselves individually, the alliance is. Which is what President Donald Trump (R) has been complaining about and why he’s been prodding, even provoking, those nations to do more for their own defense.

On the other hand, those member nations could promptly and in useful coordination act to defeat the incursion, taking prisoners, inflicting casualties, and driving the remainder back out of the invaded (because that’s what it would be, never minding the timid euphemism that is “incursion”) nation. That would provide a measure of deterrence, but only in a tit-for-tat sort of way. We and our NATO fellows should have learned as long ago as our Vietnam War that tit-for-tat only leaves the door open for another try later on, with greater friendly casualties—and as the present barbarian case in Ukraine is demonstrating, increased civilian casualties.

There is another response, though, that would act to strengthen both deterrence and the durability of deterrence. That move would be simultaneously to defeat the invasion and to attack some key fuel and energy targets, complementary to Ukraine’s extant targeting, inside Russia. And, while that’s in progress, for the governments of the UK, France, and the United States jointly and publicly to point out to Putin that NATO has nuclear weapons, also.

Gerald Baker, in his article at the link, at first considered that with Russia’s military-in-being and economy so badly diminished by the barbarian’s war on Ukraine, a Putin incursion would be unlikely. Baker reported hearing rumors, though, that Putin actually is contemplating such a move.

I don’t think that’s so outlandish, and haven’t thought so from the jump (yeah, yeah, yay me). Putin’s armies don’t have to be up to snuff, neither does his economy. Especially his armies, but also his economy, only have to be better than what NATO has to offer in counter, and NATO’s relative weakness is the current situation. And: Putin has an additional critical advantage here: he has the political will to act; nor NATO nor national leadership has any such will.

That puts a premium on that third response option. And the lack of it would demonstrate the toothless nature of the NATO kitten, even were it to make the second response.

An Insight into Agility

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NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte isn’t stupid. He’s worried about how to absorb the increased military spending that some NATO members finally are doing and turning that money into modern hardware and men and women trained to employ them in combat.

He’s adept at a particular style of politics—that of sycophancy toward President Donald Trump (R), referring as he does to NATO’s increased spending as the “Trump Trillion.” That’s nothing but a recognition that it took Trump’s hard words and mean tweets to prod the nations into actually increasing their defense spending instead of perennially yapping about it.

Importantly, he stated out loud a critical insight into modern military preparedness. Regarding lessons available to be learned from Russia’s war on Ukraine, he had this, using drones as his example:

It’s not about producing drones, but having the production capacity to produce drones because the technology itself is constantly adapting and is changing every two or three weeks.

That production agility doesn’t only apply to drones or to weapons and weapons systems, though. It also applies to tactics, to campaign strategies, and to soldier, sailor, and airman training.

It requires, too, the political stones to support those agilities. And that requires NATO’s member nations to understand that parochiality inhibits, possibly fatally, any chance for success in any war against an experienced NATO enemy.

Countries seeking to protect domestic companies are…duplicating efforts, such as building too many different types of armored vehicles. That kind of fragmentation is inefficient. It also means less cash for things such as air defense and deep-strike missiles.
Large systems that need to integrate armed forces across the continent, like intelligence, communications, and reconnaissance capabilities, could also be at risk of losing out.

It also leads to the outright failure of nominally agreed joint weapons programs. In the latest case, France, Germany, and Spain spent the last eight years arguing over their defense companies’ priorities for producing a joint fighter, the core pillar of Europe’s largest ⁠defence project. That parochialism led, finally, to complete failure to produce anything.

The leaders of Germany and France have agreed to scrap a landmark project to ​develop and build a new-generation fighter jet, officials said on Monday, bowing to industrial rivalries over Europe’s most ambitious defence programme.

It’s on the military and its political masters alone, though, to develop and deliver the means of protecting the logistic lines of communication. It doesn’t matter how well trained and dedicated are the personnel or how combat capable the equipment if they and the consumables they need—food and fuel—cannot be delivered to the front. Private enterprise can’t build any of that without the military’s clear specifications and the politicians to override nationalist parochialism and to provide the funds for the development and production—and the fortitude to monitor and call out, with stern sanctions, failures to perform, whether politicians or favored companies.

NATO still is less of an alliance than it is a committee of rivals. Correcting that would be Rutte’s next project, if he can last long enough.

Who’s Responsible for Corporate Security?

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The headline raised the question:

Wars Are Blurring Lines Between Corporate and National Security

The article dealt primarily with physical security of critical items and areas, and it touched on cyber security. There are other areas, though, where responsibility among corporate management teams, police forces, and government, whether military or civilian agencies need to be sorted out.

There’s the question of supply chain security, an enemy nation embargoing Critical Items in the supply chain of a nation’s important corporation, whether that corporation is economically important or is an important defense establishment supplier. Even here, the responsibility is mixed. It’s on the military to defeat the embargo (and the political leadership to engage in the related diplomatic engagements while giving the military the tools with which to act). It’s on the corporate management, though, to adjust its supply chain to eliminate the embargo and to do anticipate other high-risk dependencies and make the adjustments necessary to preempt those dependencies. Where the dependency can be eliminated through domestic production, vis., of raw materials, it’s on the nation’s political leadership to remove regulatory and other roadblocks so that domestic production can be done.

There’s also the question of cyber security. Here, a breach of a corporation’s cyber security should be taken as evidence, though not of proof, of corporate management’s criminal negligence. This sort of thing is too obvious an area of weakness for corporate managers to miss or to decline to commit the resources either to block proactively, or to fight and repair successfully and promptly a breach. Here, also, it’s on those managers to make public the breach, what was affected, and who was affected, in fine to spread the word for the benefit of others.

Adding to the complexity, companies now need to protect the data networks that serve as gateways to critical infrastructure. Hackers increasingly target not just computer files to steal information but also systems managing vital functions like building access and factory control, remotely causing physical damage or enabling espionage.

To which I add: vital functions of communications and financial systems, inserting sleeper malware, to be triggered during a crisis or in association with a direct attack to shut down critical nodes in those systems’ infrastructure and erase the data in financial systems, as well inserting the sleeperware into water distribution, national electricity grids, fuel pipelines, with a view to shutting those down or causing their catastrophic failure.

Addressing the question of primary responsibility, Marc Glasser, ex-DHS Chief of Chemical Security US Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security:

The private owner can invest in redundancy, monitoring, and repair capacity, but only governments and militaries can really deter, patrol, attribute, or respond to hostile state activity[.]

Not entirely. That’s all true as far as it goes, but it only goes to reactivity. It’s the responsibility of corporate managers, military leadership, and politicians to act proactively in their spheres to anticipate and move to protect avenues of attack and to block attack attempts.

The Pope’s Error

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Pope Leo XIV, sitting on the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa decried the fate of folks who made it that far and others who did not as they left their home countries, mostly in Africa, looking for a better life in Europe.

There are also those who choose not to be a neighbor and those who choose not to make a decision. Those who have lost their lives in this sea are victims both of decisions that were made and of decisions that were not made. Indifference to the common good and corruption in their countries of origin; a global economic system that generates poverty and exclusion; fear that fuels prejudice and contempt; the belief that such problems do not concern us; the criminal calculations of those who profit from the suffering of others; the slow and difficult transition from mere emergency management to the development of comprehensive and shared policies[.]

No. The problem here is not that the European nations are not accepting all of these folks, nor is it that they are beginning actively to block their entry. The correct answer is for Europe to leave off its [i]ndifference to the common good and corruption in their countries of origin and devote the resources those nations are misallocating ins to supporting those folks making it to Europe and to blocking further flows, instead to working the source: the criminal natures of the home countries so those folks don’t feel the need to try to leave.

The Pope sort of recognized this, but with badly misplaced emphasis.

Thanks to its geographical location and institutional framework, Europe is capable of addressing the crisis, in this region, in a comprehensive manner, integrating immediate relief efforts into a long-term strategic plan capable of receiving, protecting, supporting and integrating migrants, while at the same time assisting developing countries so that no one is forced to emigrate.

The Pope further muddles his argument with his insistent conflation of migrants with illegal aliens, which is what most of those making to Europe are and most of those getting to Lampedusa, and other waypoints, want to become.

That geographic location does place Europe conveniently close to the source, but it should be committing those resources exclusively to assisting developing countries so that no one is forced to emigrate. Half measures don’t accomplish anything other than waste and lost opportunity.

Then there could be fruitful trade between those nations and the nations of Europe, and that would potentiate the benefits for those then-erstwhile home nations and their populations as well as work to the economic—and moral—benefit of Europe.

Wrong Answer, Right Answer

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The US took more serious damage to Naval Support Activity Bahrain, one of CENTCOM’s naval control nodes in the Middle East, than was previously acknowledged. In response, DoD is considering a number of moves, two of which are the following.

…revamping the base in Bahrain, reducing the US presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and moving some bases or base functions west, farther from the reach of Iranian missiles and drones….

Withdrawing—retreating—is absolutely the wrong answer. That just contributes to the sense of the terrorists running Iran that they’re winning this conflict, encourages them to continue their violations of the (mistakenly done IMO) MOU, and at least as bad, to a mindset of backing up and defeat in our own military and our politicians—too many of whom already are begging for some sort of surrender.

Alternatively,

Command and control nodes could be moved underground. And military capabilities could become more spread out across the region, the officials said, though they cautioned that no decisions had been made.

This is closer to the right answer. Don’t retreat, never retreat, especially in the face of terrorists. Disperse and decentralize our assets.

And I add: plus up the defense facilities for these establishments, and increase significantly the amount of combat forces and weapons systems in the region.

It is never appropriate to signal withdrawal when our enemies attack. It’s always appropriate to counterattack, do so more powerfully than the attack, and to improve defensive systems.