Why Are We Abandoning the High Ground?

China’s first lunar rover has successfully separated from the probe that carried it into space has and made its first track upon the surface of the moon, Chinese state media reported Sunday.

Here’s the rub:

The soft landing—the term for a landing in which neither the spacecraft nor its equipment is damaged—was the first on the moon by any nation in 37 years

And not only was it not done by us, it was done by a nation with clear enmity toward us and toward our friends and allies.  Moreover, the People’s Republic of China is making no bones about its future plans for the moon.  They’re planning a sample return mission in their present Chang’e series as soon as 2017 and an astronaut landing after 2020.

The US’ space program?  Well, we don’t have much of one, and none at all where the moon is concerned.  We send the occasional robot off to Mars (those are spectacular missions, doing important science, to be sure), but that’s about it.  American astronauts have to thumb rides to the space station on Russian rockets.  American private companies are (finally!) figuring out how to send supply missions all the way to the space station.  That’s about it.

As for the moon, we got nothing.

Never mind that the back side of the moon is an excellent platform for exploring space.  Never mind that the regolith on the moon—all that moon “soil”—is rich in rocket fuel (it’s loaded with oxygen and aluminum, each a key ingredient).  Or that producing that rocket fuel on the moon and loading it into rockets there considerably cheapens exploration of the rest of the solar system, since all that mass doesn’t have to be carried uphill out of Earth’s gravity.

Never mind that the moon is militarily useful high ground: rocks dropped from there impact Earth’s surface with force of nuclear bombs, and by destroying our launch facilities, any rock throwers will be able to deny us access to space entirely.  Other weapons launched from the moon will be able to destroy our satellites with impunity, which with no launch facilities, we’ll be unable to replace.

But we’re ceding all of that to the PRC.

Mr Cohen Addresses the Iran Nuclear Weapons Deal

…in a Wall Street Journal op-ed earlier in the week.  David Cohen is the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the Treasury Department, and he admits that he is the principal in “crafting and enforcing our sanctions program” against Iran.

With this…interest…in mind, Cohen defended his sanctions program as they exist under this nuclear weapons deal [emphasis added].

[T]he relief package…lion’s share…comes from granting Iran access, in installments, to $4.2 billion of its own revenues currently trapped outside Iran.  In addition, US sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and its auto industry will be temporarily suspended.

We estimate that this additional trade could generate about $1.5 billion in revenue over the next six months….

[T]he deal also allows Iran to transfer $400 million of restricted Iranian funds to defray tuition costs for Iranian students studying abroad.

If the Iranians comply with their obligations under the Joint Plan, over the next six months they will stand to receive $6 billion to $7 billion in relief, mostly by gaining access to their own money.  Not $1 comes from US taxpayers.

What a monumental failure of understanding.  The problem with this deal, in Cohen’s context, is not that none of the monies going to Iran are coming from us, it’s that these are monies going to Iran.  Full stop.

These are $6 billion to $7 billion to which Iran did not have access until we lifted eased the sanctions.  Full stop.

These are $6 billion to $7 billion which the Iranian government will not use to better the lot of the Iranian people.  No, this is money with which Iran will

reverse that neutralization [of its stockpile of near-Highly Enriched Uranium]; money with which to reconnect those centrifuge cascades and to generate additional ones; money with which actually to develop the engineering capacity to assemble a deliverable warhead (which, recall, requires no missiles—although Iran now will get a taste of money with which to continue that development—but only a train car or a collection of suitcases separately carried into the target zone); money with which to fund its terror operations, its support of its Syrian and Iraqi operations; etc; etc; etc.

Full stop.

Idle Chit-Chat

On the People’s Republic Of China’s new Air Defense Identification Zone (which the PRC demands that all aircraft intending to fly through it check in with the Chinese government first), an airspace grab that goes with its grab of the East China Sea below, the Obama administration has had this response.

National security spokesman Patrick Ventrell:

pointed to White House press secretary Jay Carney’s remark that “the US government does not accept or recognize China’s newly declared” defense zone.

State Department spokesman Marie Harf:

[W]e’ve been very clear that we’ve called on China not to implement the ADIZ, and we’ll continue to do so.

JCS Chairman Martin Dempsey:

So it wasn’t the declaration of the ADIZ that actually was destabilizing.  It was their assertion that they would cause all aircraft entering the ADIZ to report regardless of whether they were intending to enter into the sovereign airspace of China. And that is destabilizing.

Vice President Joe Biden:

the US is “deeply concerned.”

And

crisis management mechanisms and effective channels of communication between China and Japan to reduce the risk of escalation.

President Barack Obama:

Not even that much.

PRC President Xi Jinping:

…took on board what the Vice President laid out….

Yeah.  We showed ’em.

Northern Korea’s Nukes

Northern Korea has begun expanding its missile site at Tonghae, on the northeast coast, as well as its missile site at Sohae, on the northwest coast, in order to enable them to handle larger—longer-range and/or bigger payload—missiles.

Northern Korea also has restarted its plutonium reactor at Yongbyon.  Recall that the only viable product from a plutonium reactor is weapons-grade plutonium.

All of this comes against the backdrop of northern Korea’s oft-repeated claims of being willing to enter into talks about trading disarmament for food aid.

But why should they not resume, along with continuing empty dialogs?  Our administration is well-known to have no heart for anything other than chit-chat and acquiescence.

The Failed Nuclear Deal

This is what President Barack Obama and his State Department Secretary, John Kerry, have foisted off on us in an allegedly interim deal with the Iranians concerning the latter’s nuclear weapons program:

Iran committed to:

  • halt enrichment above a 5% threshold
  • dismantle the technical connections required to enrich uranium above 5%
  • neutralize its stockpile of near 20% enriched uranium
  • halt progress on its enrichment capacity
  • construction on the plutonium reactor at Arak will “halt”
  • increased transparency and intrusive monitoring

What Iran has in place:

  • 18,000 centrifuges installed
  • more than 10,000 operating
  • some number of tons of low-enriched uranium
  • 440 pounds of higher-enriched uranium (roughly a bomb’s worth) in a form that can be converted relatively quickly to fissile warhead material

The P5+1 (US, Russia, PRC, UK, France, plus Germany) committed to:

  • not impose any new sanctions
  • suspend sanctions on “certain sectors” of Iran’s economy
  • unfreeze $4.2 billion in revenue from oil sales if Iran meets “other conditions.”  These last two easily can run over $7 billion in total

Obama summarized the remaining sanctions this way:

The broader architecture of sanctions will remain in place, and we will continue to enforce them vigorously[.]

Let’s review the bidding here.  Iran has agreed to stop enriching above a purity, and the UN gets to watch.  We’ve seen already the effectiveness of the UN at watching weapons programs.

Iran’s dismantling?  They’ll unplug some plugs, clip some wires, and call it a day.  OK, that’s an exaggeration; Iran has promised, essentially, to shorten its centrifuge cascade at the 5% threshold.  The simplicity of a centrifuge cascade, though, is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 in a unit of Dr Frank Settle’s description of Nuclear Chemistry, located here.  Settle has this to say, in particular:

Cascades of individual centrifuges constructed to produce LEU [Low enriched uranium] for reactors can be easily reconfigured to produce HEU [Highly enriched uranium] for weapons.

LEU typically is uranium enriched to less than 20%; it’s a simple matter of adjusting the cascade length to stop at 5%.  Keep in mind, now, that Iran agreed to dismantle, not to destroy.  The components will remain in Iran’s possession; the pipings, etc., necessary to regenerate the longer cascades in order to resume weapons grade enrichment will remain an easy matter to reconnect.  And they have 8-ish thousand centrifuges with which to set up additional cascades, with which to accelerate their “5%” uranium production.  But Iran promises….

Iran will retain its tons of existing LEU—and that 5% is the critical base, the hardest stage of enrichment; everything after that is just those cascades repeating a process.  However, Iran promises to neutralize its near-HEU by combining it with Oxygen to make the HEU into an oxide.  This, though, not only is a chemical reaction, relatively simple to reverse, if not entirely cheap (but see what we’re giving the Iranians, below), the oxide is just a standard intermediate step in getting from uranium ore to reactor- or weapons-grade metal.  The HEU will be entirely straightforward to recover.

And the Iranians promise to stop “progress.”  OK….

In return for these…promises…and letting the UN “watch,” we’re giving the Iranian government a ton of money.  Money with which to reverse that neutralization; money with which to reconnect those centrifuge cascades and to generate additional ones; money with which actually to develop the engineering capacity to assemble a deliverable warhead (which, recall, requires no missiles—although Iran now will get a taste of money with which to continue that development—but only a train car or a collection of suitcases separately carried into the target zone); money with which to fund its terror operations, its support of its Syrian and Iraqi operations; etc; etc; etc.

Oh, and Obama will “vigorously enforce” the remaining sanctions, and they’re reversible.  The first is risible: he’s never vigorously enforced; he’s been dragged kicking and screaming to any sanctions at all.

Moreover, any reversal will be strictly an American one, if it happens at all.  Neither the PRC nor Russia will agree to re-ratchet sanctions, and the UK government, like our own, has no stomach for stern measures of any sort on the world stage—a natural outcome of an insistence on moral equivalence.  Germany will simply do what it’s done since 2003: sit on the sidelines and cluck.  France might be willing to act unilaterally, but that’s a small, lone voice in the wilderness.

This is a terrible “deal,” and the Israelis and most Americans are wholly justified in demurring from it.  But we have “peace” in our time.

 

NB: the bulk of this was cross-posted a bit ago on Ricochet, a site well worth frequenting outside its paywall, and even more worth frequenting for the modest subscription fee.