Couldn’t Possibly Be

It seems that more than 3 million folks once getting “Federal food aid” have stopped getting that aid. This is due, primarily, to tighter work requirement restrictions:

Under the new rules, able-bodied adults aged 18 to 64 without children under 14 must work, volunteer or participate in approved job-training programs for at least 80 hours a month. The previous age limit for work requirements was 54, and allowed exemptions for adults with children under 18.

Naturally, the Left is engaging in its manufactured angst over this.

Colleen Heflin, a professor at Syracuse University who studies food insecurity, said larger state drops like Arizona’s were “beyond anything we’ve ever seen.” Heflin said she was concerned it would result in vulnerable Americans not getting enough to eat.
“These large state drops in SNAP caseloads represent a fundamental restructuring of the food-assistance safety net,” she said. “We should expect to see a surge in food insecurity and its related negative consequences at new levels.”

Of course. The large drop couldn’t possibly be an indication of the bloat in the program and the number of ineligible folks taking the aid “beyond anything we’ve ever seen.”

And there’s Bruce Meyer, a University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy Professor, who accidentally let that cat out of the Leftists’ bag:

Most of the people who are getting food stamps are needy. When you’re cutting that many people, you’re probably cutting into some people who really do need the benefits.

It certainly should be “most,” and it should be far more than just that. Only cutting “some” who really need the benefits is a strong indicator of the amount of bloat that’s been present.

A Problem of their own Making

In a Wall Street Journal article centered on the People’s Republic of China’s setting up trade-centric “retaliatory tools,” there’s this bit in the middle of the piece:

The rules could put US and other Western companies in a bind: they need to comply with US restrictions on trade with China and often want to reduce their reliance on Chinese production, yet such actions expose them to punishment by Beijing and even possible expulsion from the world’s most important manufacturing hub.

Of course, if those companies weren’t in the PRC in the first place, the PRC couldn’t “punish” them. They’ve had plenty of time to move their supply chains and businesses out of that nation and plenty of warning regarding the necessity of doing so.

Still, there remains no time like the present to take serious heed and get moving on those adjustments.

Big Brother’s Nanny Sister

President Donald Trump (R) wants to let businesses allow private equity investments be included in their 401(k) Plans so employees can invest in them with their retirement savings. After all, unions, those voting bloc and funders for the Progressive-Democratic Party do, with enthusiasm.

Nope, say those same Progressive-Democratic Party politicians. We get to do it. You others don’t. Just look at those collapsing private equity funds now. Besides, the Labor Department is only letting those 401(k)s have risky investments that could include Trump meme coins.

Labor says otherwise.

The Labor Department is proposing to clarify that employers don’t violate their fiduciary duty merely by incorporating private equity, real estate and other “alternative” investments in 401(k) fund options.

Nothing else.

I agree that private equity is a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad investment. However, that’s a matter for the individual investor to decide. It should not be a matter for Nanny Statists like Party politicians to actively bar, nor should it be a matter for Republicans of any stripe to passively bar by not permitting.

Caveat emptor, and caveat collocator.

Not Sure This Is Correct

James MacIntosh, writing for The Wall Street Journal, is worried about the Fed worrying too much about its last mistake regarding inflation, when it was too slow to respond to rising prices. For instance,

But there’s a fundamental difference between the new oil shock and the postpandemic boom. Inflation today, already visible in rising prices at the pumps, is driven by restricted supply as Iran cuts off oil and other shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The 2021-22 inflation was driven by soaring demand as stimulus-rich consumers emerged from enforced hibernation during Covid lockdowns.
Central banks know how to deal with too much demand. They should have raised rates much earlier than their eventual 2022 rises to hold back borrowing and spending. Today, they can’t do anything about the hit to supply, because, as the saying goes, you can’t print oil.

The problem with this, though, is in the relationship between inflation—rising prices—and rising—”too much”—demand. Rising prices occurs because demand is rising faster than supply can rise to satisfy it; it does not occur simply from rising demand. If we want more stuff—here oil—and the production of oil exists to satisfy that rising demand, prices don’t rise; there is no inflation.

Inflation is always and only in the relationship between demand and supply; it is never in demand alone or in supply alone. The only way there can be too much demand if there’s too little supply (the other side of this is true, too: the only way there can be too little demand is if there’s too much supply, which results in falling prices—deflation). More demand than supply can satisfy and less supply than can satisfy demand are the same thing.

So, what can/should the Fed do about today’s too little supply of oil relative to the demand for it and the consequent rise in prices? Its mandate, aside from full employment, is price stability: no change in price level, or via its goal, keeping price increases to 2% inflation. The Fed’s tool for this interest rates, which is to say here, reducing demand by raising the cost of the money that is that demand. Thus: raise interest rates when that inflation gets out of hand/rises too far above that 2% in a sustained upward trend. This is wholly independent of both supply and demand individually and responsive only to the relationship between the two.

The problem here is that “out of hand,” “too far above,” and “sustained” are each individually only hazily defined criteria. My own opinion is that with employment, which is a consequence of stable prices as well as its own economic condition, close to full and stable and currently rising prices not yet out of hand or too far above 2% or on a sustained upward trend, the Fed should do nothing more than keep a watchful eye. Trying to time the market with enough precision to preempt inflation without cutting off growth is as much a fool’s errand as an individual investor’s timing with a view to precise top or bottom picking.

This also is consistent with my view that current interest rates are consistent with (if a bit lower than) interest rates that historically are associated with 2%± inflation, so there’s nothing generally that the Fed needs to do.

When is a Strategic Strength a Strategic Vulnerability?

The lede laid out the misconception:

The oil states of the Persian Gulf have made great strides to diversify their economies in recent years, but they have also created a new vulnerability: more strategic targets for Iran to hit.

More targets to hit? Sure. But attacking them dilutes and dissipates any ability to attack a choke point in any economy, to seriously degrade or to destroy a Critical Item in an economy. Indeed, by diversifying, an economy’s single or a couple of Critical Items are eliminated, and what replaces them are a larger number of Important Components to that economy.

But that number protects the economy as a whole, and so strengthens the targeted nation: it will suffer economic losses, but it has become much harder to shut down.

When is a strategic strength a strategic vulnerability? Not this time.