The Will of the People

The West Virginia House of Delegates has returned articles of impeachment against every one of the sitting Justices of the State’s Supreme Court.  One Justice, Robin Davis, has resigned her post, doing so before any of the impeachment cases proceed to the West Virginia Senate for trial.  In her resignation press conference, Davis complained

The majority members have ignored the will of the people who elected the justices of this court.  They have erased the lines of separation between the branches of government.

The will of the people in electing Supreme Court Justices is overruled, is it?  Certainly it has been—by the will of the people as expressed in their election of the Representatives who voted for (and against) the impeachment. Those elected Representatives will be subject to the will of the people again, and much sooner than the Justices would be—the one stands for election every two (Senators, who will conduct the trial, every four years); the other only every dozen years.

Beyond that, it’s a critical function of the Legislature to remove misbehaving people from government, including those of the other branches of government.  This is what impeachment and trial proceedings are for.

The will of the people is being well served.

Heads in the Sand

There is a Defcon computer security conference in progress at which a Voting Village hackers collection is busily hacking various voting machine manufacturers’ machines.  As McMillan and Volz put it in their Wall Street Journal piece about the Village,

These hacks can root out weaknesses in voting machines so that vendors will be pressured to patch flaws and states will upgrade to more secure systems, organizers say.

Sadly, many of those manufacturers are upset over it, even to the point of warning about voting software license abuse.  Even State government representatives don’t like the idea of testing this software’s and these machines’ security.  Here’s Leslie Reynolds, National Association of Secretaries of State Executive Director:

Anybody could break into anything if you put it in the middle of a floor and gave them unlimited access and unlimited time[.]

To a small extent, that’s a valid beef.  But only to a small extent: that direct access “in the middle of a floor.”  However, malicious hackers—for instance, Russian hackers, to say nothing of Iranian, People’s Republic of China’s, northern Korean’s, each of whom also have an interest in sowing doubt and causing outright disruption—have lots of time between now and our November elections, and they’ve had the last couple of years (at the least) already—a good approximation of unlimited time relative to the evolution of software and hardware.

In addition, Reynolds’ argument is a bit of a strawman.  No one is representing this hack-athon as the last word in the security investigation.  It is, though, a highly useful step in the process of locating security failures (vulnerabilities being a too-soft term) so they can be patched.

Election Systems & Software LLC, a leading manufacturer of voting equipment, was reluctant to have its systems tested at the conference. … Hackers “will absolutely access some voting systems internal components because they will have full and unfettered access to a unit without the advantage of trained poll workers, locks, tamper-evident seals, passwords, and other security measures that are in place in an actual voting situation.”

Sure.  Our stuff don’t stink, so there’s nothing to see here.  Move along.  Don’t investigate because we don’t want to know the problems.  They’d be invalid, anyway.

Jeanette Manfra, a senior cybersecurity official at DHS, actually sympathized with concerns that Village hackers could unintentionally lower Americans’ confidence in our election systems.  She’s wrong, though.  Responsible persons’ hiding their heads under their pillows, chanting, “La la la, I don’t hear you” are the ones lowering our confidence.  Pretending problems don’t exist is a thin shield, indeed, against those problems’ exploitation.

No.  The more objections there are to investigating and testing the security of our voting system, the more badly we need those investigations and tests.

An Oxymoron

Apple has chosen to conceal accesses to Infowars by removing links to it from Apple’s podcast facility because Apple thinks Infowars is too far right for Apple’s taste and because the site pushes bad speech.

This is rank censorship.

Eliminating easy access to Infowars podcasts marks a rare, prominent foray for Apple into an issue confronting many major internet companies: how to remove hateful or conspiratorial messages from their platforms without infringing on free speech.

This is an impossible task to achieve legitimately.  Our 1st Amendment is explicitly intended to protect unpopular or disgusting or hateful speech as well as “approved” speech.  The Amendment recognizes the ability of individual American citizens to think for themselves and to evaluate for themselves what speech they choose to hear, free from Government “advice.”

It’s true enough that the Amendment enjoins Government and not private enterprise.  However, the principle the Amendment protects is a universal one; it applies to all of us, individuals and enterprises alike.

Apple’s MFWIC, Tim Cook, clearly thinks he’s above all of this.  His attaboy for resisting the FBI’s demand that Apple destroy individuals’ ability to encrypt effectively their private communications has been used up.

Based on What Law?

Federal District Judge Robert Lasnik of the Western District of Washington has blocked, temporarily, the online distribution of blueprints for printing 3-D guns.  Lasnik’s temporary restraining order is subsequent to a settlement reached between Defense Distributed and State (which previously had blocked the posting of the plans) that functionally set aside State’s security objections to the posting.  The State of Washington, et al., then sued to reinstate the prior block.

In decrying the settlement that’s the subject of his TRO, Lasik wrote

the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement which, as described in the first paragraph of this order, will allow Defense Distributed to place downloadable CAD files for automated weapons printing on its website. No findings of fact or other statements are provided in the agreement that could explain the federal government’s dramatic change of position or that alter its prior analysis regarding the likely impacts of publication on the United States’ national security interests.

And

The proliferation of these firearms will have many of the negative impacts on a state level that the federal government once feared on the international stage….

Regardless of the merits of these concerns, though, they are political concerns, not judicial ones.  Lasik was wrong to intrude himself into the matter rather than referring it to the political arms of our government.

Illustrating the irrationality of a judge intruding into inherently political matters, Lasnik also wrote [cites omitted]

Under the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), the President of the United States is authorized “to control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services” “[i]n furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States.” “Defense articles and defense services” includes all firearms up to .50 caliber and all technical data related to such firearms, including information that “is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of” the firearms.

Replicas of Hawkin muzzle-loading rifles are of .50 caliber, or less.  Would Lasnik seriously entertain blocking export or import of these, too?

On the other hand, there’s this:

Some firearms experts played down the danger of these guns, saying most 3-D printers use materials that aren’t strong enough to produce a reliable firearm.

This is irrelevant.  The technology surely will evolve, and full-up, durable and reliable weapons will become 3-D printable, and the printers involved will come down in cost.  What is relevant here is the principle of the matter: should a US citizen be able to exercise his rights under our Bill of Rights and post such plans, or not?

Lasnik’s TRO can be seen here.