Category Archives: rights

Government and Due Process

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Senator Barbara Boxer (D, CA) and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D, UT) want to bar American citizens from leaving the country solely on the basis of the say so one of the collections of President Obama’s decried “unelected officials”—this time the bureaucrats of the IRS.

Boxer’s Senate Bill 1813, “Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act” (MAP-21), is “AN ACT To reauthorize Federal-aid highway and highway safety construction programs, and for other purposes.”  Reid tacked on to this his amendment, which reads in part (it’s in Section 40304 of this 1,700 page bill):

If the Secretary [of the Treasury] receives certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that any individual has a seriously delinquent tax debt in an amount in excess of $50,000, the Secretary shall transmit such certification to the Secretary of State for action with respect to denial, revocation, or limitation of a passport….

Hmm….

The Editor of the Congressional Quarterly publication’s Senate Watch, Niels Lesniewski, insists that such a thing has legal precedent:

Existing law says that passports may not be reviewed for applicants owing child support in excess of $2,500.  So I think supporters would say: “You can’t get a passport if you don’t pay child support, but you can get a passport if you don’t pay taxes?”

But this is a red herring.  The deadbeat parent has been found in open court to be guilty of the arrearage.  An IRS filing of notice, which is all Reid’s amendment requires, is not even an accusation of tax evasion, as Constitutional Lawyer Angel Reyes points out, much less an actual conviction for tax evasion.  Reyes expanded on the point:

It takes away your right to enter or exit the country based upon a non-judicial IRS determination that you owe taxes.  It’s a scary thought that our congressional representatives want to give the IRS the power to detain US citizens over taxes, which could very well be in dispute.

Our Bill of Rights’ 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Amendments each carry very a strongly implied right to due process, and the 14th Amendment makes that right explicit.  But, then, as the Progressive opinionist, Ezra Klein, has already pronounced, the Constitution isn’t binding on anyone.

This is a bad amendment, and one marvels at the cynicism of the Progressive Senators in attaching such a wholly irrelevant amendment to what is, at bottom, an attempt at a jobs bill.  If they really believed in the legitimacy of this concept, they’d put it into a separate bill of its own and bring it to the floor for open debate.

One marvels further, though, at the margin of passage: this bill passed out of the Senate on a 74-22 vote.  There are entirely too many RINOs in the Senate.

It’s Not My Fault

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In his diatribe against the Supreme Court over its potential (not realized) to overturn the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, President Obama is not demonstrating a breathtaking ignorance of our Constitution or of the Federal Courts’ power of review of Congressional legislation.  Instead, he’s just beating an old familiar drum: any failure is somebody else’s fault.

In “framing the court as a potential villain that substitutes its judgment for that of elected legislators,” he’s just setting up the next set of villains in his serial pulp novel, I Didn’t Do It.

Mr. Obama ticked off a string of popular benefits that would disappear if the law is shot down….

Thus, Obama cynically ignores the fact that, were they good ideas, they could have been enacted, after public debate rather than locked door deals, through constitutional legislation.  Or he could have let a free market agree that they’re good ideas and generate a (potentially large) niche for them.

But Mr. Obama…said he was confident the high court would not [strike down PPACA], partly because conservatives—who are in the majority on the court—have long argued against what some refer to as legislating from the bench.

He, just as cynically, conflates upholding the Constitution as judicial activism.  Also,

He said that without the mandate, it would be impossible to require insurance companies to cover everybody, including those with pre-existing conditions, at a reasonable price.

He ignores the fact that it’s impossible to require this at any price.  A free market, however, would allow such coverages at costs commensurate with the risks being transferred.

President Obama, through his Press Secretary Jay Carney, even argues with a straight face that for the Court to overturn PPACA would be to undo 80 years of precedent vis-à-vis the Commerce Clause.  This disingenuously ignores recent Commerce Clause overturnings that others have described.  Even more disingenuously, it ignores the fact that those “80 years of precedent” began with Supreme Court’s overturning of 100+ years of Commerce Clause precedent in Jones & Laughlin and Wickard—the former by a Court thoroughly intimidated by FDR’s court packing effort, and the latter carried out by an FDR-packed Court, a Court in which 8 of the 9 Justices were FDR appointees.

And it puts Obama in the strange position of implying that Brown was wrong because it overturned 80 years of precedent flowing from Plessy.

It’s not my fault.  The devil made me do it.

Our Government at Work

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This time, it’s Homeland Security, and its move to confuse and then steal from, an American family, that is hard at work.  The present case involves a couple and their two-year-old daughter traveling from George Bush International Airport in Houston, TX, to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the wife’s city of birth and a cash-and-carry city, where they planned to stay for two months visiting her family.  At the airport, TSA agents confiscated every dollar the family had on them because they were confused both about what constituted “currency” in the agents’ eyes and were uncertain about the amount of money they had on them and in their luggage.

Their case wound up in Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas; here are some excerpts from District Judge Lynn N. Hughes’ ruling [emphasis mine]:

The government presented no evidence—none—that the Joneses intended to evade the reporting requirements.  Kyle told Hernandez that he did not know the amount of money he was carrying.  Saying “I do not know” is not a deliberate failure to report.  After Hernandez insisted on an answer, Kyle said that he would have to guess.  Guessing is not a material omission or a misstatement of fact—certainly not one the government can use to steal the money.

and

These public servants sought to earn credit with their agency by collecting money.  Some of it is returned to the agency—like justices of the peace whose pay is derived directly from the fines they impose. They focused on bureaucratic imperatives—not their duties to the public and law.

and

A lack of leadership at the agency allowed this.  Its mission statement—which none of the officers could recall at the trial—is to serve the American public with vigilance, integrity, and professionalism.  They displayed none of these.  The agency says that integrity is its cornerstone; that its officers are guided by the highest ethical and moral principles.  A gang of armed security officers bullied this family—a family who cooperated with the officers to their detriment.  Our homeland will not be secure by these rascals.

While Mr and Mrs Jones, the parents in this traveling family, might be derided for not knowing how much money they had with them, this is neither illegal, evidence of illegality, nor actionable under any other guise of interest to Homeland Security.  Nevertheless, on being pressed to fill out (legitimately required) forms declaring the amount of money the Jones were taking out of the US based solely on their guess, their money then had been seized in its entirety, without allowing the Jones to correct their error.  It’s also important to note that the amount stolenseized was over $31,000 and that the recommended penalty for an actual evasion of this type is a forfeiture of $500-$5,000.

Judge Hughes ordered the Jones’ full $31,131, the amount seized, returned to them and she awarded the Jones court costs and legal fees.  I would have added to that the $1,500 the Jones were required to pay for a new airline ticket, this assault having forced them to miss their scheduled flight; the cost of the hotel room they were forced to get while waiting for that next-day flight; and the value of their time consumed by this wholly unnecessary delay.

The complete opinion is short and to the point, and it can be found here.

Note, though, that despite my (and others’) pontificating on this, it’s not Homeland Security’s fault.  After all, as DHL Secretary Janet Napolitano said in another case,

Look, everybody has a role to play. … And if people don’t want to play that role, if they want to travel by some other means, of course that’s their right. This is the United States….

A Bill Under the Commerce Clause

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Some view the Constitution’s Commerce Clause as granting to the Congress expansive powers of Federal control of intrastate activities, individual activities, and even the thoughts of private citizens.  A supine Supreme Court has supported this view.  Wickard v Filburn, for instance, agrees that Congress can regulate privately carried out agricultural activities, and NLRB v Jones & Laughlin extends that to manufacturing activity that occurs wholly within a state—an activity that prior to Jones & Laughlin was considered separate and distinct from any commerce-related process.  With these rulings in mind, a Federal District judge, Gladys Kessler, has even held that this Commerce Clause control extends into the private thoughts of individual citizens (Mead v Holder).

The line of reasoning for this startling evolution can be summarized in Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’ majority opinion in Jones & Laughlin: activities that are intrastate in character (which rather tautologically includes those individual activities) are regulable under the Commerce Clause when they bear a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.”

Agriculture is such an intrastate activity when the processes of field preparation, sewing, growing, and harvesting are considered separately, and separately from any subsequent process of bringing that harvest to market.  Likewise, manufacturing is such an intrastate activity when the processes of gathering equipment and locally procured supplies, the assembly of those supplies into finished product, and their in-plant inspection are considered separately, and separately from any subsequent process of bringing those finished products to market.  However, since Wickard and Jones & Laughlin hold such activities to bear a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce,” it is reasonable to hold that any activity that impacts those processes of agriculture and manufacturing also bear a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.”  Such activities here plainly include union strikes and boycotts.

Accordingly, I propose a simple, one-page bill (no 2,000+ pages for me) that bans union strikes and boycotts, citing the Commerce Clause as the constitutional authority for such a ban.

It would be interesting to hear the Commerce Clause objections to such a bill.  What rationalizations might be offered?

The Supreme Court and Rule By Law

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Steven Hayward, at Power Line, wonders whether the Supreme Court could take a mulligan on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act case before them.  The background for his question is this:

What people forget is that Citizens United was reargued, because the Justice Department also could not give a coherent answer to a killer question, this time from Justice Alito, as to whether the campaign finance laws that prohibited the distribution of Hillary, the Movie wouldn’t also allow the Federal Election Commission to regulate the distribution of books near election day.  Then-solicitor general Donald Stewart answered Yes, notwithstanding that pesky little First Amendment thingie.

Alarmed, the Court ordered the case reargued, specifically expanding its scope to ask whether certain previous cases that provided the basis for Stewart’s answer had been erroneously decided and should be overruled.  During the second oral argument, a new solicitor general—Elena Kagan—was asked the same killer question, and answered: “No [we can’t regulate books]; the government’s position has changed.”

Stop and dwell on that one phrase for a moment: “The government’s position has changed.”  That says about all you need to know about the rule of law in the liberal wonderland of today’s administrative state.

The question in the Court’s present PPACA case that raised Hayward’s concern was Justice Kennedy’s “Can you create commerce in order to regulate it?”

The question I have, though, concerns the Court’s position on the rule of law vs rule by law.  Why did the Court need to wait on the Executive’s instruction to it of the distinction between one form of free speech and another form of the same speech?  Surely it knows that there is no distinction, and it can rule on its own initiative.  Surely, it could have recognized on its own judgment that a proper ruling in Citizens (i.e., that speech really is a matter of freedom) would require acceptance that it had decided erroneously on earlier cases, and that those opinions would have to be overruled.  How many times was Brown argued on the recognition that Plessy would have to be overruled?

Surely the Court knows that when commerce does not exist, there is nothing to regulate, and by extension, government cannot create commerce out of the æther in order to have something to do.

That this Court needs these answers makes me wonder about its own attitude toward rule of law.  It got Citizens right, but it shouldn’t have needed additional (and in the event both erroneous and irrelevant) instruction from the Executive in order to do so.  It shouldn’t need additional instruction here, either.