A Foreign Tax on American Investors in America

The European Commission earlier this month proposed a new financial-transaction tax for 11 participating states, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Slovenia, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, and Estonia.  These produce roughly two-thirds of the EU’s economy.

It’s an enormous tax, too, in a market where spreads are on the order of pennies, even fractions of pennies: 0.1% for trades in bonds and shares, and 0.01% for derivatives transactions, and it would apply to both buyers and sellers

as long as either of them is based in one of the participating states, or if the financial instrument being traded was issued in any of these countries.

As damaging as this tax is, they’re not done.  The tax is intended to suppress trading:

[The European Commission’s] own impact assessment estimates that the number and volume of trades in shares and bonds could drop by around 15%, while derivatives transactions may drop by as much as 75%.

Never mind that this activity—especially its volume—contributes to the liquidity of the instruments and so contributes to holding down their price to buyers.  Which facilitates more general investing in companies—their source of funds for R&D, plant expansion, even hiring.

But wait, there’s more: they’re claiming the right to tax folks outside their jurisdiction—we Americans, investing here in the US, for example, as a result of those domiciliary and passing-through aspects.

This tax will hurt us: Paul Jiganti, Managing Director of Market Structure and Routing Strategy at TD Ameritrade Holding Corp, estimates that

a typical [American] customer who pays $9.99 to buy 1,000 shares priced around $35 apiece could see that charge rise sevenfold, to around $70 on the trade.

Which will have the EU’s desired outcome.  Jiganti was caught by surprise by all of this:

To be honest, I thought that cooler heads would prevail.  I thought the US government would take care of it before it really became an issue.

For all of Treasury’s sharp words about the tax, though, don’t expect any real action.  President Barack Obama, Treasury’s boss, has never met a tax he didn’t like.  He’s not going to oppose this one in any meaningful way.

China’s Economic Course

In a nation that’s facing a demographic implosion (a birth rate of around 1.5 against a rate of roughly 2.1 required to maintain current population levels, and an aging population (expected by 2050 (the current generation plus their children) to have four workers in the age band 50-64 for every three aged 15-29, and for every 100 people aged 20-64, 45 over 65), that chronically lives on the edge of famine, and that has a population increasingly aware of what could be compared to what is, the PRC government is not treating its poor or its farmers (22% of whom will be over 65 as early as 2030—the current generation) very well.  And so it’s not treating its society or its economy with any foresight.

For instance:

In December 2010, when [Fu Liang]  says a campaign of harassment drove him off the small plot where he ran a fish farm, the local government paid Mr Fu just nine yuan ($1.45) a square meter for it.

The plot was quickly resold for 640 yuan [$103.11] per square meter to a developer, a national database of land transactions shows.  The developer has built villas that sell for 6,900 yuan [$1,111.67] a square meter.

A markup of a factor of nearly 10 at each stage.  Fu’s 9 yuan meter of fish farm was worth far more than he was paid.  In another sense, it was priceless, since he didn’t want to sell.

Mr Fu now is unemployed, one among tens of thousands of former farmers who inhabit the impoverished fringes of Chengdu, a city in southwestern China.  He has no heart to start another business.  “What’s the point if the government can just destroy it?” he says.

With no sense of irony, the PRC’s new president, Xi Jinping, claims to want strengthen that demographically unstable society and its unstable economy—through property (land) ownership.  After all, as Fu pointed out,

precarious land rights mean little incentive to invest in improving agricultural output, and no asset that can be sold to fund a move to the city.  Low compensation for the millions ousted from their land—coupled with ineligibility for social benefits because they aren’t registered as urban residents—means for many a life of poverty on the edges of the cities.

And no incentive to bring additional children—boys only, mind, in a mandated one child environment, with the bias’ own long-run population sustainability implications—into the world.  And the one-child policy was put in place explicitly to achieve the population reduction about to occur sharply.

Fat chance for any serious change:

“Push forward scientific development and advance social harmony,” proclaims a banner draped across one construction site, parroting a catch phrase of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao.  Mr Fu, surveying a noodle bowl of highway overpasses, said, “A few years ago, this was all farmland.”

Because farmland—the means of feeding the population—stands in the way of progress.  Xi will have a great deal of trouble reversing that, especially with the money to be made converting farmland to urban land.