A Gun Control Loss

The gun rights sheriff incumbent, David Clarke Jr, defeated his Democratic primary challenger for the Milwaukee (Wisconsin) County job (and he’s in because there’s no Republican challenger for the fall general election). This also had been, among other things, a referendum on ex-New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s gun control philosophy, as that one had thrown down $150,000 on TV ads in his own attempt to influence the election.

However, primary challenger Milwaukee Police Lt Chris Moews‘ own justification for gun controls demonstrates the fallacy of the gun control position:

If I have the opportunity to defend myself and my family I will do so to the best of my abilities but I’m certainly also going to call 911 if I have the ability because I need the cavalry to come and help me.

Indeed. Because the cavalry—those police on the other end of that 911 call—are minutes away, plus the time to make the call, the man on the scene is the one who must deal first with the situation.

Moreover, as Moews intimated, it might not be possible for the man on the scene to make the call, leaving him without aid in facing the threat.

And there’s Moews’ implied strawman that an armed man wouldn’t call 911 at all.

Forcing that man to remain unarmed maximizes the danger to him.

e pluribus unum

This post is adapted from a passage in Chapter 4 of my book A Conservative’s Manifesto.

What is the “many” in the title, the pluribus? When the phrase was first proposed for the Seal of the United States in 1776, it referred to the 13 States being joined into one nation. It has come to mean, in addition, the several peoples, religions, languages, heritages, and so on who come to the United States to join our great experiment in individual freedom and individual responsibility.

What is the one, the unum? That’s the point of this post.

We Americans take in and incorporate (note that verb) immigrants, and gladly so, for they bring fresh ideas as well as fresh approaches to old problems and a renewal of dedication to nation. However, we should not become our immigrants—they need to become Americans, or alternatively to recognize their resident alien status. Those who come to the United States do so for the opportunities here, and they’re welcome to share in these opportunities—immigrant and legal alien alike.   Immigrants come to America specifically for the economic opportunities, the political freedoms and opportunities, the sociological opportunities—in a word, for the American culture, which they know a priori to be different from their own—and which they understand to be the foundation of our American exceptionalism.

Immigrants need to adapt to, and assimilate into, our culture. Some will argue that this implies an imposition of a particular majority culture on minorities, but it is not an imposition. It is a recognition and an acceptance that to benefit from what America has to offer, to benefit from American opportunities, and to preserve these for Americans already present and for future Americans, native born and immigrant, it is necessary to preserve and to adapt to that which is America. Immigrants holding themselves apart denies to them the very reason they came—our opportunities and escape from the restraints of their old countries.

What immigrants must do is accept the current political structures, which they knew from the start, and take part in their new community. These new citizens, like the “original” citizens, must speak a common national language and share the commitment to maintaining and defending the nation. And so, having committed to the nation—to America—they will have their impact by engaging as citizens in our common discourse. However, this is not a demand for sublimation. On the contrary, once immigrants have become citizens, rather than having chosen to remain resident aliens, they can, they should, actively participate in that common discourse and make their influence concerning the nation’s goals and future through free discussion.

Parenthetically, the need to preserve these American attributes, these fundaments of American exceptionalism, emphasizes, also, the importance of providing civics courses that teach the American social contract and American citizenship in our schools, so as to reach all American citizens.

Freely Traveling and Peaceable Assembly

The US government offers no adequate method for people to challenge their placement on its no-fly list, a federal judge ruled Tuesday in a case involving 13 Muslims who believe they’re on the list.

US District Court Judge Anna Brown found people lack a meaningful way to challenge their placement on the list, which bars them from flying to or within the United States. She also said the 13 people who sued the government have been unconstitutionally deprived of their right to fly.

The Federal government’s no-fly list is treated as secret, and it’s through this list that the Federal government determines who is barred from flying from or to US airports.

Brown earlier had ruled people had a constitutional right to travel and via this list, the Federal government had violated that right.

How do I get from this to peaceable assembly? These 13 innocents, by their placement—against their will—in company with terrorists who are on the no-fly list is one path. The government’s denial of their right, through denying them a pathway, to protest against that association and be removed from it is another. Preventing these 13 from traveling via a transportation of their choice—and so of associating themselves with travelers of their choice (strangers they may be, but still fellow air travelers)—is a third path.

Obama Is Legally Allowed to Enforce—or Not Enforce—the Law

Amazingly, a professor at the University of Chicago’s law school wrote this in the New Republic, and he’s serious. Yet he cites not a single clause from the Constitution, not a single phrase, to support his…thesis.

Eric Posner wrote, among other things,

Would President Barack Obama, by refusing to enforce the immigration laws against millions of undocumented immigrants, be engaging in “domestic Caesarism,” as Ross Douthat charges [in a New York Times op-ed]?

…if he chooses not to enforce immigration laws against “up to half the country’s population of illegal immigrants,” as Douthat claims, the president wouldn’t be doing anything different from what his predecessors have done (or rather, not done).

There’s that Progressive morality, again. The rightness or wrongness of a behavior isn’t at all inherent in the behavior. No, the behavior’s morality is determined solely by whether someone else did it first or is doing it also.

And

The president cannot suspend or change the law: when he leaves office, the law will remain the same as it was, and the next president will be free to enforce it or not.

No, no president, nor Obama nor any “next president,” is free to not enforce the law (nor has any past president been, although past ones have been guilty of this, also; Posner is right on this much). Here’s what Article II, Section 3, has to say on the matter:

he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed

Full stop. There’s nothing in there about taking Care if he feels like it or taking Care not to faithfully execute.

And

The executive branch spends a lot of time not enforcing laws. Congress has illegalized an enormous amount of activity without giving the president the resources to enforce the laws, so the executive has no choice but to make a list of priorities and devote its attention to law violations that, in its opinion, are the most serious.

with

Nearly all of this non-enforcement takes place with implicit congressional acquiescence….

This merely means Congress may be failing its tasks, too (“may be:” Congress has no obligation to allocate money to be spent in amounts a president might demand. A case can be made, in fact, that Congress allocates too much as it is); it in no way legitimizes Presidential lawlessness. Certainly, a lack of resources does increase the difficulty for a President. However, the difficulty in no way legitimizes choosing not to enforce.

This is, also, a straw man. This President also chooses not to enforce laws for which he has the resources: the Business Mandate and the Individual Mandate of the ACA; border security; delivery of subpoenaed documents to the Congress that subpoenaed them, including Benghazi, Fast and Furious, the IRS; refusing to comply with Congressional oversight; the list runs on.

Then there’s this:

People like Douthat wrongly think that separation of powers means that the president must do what Congress decides. That’s not the principle of separation of powers….

This is another straw man. The Constitution gave the President executive power for the purpose, among others, to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, not to choose among them to enforce only those convenient to him. In this guise, the President must, indeed, do what Congress decides: he must enforce the laws that they pass—and that become actual law when he signs the bill and thereby enacts it, or when they pass it again, over his veto. To do otherwise is the principle of Executive supremacy, embodied in monarchies like an earlier Britain’s, against which we rebelled some years ago.

And this:

If Congress cannot pass any laws because of gridlock, then it has violated its obligations under the Constitution, and accordingly the president has the right to use his enforcement powers to implement policies that serve the public interest.

Of course, a President has no such right. There’s that pesky Art II, Sect 3 clause, after all, which also contains no syllable of authorization for a President to create “law” on which he might then presume to act. Further, in the entirety of that second Article of our Constitution, there’s no such “right,” or power, or authority identified.

Above all that, the President has no authority to decide what “policies…serve the public interest.” That’s the province of We the People, who are the public, and we make those determinations through our elected representatives in the Congress.

Posner’s piece goes on, but you get the idea.

Appellate Court En Banc Hearings

The DC Circuit a short time ago held in Halbig v Burwell that Federal regulations regarding Federal health plan exchanges violate Obamacare’s plain language: Federal subsidies, contrary to those regulations, are available only to health plan holders who got their plans through State-run health plan exchanges.

Adam White, in a recent Wall Street Journal piece in the context of that ruling and the Federal government’s subsequent appeal to the DC Circuit to rehear the case en banc, noted a couple of things.

One is how rare en banc (re)hearings are, especially for the DC Circuit:

The DC Circuit rehears virtually none of its cases. Each year the court’s three-judge panels make roughly 500 rulings, but the court averages roughly one en banc rehearing. This year has produced a bumper crop: two. The previous year: zero.

Then he got into why this is so.

…the court’s high standard, found in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure: en banc rehearing “is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered” unless the case satisfies one of two standards. First, an en banc rehearing may be needed to “secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions.” A three-judge panel is not allowed to overrule old precedents, even when precedents are in conflict; only the full court can do so, en banc.

Second, en banc rehearing is appropriate for what the federal appellate rules call cases of “exceptional importance.” For the DC Circuit, this standard has been met almost exclusively by cases raising serious constitutional issues. Over the past decade seven of the nine cases reheard en banc raised difficult questions of constitutional law, such as the rights of Guantanamo detainees or of terminally ill patients.

Cases that will substantially affect the court’s own workings also can be deemed of “exceptional importance.” In 2011, the court sat en banc to decide whether taxpayers could file lawsuits challenging IRS procedures for obtaining tax refunds.

Halbig was a straightforward application of the Obamacare law as it was written. That the 4th Circuit saw this differently isn’t relevant; the DC Circuit can only rehear its own cases, not those of sister appellate courts. There’s no precedent conflict here. Some might argue that the question has Constitutional significance, and I’d agree with them. However, neither set of litigants raised any sort of Constitutional question, and the case and the ruling turned on the law itself. There’s no Constitutional controversy here, either.

What about the case’s “exceptional importance?” Judge Harry Edwards, who dissented in Halbig, wrote this in a 1987 case [Edwards’ emphasis]:

[N]o judge agrees with all of the decisions handed down in the circuit….” But if each judge called for en banc rehearing simply to overturn a panel decision with which he personally disagrees, it would do “substantial violence to the collegiality that is indispensable to judicial decision-making.” Rather, en banc review must be reserved for “the rarest of circumstances… [with] real significance to the legal process.”

In the context ofHalbig, it’ll be instructive to see whether the DC Circuit’s newly appointed judges are appellate judges who happen to be Democrats or whether they are Democrats who happen to be appellate judges.