Sound Money and the PRC

In a Letter to The Wall Street Journal Wednesday, one writer had this on the idea of the People’s Republic of China being a competitor with its renminbi as global reserve currency and its bond market as debt safe haven:

Credible money paired with reduced government spending have long been pillars of conservative rhetoric stateside, and with good reason.

Indeed. However, what the writer elided are the capital risk the PRC poses with its history of limiting or barring repatriation of profit, the economic risk from the PRC’s requirement that foreign companies give up their technologies and intellectual properties to domestic companies as a condition of doing business in the PRC, and the political risk of the PRC’s requirement that companies supply its intelligence community with any information that community “requests.”

The absence of these risks in the US also is an important aspect of conservative economic and political thought—and not just rhetoric.

It’s Not Our Money

That’s the position of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo (D). On the heels of the Progressive-Democrats winning both of Georgia’s Senate seats, giving control of the Senate to the Progressive-Democratic Party, he had this to say:

Washington has…literally have taken billions of dollars from us, and that was a function of the Senate and the president, and they are both gone. And today, Washington theft ends and compensation for the victims of the crimes of the past four years begins. New Yorkers have been crime victims by the theft of the federal government.
We want a return of the state’s property that was stolen by Washington over the past four years. They wouldn’t pay us state and local funding, even though this state has a $15 billion deficit….

Because it’s not our money. It’s not anybody’s money but the New York Government’s.  Pay up, suckers.

Surrender?

Recall that the New York Stock Exchange, pursuant to an Executive Order regarding US investors and People’s Republic of China’s PLA-owned or -controlled companies, had begun the process of delisting China Telecom Corp Ltd, China Mobile Ltd, and China Unicom Hong Kong Ltd.

Now the NYSE has walked that back and decided not to proceed with the delisting. Exchange management have chosen to not provide any details or rationale for their, other than that their decision follows “further consultation” with federal regulators. The Exchange’s full statement can be read here; it’s carefully uninformative.

I have to wonder: is this in response to the PRC’s threat to take the necessary countermeasures to resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies? Or is it an attempt to duck away from those threatened countermeasures rather than fighting a battle that needs to be won?

The foregoing was written Tuesday. Now the NYSE has reversed itself again:

it received “new specific guidance” from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control on Tuesday, which listed the three companies’ American depositary receipts as being covered by Mr. Trump’s order.

Which raises an additional question: who’s actually in charge at the NYSE, since the new specific guidance should not have been necessary.

The Stock Market

Much is made of the market drop last spring pursuant to the government’s decision to close down our economy in response to the apparent (apparent because we were operating on vastly incomplete data, much of which was being deliberately falsified by the People’s Republic of China). Much is made, too, of the market recovery later in the spring as our economy was permitted by government to begin reopening.

Readers of this blog know that I view the market as economically strongly tied to the underlying economy, but only loosely tied to it temporarily.

This graph, via MarketWatch, puts last spring’s market drop and recovery, illustrated by the S&P 500 Index, into some context.

The axes are somewhat hard to read (right click on the image and select View Image from the pulldown to get a larger image), but the X-axis labels run from Jan 80 through Jan 20. The data themselves actually run from 1 Jan 78 through 1 Nov 2020.

Last spring’s government-caused Wuhan Virus drop and recovery (the grey-blue region at the right end) compares in two ways with previous drops. This government-caused drop is no deeper than the two economically-driven drops of the last 32 years: the dot-com bust of Jun 00 to Dec 02 and the Panic of 2008 of Jun 08 to Mar 09. The Wuhan Virus drop and recovery also was much steeper and the recovery must faster than those prior drops: 6 months vs 18 months and 10 months just for the drops, and an additional 4 years to recover from dot-com and from the Panic.

Beyond that, the current Wuhan Virus data suggest that the government-mandated shutdown had very little impact on the virus’ progression. Especially given that key government officials like Anthony Fauci, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Director, openly lied about the severity of the virus and what we should do about it.

Miami as Financial Center

Financial firms are starting to figure it out: in addition to a better climate and (much) friendlier tax regime, Miami is the place to be for them. I have a thought on one bit of that maybe-migration, the opening statement:

This city has long pitched itself as an attractive location for finance and tech firms, with its tax advantages, flight connections to New York and cosmopolitan flair. Its efforts appear to be paying off.

I’m not sure that Miami needs to tout New York as being within easy reach. It should begin noting that it’s within easy reach of New York. There’s no need for Wall Street to remain in a city as anti-business, anti-financial success, as badly run generally as New York City, or as badly run and high-tax as is the State of New York.

Miami should encourage all of them to come on down to Brickell. The water’s better than fine.