“It Does Because It Does”

The dishonesty of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s case against ex- and brief-Trump Campaign Manager is made manifest in the opening questions Eastern District of Virginia Federal Judge TS Ellis III and Michael Dreeben’s (arguing for the Mueller side) answers.

Ellis noted

Apparently, if I look at the indictment, none of that information has anything to do with links or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of Donald Trump. That seems to me to be obvious because they all long predate any contact or any affiliation of this defendant with the campaign.

Then, after a long soliloquy regarding the rationale for a prosecutor indicting a lesser player on lesser charges in order to squeeze that player into extruding information on a larger player, Ellis asked,

Where am I wrong in that regard?

Dreeben: The issue before you is Manafort’s motion to dismiss the charges.

Ellis: Yes, now answer my question.

Dreeben: “our investigatory scope does cover the activities [of the indictment]”

Ellis: Answer my question.

Dreeben: “the authorization for the special counsel to investigate matters is described generally in the appointment order on May”

Ellis: Yes, I have that letter.  Answer my question.  How does that letter include the indictment?

Dreeben: “So the authorization order permits….”

Ellis: “You’re running away from my question again. You know, I’m focused on the indictment that is here.”

Dreeben: “Well, Your Honor, we are the Justice Department.”

And there it is.  Mueller’s team flatly refused to explain how indictments related to 13-year-old events in Ukraine are tied in to an investigation of the relationship between the Trump campaign and Russia, choosing instead to be deliberately evasive.  Here, by the way, are the public parts of the Mueller Special Counsel Authorization Letter (my title for the thing), as quoted by Ellis:

Sub-paragraph b(i):

any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump.

Sub-paragraph b(ii):

any matters that arose or may arise directly from the [Mueller] investigation.

Nothing in there about any allegedly nefarious activities in Ukraine.  “Arose or may arise” from the Mueller investigation means exactly that.  Stuff from outside the investigation—the Manafort money laundering charges, for instance—aren’t part of the investigation.  And so Dreeben’s implication that Ellis should just sit down and shut up: “We are the Justice Department.”

Which only emphasizes the Special Counsel’s team’s evasions.

The transcript can be read here.

The Special Counsel Authorizing Letter

House investigating committees have demanded that Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein turn over his letter to Special Counsel Robert Mueller, and Rosenstein has refused to do so.  Now, in a case Mueller brought against ex- and brief-Trump Campaign Manager Paul Rosenstein, the presiding Federal judge TS Ellis has demanded that Mueller turn over to him an unredacted copy of that letter, and he’s given Mueller two weeks to comply, which works out to 18 May.

We’ll see. Two weeks is much too long to give Mueller to produce his copy of Rosenstein’s authorizing letter; 36-48 hours is plenty—especially since Mueller’s team plainly has that copy always ready to hand; they are, after all, responsible persons.

Ellis also needs to be prepared to jail Mueller and possibly Rosenstein for contempt if Mueller doesn’t meet the deadline, whether Ellis’ or mine, or Rosenstein won’t allow him to, and keep them locked up until the letter is produced.

President Donald Trump could speed things along by declassifying the letter, if Mueller/Rosenstein try to hide behind that. This is a national affair, and We the People need, and have the fundamental right, to know what Government’s unelected bureaucrats are doing under the pretense that it’s in our name.

A Federal Judge’s Mistakes

US District Judge John Bates has ruled that President Donald Trump’s Executive Order rescinding the DACA program initiated by DHA memorandum under ex-President Barack Obama (D) is illegal.  He’s gone beyond that: he’s ordered the Trump administration to process new DACA applicants, not just renew existing ones.

Bates’ mistakes are two.  One is his ruling that, in effect, it’s illegal to rescind a Department Memorandum by Executive Order.  Of course, this is erroneous.  A Department Memorandum is not statute; it’s not even a Regulation.  It has no legal force beyond being a Cabinet-level equivalent of an EO.  As such, it’s subordinate to Executive Orders and available to cancelation by same.  At worst, the issue is a quibble, easily correctable by an EO instructing the subordinate DHS to rescind its Memorandum.

Bates’ next mistake is claiming the EO is illegal because it offered insufficient support to its claim that the DACA program is illegal.  This is simply irrelevant.  See above: it’s sufficient for the President to instruct a subordinate Cabinet to do a thing, so long as the thing itself is legal.  There are no statutes barring a President from instructing the rescission of a Department Memorandum; such a statute would be unconstitutional, anyway, trampling on the separation of powers as one would.  No explanation for why a Memorandum should be rescinded is necessary, however useful one might be.

A Mistaken Argument

The Supreme Court heard oral argument earlier this week on the legality of President Donald Trump’s Executive Order producing a moratorium on entry into the US from certain selected nations.  Neal Katyal, representing those arguing to keep Trump’s EO blocked,

says Congress previously has rejected exactly the kind of nationality-based ban that Mr Trump has implemented.

Whether or not that’s true, though, is irrelevant.  All that the Court can consider (aside from what is in the Constitution, which is always before the Court, and what’s in the Executive Order before the Court today), is what Congress has done this time.  Past actions are irrelevant, particularly since what Congress does today that differs or outright contradicts what Congress did yesterday overrides yesterday’s action.

The “Muslim Travel” Moratorium Case

The Supreme Court is hearing this case as it pertains to the current Executive Order that imposes a moratorium on entry into the US by persons coming from certain specified nations.  (In aside, I emphasize that calling the EO a “Muslim ban” is dishonest. It presents an impermanent moratorium on entry from nations representing a bare 10% of the world’s Muslims, and it presents the same impermanent moratorium on non-Muslim countries, like northern Korea.)

Lower courts have invoked campaign rhetoric, the clumsiness of the rollout of the first EO on the matter, a made-up permanence of the moratorium, and on and on, to create a court-manufactured policy determination that the EO was somehow prejudiced in some way.  With that fantasy, those lower courts have struck the EOs, one after another.

The lower courts have been imposing their own prejudices.

What’s in the text of the Executive Order? Is the EO itself legal? These are the only questions legitimately before the Justices. Campaign rhetoric is not in the EO, and so cannot be considered. The clumsiness of the rollout of the first EO had nothing to do with the EO—or with the one presently before the Justices—and so cannot be considered by the Justices.  The duration of the moratorium is a political decision, and so cannot be considered.

In Connecticut National Bank v Germain, the Supremes held

…time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.

The concept plainly holds for EOs as well.  If it’s not in the EO, the EO doesn’t say it.

Whether the EO’s moratorium on entry into the US from a selected set of nations is good or bad policy is certainly worthy of debate, but it’s strictly and solely a political debate to be had by We the People, and through us, our elected representatives. Politics and associated policy decisions are beyond the ken of courts.