Tag Archives: political economy

State Problem, not Federal

Posted on by
Reply

Amid the moves related to canceling, or not, $160 million in Federal funding if California misses its 5 January deadline for canceling some 17,000 Commercial Driver Licenses illegally issued to illegal aliens, comes this Federal lawsuit objection by the Asian Law Caucus and the Sikh Coalition, along with the law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP:

the cancellations would “result in mass work stoppages” immediately upon the deadline.

Say that’s true, and it likely is. Their beef is with California’s State government for its decision to act illegally and so broadly so, not with the Federal government for enforcing the law. Suing the Feds to stop their enforcement of law should be a nonstarter.

A Useful Test

Posted on by
Reply

In their Wall Street Journal Tuesday op-ed, Michael O’Hanlon and Marta Wosinska, Brookings Institution Senior Fellows, pointed out that shotgunning moves (vis., universal tariffs on everything a target nation or group of nations exports to us and broadly barring exports to those same targets) as a means of altering the several links to the supply chains our economy needs to make the goods we need along with altering those links our economy wants to make the things we want. They then offered a three part test to better target those supply chain links that are most important and most time critical to us and our security.

  • First, a supply chain warrants special focus when its disruption would quickly threaten lives, core defense missions, or essential economic functions.
  • Second, when substitutes or workarounds can’t be instituted in time to mitigate the disruption.
  • Third, when surge capacity can’t be built on a reasonable timeline.

This approach, as they emphasize, acknowledges that developing resilience is costly and helps ensure that scarce capital goes to the most vital choke points. In fine, it targets links for better allocation of our non-tree-sprouting spending money

This is a good test, and it’s applicable in another way than purely domestically. It needs to be applied in reverse, also. What are the analogous critical choke points in our enemies’ supply chains? Applying the test to those would let us better target our enemies’ ability to wage and sustain war against us, our friends, and our allies.

There’s a Lesson Here

Posted on by
Reply

Recall that the Federal government last summer canceled a $4 billion grant to California’s slower-than-a-sick-snail-in-January bullet train project over that thing’s huge cost overruns and delays that kept the train not far from its drawing board. California’s Progressive-Democrat governor Gavin Newsom had filed suit over the Trump administration’s effrontery in declining to fund, further, this California waste management project. Now we get this:

California dropped its lawsuit against the Trump administration after it pulled roughly $4 billion in federal funding for the state’s high-speed rail project.

The bleats of the California High-Speed Rail Authority in explaining its decision to drop the lawsuit notwithstanding, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy explained the reason for cancelation.

Governor Newsom and the complicit Democrats have enabled this waste for years. Federal dollars are not a blank check—they come with a promise to deliver results. After over a decade of failures, CHSRA’s mismanagement and incompetence has proven it cannot build its train to nowhere on time or on budget[.]

The lesson: don’t do upfront Federal grants to States for projects. Don’t do grants after the fact without hardy strings attached. Make all grants conditional on the States having let the contracts; construction having begun; and significant, serious construction progress having been underway for six months. Then release the grant money a month at a time, after the State has released its funding for the month, with the granted funds matching, not exceeding, the State’s funding for each month. If the State misses funding its project for two consecutive months, or for any three months out of five consecutive months, the rest of the grant must be canceled. The grant could then be renewed, or funding resumed, conditioned on the State having relet its project contract; construction having been resumed; and significant, serious construction progress having been underway for six months. The month-to-month grant funds then could be released as above.

CHSRA’s CEO Ian Choudri had this in the alternative:

Interest from the private sector in investing in California’s high-speed rail project is strong and continues to grow[.]

Even better. If the private sector really is willing to fund this, then go for it. Just don’t expect the Federal government, or the taxpayers of the other 49 States who are the source of Federal dollars, to pay for it.

Not Enough

Posted on by
Reply

European managers say they’ve made a concerted effort to stop buying Russian oil when the barbarian invaded Ukraine. Then there’s Turkey.

Several times a month, tankers unload tens of thousands of barrels of oil products at a Turkish storage terminal in the port city of Mersin. The vast majority of the ships come directly from Russia.
And several times a month, tankers leave that facility carrying similar quantities bound for the European Union.

In that alleged effort, those managers neglected Turkey. Now they’re claiming to be increasing “scrutiny” of that Turkish port and others.

I claim those managers’ neglect was largely intentional. I claim they consciously chose to ignore Turkey’s long relationship with Russia. Turkish enterprises, and the Turkish government, have long been happy to broker Russian oil.

Even if the increased scrutiny leads to concrete action regarding Turkish ports and transshipments of Russian oil, it’s not enough.

European nations, in addition to actualizing their scrutiny, could stop buying Russian oil that passes through Turkey. It isn’t that hard to trace the provenance of most of that oil, and where the provenance can’t be determined, that should be sufficient reason to not buy that oil.

Deterring the PRC

Posted on by
Reply

Deterring the PRC

The editors at The Wall Street Journal are correct in one respect regarding convincing the People’s Republic of China that it cannot successfully fight us at sea, but the editors fall woefully short of what’s truly necessary. And so does the Trump administration, although it is taking more serious steps regarding our national defense and our national security than has any administration since Reagan.

Today’s 296-ship Navy isn’t large or capable enough to prevent a war in the Pacific while deterring bad actors elsewhere. China is amassing military power with one adversary in mind: the US. This threat demands a diverse mix of firepower, including more stealthy submarines, longer-range aircraft, a deep cache of long-range missiles spread across more ships, and an unmanned fleet to deter an invasion across the Taiwan Strait.

Our Navy badly needs that, but it needs much more than that. It needs more combat ships, building rapidly to at least a 500 combat ship fleet, it needs more cargo ships capable of replenishing at sea those combat ships of everything from ammunition of all types, fuel, and such consumables as potable water and food. It needs better ship- and fleet-wide defenses capable of much earlier detection of incoming fires and countering those fires, including the PRC’s ship-, air-, and ground-launched hypersonic missiles. It needs hardening against EMP attacks and cyber attacks against shipborne software. It needs improved capability against PRC ECM measures. It needs its own ECM capability to isolate PRC shipping—surface and subsurface—from its command centers and from each other. It needs countermeasures capable of blinding PRC aircraft and missiles. It needs longer range and better detection systems against the PRC’s growing and increasingly capable submarine fleet.

Our Navy needs also to be backstopped by other services and measures, especially in cyber warfare and in space. When the PRC attacks our fleet, we need to be able to counter those attacks, at least in part, from space, kinetically and electronically. We need to fragment with cyber measures the PRC’s onshore energy distribution infrastructure. We need, with cyber measures, to isolate the PRC government from the PLA, and we need fragment the PRC government, preventing the several branches from talking to each other electronically.

And one more major improvement.

New battleships for the US Navy will “help maintain American military supremacy, revive the American shipbuilding industry, and inspire fear in America’s enemies all over the world,” Mr Trump said Monday. “We’re going to start with two” ships and “quickly morph into 10,” he said, with lasers, guns, missiles, and more.

We need all those things, but we need them now, not in 10 or 15 years. We need to get rid of the development and acquisition bureaucracy that infests DoD and replace it with personnel and procedures that streamline the process and get systems from the drawing board into production much faster than that. In conjunction, design and mission creep must be put to an end, with both frozen early rather than being allowed to continue past laying down keels.

2027 is two years off, and that’s when PRC President Xi Jinping intends to begin his war of conquest against the Republic of China, and in support of that, that’s when he will have the PLA attack our Navy. Nor will his attack be limited to that. His announced goal is to dominate us, and the PLA’s doctrine is total war across the entire spectrum. This has been clear for more than 20 years, since publication of Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s Unrestricted Warfare, China’s Master Plan to Destroy America in 2002.

Time’s a-wasting, and our freedom, every bit as much as the RoC’s, is in the wind since what we have in being is not much deterrence.