Category Archives: Courts

“Special Prosecutor”

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The 9th Circuit has appointed one to “investigate” President Donald Trump’s pardon of ex-Sheriff Joe Arpaio last summer.  This was done in response to the fiction offered the court by the Perkins Coie law firm that the pardon, an explicitly named power of the President under Article II, Section 2, is somehow unconstitutional and a violation of due process.

Never mind that the due process—to the extent this…claim…is relevant to the matter of pardons—was supplied by the prior trial and conviction of Arpaio, a trial without which there would be no pardon to grant.

9th Circuit judges William Fletcher and Wallace Tashima, making their own claim that their Circuit “needs ‘the benefit of full briefing and argument’,” of the legitimacy of a President’s Constitutionally authorized pardon, appointed their “special prosecutor.”

Two things must flow from this usurpation of Executive Branch power.  One is that the Senate must get off its collective duff and confirm Trump’s nominees to fill the 9th Circuit vacancies.

Separately, judges William Fletcher and Wallace Tashima have violated their oaths of office, which include a promise to support and defend the Constitution. As they’re no longer hold[ing] their Offices during good Behavior, they need to be removed from the bench.

It Still Is

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The Supreme Court is hearing a case, South Dakota v Wayfair Inc, wherein South Dakota is looking to overturn a generation-old ruling that exempts out of state retailers from State sales taxes unless the retailers also have a physical presence in the State.  I wrote about one aspect of the matter here among other places.

Here’s another, more critical aspect of the matter [emphasis added].

In a 1992 mail-order catalog case [Quill Corp v North Dakota], the court held that, absent congressional approval, states could impose tax-collection duties only on retailers with a “physical presence” within their borders. Congress, with its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, was the place to balance state revenue needs with burdens on business, the court said at the time.

Congress still is the place for such a decision.  This is a political matter, not a judicial one, and the Supremes, by overturning their “precedent”—which was nothing more than a recognition of who has law-making authority and who has only law-applying authority—would be usurping law-making authority to themselves.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t end there.  South Dakota’s Attorney General, Marty Jackley, argued with a straight face that

the states—45 impose sales taxes, and nearly all support South Dakota’s case—wouldn’t make draconian demands of remote sellers….

Never mind that it’s already draconian to demand that retailers pay taxes they don’t owe.

And this from our favorite Living Constitution Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg:

If time and changing conditions have rendered it obsolete, why should the court, which created the doctrine say, “Well, we’ll let Congress fix up what turns out to be our obsolete precedent?”

Except for the small matter that the Court didn’t create this “doctrine,” our Constitution did.  That document says, in so many words, that all law-making authority resides in the Congress and nowhere else, and it says further that regulation of interstate commerce is one of the enumerated tasks of that same Congress and not any business of the judiciary.

A Judicial Miss

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Recall the Marquette University case wherein a graduate-student instructor, Cheryl Abbate, shut down debate on the subject of gay marriage, arguing that views that didn’t accept such things were “homophobic and unwelcome in her classroom.”  Tenured Political Science Professor John McAdams objected, in blunt terms, to the evident bigotry demonstrated by Abbate in a personal post on his personal blog.  Marquette disciplined him for disagreeing—that’s a violation of Marquette “speech” policy.  McAdams demurred and took Marquette to court.

Milwaukee County Circuit judge sided with the university. The judge, David Hansher, wrote that academic freedom “does not mean that a faculty member can harass, threaten, intimidate, ridicule, or impose his or her views on students.”

And yet, that’s exactly what the graduate-student instructor was doing. Hansher needed to pay actual attention to the facts of the matter.

State Taxation of Internet Businesses

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The Supreme Court is hearing a case, South Dakota v Wayfair Inc, that seeks to overturn an older precedent that prevents States from taxing businesses doing business in the State that don’t have a physical presence there.  South Dakota is claiming that

…the 1992 precedent harms state treasuries and disadvantages taxpaying home-grown businesses.

That argument might hold water if the States were powerless. They’re not. There’s nothing at all preventing them from lowering the tax rates they impose on the brick-and-mortar and home-grown businesses resident in those States so they can compete. There’s nothing at all preventing the States from lowering their spending rates and thereby protecting their treasuries.

There’s nothing at all preventing the States from taking advantage of the increased economic activity that would result.

A Better Answer

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The Supreme Court might take up a case involving cy pres, the policy of handing class action suit settlement fund “leftover” money to third parties.  It’s especially used where the number of plaintiffs in the class is huge.

In privacy or data-breach cases, where the number of potential plaintiffs reaches into the millions, the majority of a settlement can go to cy pres recipients.

A 2015 class-action settlement involving Alphabet that centered on its Google subsidiary would have led, after the lawyers’ cut, to four-cent checks being sent to each of nearly 130 million plaintiffs, for instance.

Cy pres also becomes a player when the bulk of the funds are distributed and the remainder is impractical to distribute (“impractical” generally is determined by the court involved, or by the court’s acceptance of an agreement between plaintiffs and defendant(s)).

The Court should take the case and strike the practice.  Part One of a better answer, which the Court can impose, is to reduce the permissible per centage of the total payout that can go to the lawyers.  That would leave more money for the payout and reduce, if only by a little, one of the problems: the pennies distributed were all the monies disbursed to the plaintiffs.

Part Two of the better answer is a political decision, and so it’s beyond the reach of the Court; although, the Justices can, and should, inveigh Congress to address the matter.  That political decision is to bar the leftover monies from going to third parties.  By definition, those entities were not victims of the misbehavior that led to the payout, and so they should not receive any of it.  Instead, the leftovers should be delivered to the Federal or State Treasury, depending on whether the case was a Federal or State one.

Part Two-a of the better answer likely would find the most use in those privacy or data-breach cases, where all of the plaintiffs might each get impractically small payouts.  In this sort of case, all of the settlement funds should go to the Federal or State Treasury.