Proportional Responses

Last week, Iran-backed terrorist organizations in Iraq fired rockets into an Iraqi military base that housed, among others, American and British soldiers, killing two American soldiers and one British soldier, a medic.

In response, we struck some of those terrorists’ operating locations.

The US strikes targeted five separate weapons storage facilities in Iraq associated with Kataib Hezbollah, a Shiite militia group operating in Iraq that US officials said has frequently targeted bases where American service members are based.
The strikes aimed to degrade the group’s ability to conduct future attacks against US and coalition forces….

And this:

The strikes were “defensive and proportional,” the Pentagon said….

On this, “the Pentagon” is dead wrong.

Tit-for-tat is not proportional; it just facilitates action-reaction cycles with mounting damage, casualties, collateral casualties, and collateral damage. This is demonstrated by a subsequent terrorist rocket attack on the same base Saturday, this one wounding three of our soldiers and two Iraqi soldiers.

A proportional response isn’t a tit-for-tat one, it doesn’t aim to degrade anything. It is an overwhelming one that destroys our enemy’s ability to act further in hostility. That is what stops the action-reaction cycle and holds down the totality of damage and casualties.

Proportionality must be considered against the overall, long-term situation, not against any single event.

Some Coronavirus Perspective

To put some perspective on national coronavirus infection levels, I’ve picked out some nations that have been in the news lately.  Coronavirus cases are drawn from Johns Hopkins University as of 14 March, and the population data are from Wikipedia. The per capita normalization is from third grade arithmetic.

I’ve emphasized one nation of particular interest.

Population Coronavirus Cases Per Capita Cases (per 10,000) Deaths Per Cent Deaths per Case
People’s Republic of China 1,427,647,786 80,976 0.56720 3,189 3.93820%
Germany 83,149,300 3,758 0.45196 8 0.21288%
US  328,239,523 2,175 0.06626 47 2.16092%
Japan 126,150,000 725 0.05747 21 2.89655%
Republic of Korea 51,709,098 8,086 1.56375 72 0.89043%
Italy 60,317,546 17,660 2.92784 1,266 7.16874%
Republic of China 23,780,452 53 0.02229 1 1.88679%
Iran 83,183,741 12,729 1.53023 611 4.80006%

How Long Can Russia Hold Out?

What’s behind the oil price plunge and the associated stock index plunge?

Russia refused a Saudi Arabia deal to cut oil production during the current drop in demand for oil by an additional 1.5 billion barrels per day. This would have been on top of the 1.7 billion barrel per day cut begun some weeks ago in response to reduced oil demand driven by reducing Asian and European economic activity.

That reduced demand has been exacerbated by the coronavirus’ panic-driven impediment to overall economic activity.

In response to the Russians’ refusal the Saudis cut their price of oil by $6-$8 dollars and have said they’d increase their oil production by some 2.3 million barrels per day. In essence, the OPEC-agreed limits on oil output are completely withdrawn.

This has added stress to the Russian economy.

…the Russian ruble ha[d] its worst day since 2014, down more than 8% against the dollar.

Russian authorities on Monday pledged to use their $150 billion sovereign-wealth fund to support the economy and said the nation’s budget can withstand low crude prices for a decade.

But at what cost, what trade-offs? Given Russia’s financial commitments/needs to support its occupations of Ukraine and Georgia, its drive to build up its military, its cyber attacks against Ukraine, the Baltic States, and elsewhere around the world, it’s part in the joint development, with the People’s Republic of China, of Siberian resources, and on and on, for how long can Russia’s monetary reserves last, really? How long until Russia starts printing roubles, and triggering dangerous inflation?

And: do we have the stomach for lasting longer and doing better than Russia?

A British Proposal

In contrast with UK-EU negotiations, begun earlier this week, these are the high points of Great Britain’s suggestion of what a US-UK trade deal would look like.

  • reduce or remove tariffs for UK exports…US has indicated its intention to seek to reduce or remove UK tariffs on US exports in a UK-US FTA
  • customs procedures at the border are as facilitative as possible makes importing and exporting easier
  • address subsidies which have the potential to distort trade. Provisions for fair, effective and transparent competition rules could underpin liberalisation of trade between the UK and the US
  • a UK-US FTA as an opportunity to build on our global leadership in this area to develop a world-class [Intellectual Property] chapter

These form the core of an actual free trade agreement, one that is much better than the restrictive, anti-competition, anti-business straitjacket in which the EU wants to trap Great Britain and in which it wants to keep remaining member nations trapped.

The proposal itself can be seen in its entirety here.

Close

…but no cigar.  Senator Mike Lee (R, UT) has some thoughts on fixing the  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its secret FISA Court.  He’s on the right track, but his ideas fall short.

Lee wants to fix the FISA Court and tighten the parameters under which it operates. This Star Chamber cannot be fixed; it must be disbanded and the sections creating and empowering it must be rescinded from the FISA altogether.

There remains a need to guard against and to respond to espionage and interference efforts, and there remains a need for that response to involve investigations of American citizens who might be involved in those foreign assaults.  There remains a need to keep many of our responses and investigations secret—for a time—so as not to tip off the targets of our investigations, whether they’re foreign or American.

Counterbalancing that is the even more crucial need to protect Americans’ individual liberties, including those being investigated.  Especially the latter need protection; they’ve not been shown to have done anything wrong, but public suspicions would ruin the reputations of those actually innocent.

Our present Article III courts already are well-versed in handling secret warrants where necessary for domestic criminal investigations and for sealing records until it’s useful to release them or after sufficient time has passed that their release will not harm an ongoing investigation.  FISA warrants can be handled here.

Many of Lee’s other ideas, with some adjustments, will work just fine in a sealed Article III court.

He wants to expand the role of an amicus in FISA warrant applications beyond warrants involving a novel or significant interpretation of law.

amicus should advocate for the privacy and civil liberties of the person targeted.

The role needs to be expanded further. This new amicus should overtly act as Devil’s advocate and seek to expose weaknesses in the warrant application with a view to getting the application denied. The target legitimately cannot be present, yet in most domestic criminal cases, the target has opportunities to contest the warrant, even if only after the fact.  Such a contest needs to be present with FISA warrants, as well.

Lee wants relevant agencies to be required to provide all information in their possession as part of the application, including any exculpatory evidence. The FBI Director and the Attorney General should be required to certify that this has been done, and there needs to be heavy sanctions applied to the agents, the Director and the AG if this requirement has been found, after the warrant’s submittal, to have gone unsatisfied. It’s almost never enough merely to punish the workers directly responsible; too often they acted improperly because they were actively allowed to or because they were permitted to by too lax supervision.

It’s critical that we take these kinds of measures in response to the failures of and abuses from the present FISA setup so that this sort of violation of United States citizens never happen again.