A Thought on Chevron Deference

Chevron Deference is a Supreme Court-created doctrine flowing from an appeal by Chevron Corporation to NRDC v Gorsuch, in which the Natural Resources Defense Council, during the Reagan administration, sued the EPA over a then-newly enacted regulation that allowed manufacturing plants to get pollution emission permits for new equipment that didn’t meet EPA emission requirements so long as the plant’s total emissions didn’t increase following the new equipment’s installation.

The Supreme Court found for the NRDC in Chevron’s appeal (Chevron USA v NRDC) and in the process created their Chevron Deference doctrine.  The heart of the doctrine, as articulated by Justice John Paul Stevens in writing for the majority, is this two-part test [citation and footnotes omitted]:

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created…program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”

Eliding the specifics of the case and appeal, what Chevron Deference says in essence is that the Court owes Executive Branch offices considerable deference in those offices’ interpretations of statutes and the regulations those offices implement to enact those statutes: the Courts’ opening position should be that those offices are correct in their interpretations and implementations.  The problem, though, is in Stevens’ last sentence and in the sentence he quotes:

…whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute[,]

and

The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created…program necessarily requires the formulation…of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.

Here is what the Constitution has to say on…gaps:

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Legislative powers—every single one of them—are the sole province of our United States Congress, and not any other body.  That Congress, too, consists solely of a Senate and House of Representatives; it does not include Executive Branch offices or Cabinets…or Agencies, administrative or otherwise.

What about those gaps in legislation?  All legislation, of necessity, fills gaps, whether those gaps exist de nihilo or they exist, or develop, as the law is seen in operation and/or as society evolves—else there’d be no legislation.  That includes, naturally, gaps in legislation.

When an (administrative) agency creates a rule to fill a gap in legislation that agency is authorized to administer, it is doing far more than formulating policy, or setting out rules for carrying into effect aspects of the legislation.  It’s legislating into that gap, which only Congress can (not may) do.

There’s also a problem with the concept of deference.  Regulating agencies are subordinate entities of the Executive Branch, and as such they cannot have any status but a subordinate one to each of the three branches of our Federal government.  From the other side of this relationship, the judiciary is a coequal branch of our Federal government, equal in status, hierarchy, and power and authority to each of the other two.  As such, Courts owe no deference at all to either of the other two branches, much less to agencies subordinate to either of those branches.  The mindset that the Courts do owe deference is a dangerous one.

The Chevron Deference doctrine is wrong.  The right answer for a Court in adjudicating a regulation has a different second step:

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is nearly the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress—so long as that intent is implemented in a constitutionally permitted manner, for if it has not then regardless of intent, the statute cannot stand.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, or allow an administrative interpretation to stand. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the answer for the court is to return the matter to the legislative (political) branch of the government so it can address what is strictly a legislative and a political question.

A Judicial Error Regarding the 2nd Amendment

A Federal trial judge in Seattle has ruled that it’s OK for the Federal government, in the form of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, to ban ammunition originally “designed” for AK-47 rifles.  The ammunition in question, Russian-manufacutered 7N6 armor-piercing rounds had been imported prior to BATF’s ban, to the tune of 100 million rounds, and as the importer, PW Arms Inc noted in its suit—the one in which the trial judge ruled for BATF—none of those rounds had been misused.  PW Arms noted in its suit

In fact, before ATF banned 7N6, this ammunition was used lawfully by sportsmen as rifle ammunition for target shooting.

In 2014, though, BATF decided it didn’t like this and instituted its ban.

The Seattle-based Federal judge screwed this one up badly.  As we all know, a ban on ammunition is a ban on the weapons that use them—which is a violation of our right to keep and bear those Arms.

This is another example, too, of the jeopardy in which our judiciary will be under a Clinton White House and Democratic Party Senate.

Another Reason This Election Matters

I wrote earlier about what a Clinton Supreme Court would look like.  President Barack Obama (D) already has largely succeeded in fundamentally altering our judicial system, an outcome obscured by the high profile battles fought over Supreme Court and DC Circuit Court nominations.

Obama has already appointed 329 judges to lifetime jobs, more than one third of the judiciary, and they’re already moving American jurisprudence in Obama’s direction. He got two left-leaning women onto the Court: Sonia Sotomayor, the first Hispanic justice, and Elena Kagan, his former solicitor general. He also flipped the partisan balance of the nation’s 13 courts of appeals; when he took office, only one had a majority of Democratic appointees, and now nine do.

That’s borne fruit, too.

His appointees have already taken the progressive side in cases involving issues like gay marriage and transgender bathroom choices, as well as cases involving his own health reforms and carbon regulations.

Democratic Party Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton says she intends to go even further.

Elections have consequences.  And the last two at the Presidential level already have had.

Cynical

The DC Circuit, in a mixed ruling, has said the trial court judge had erred in dismissing a collection of Tea Party suits he said had become “moot” because the IRS had apologized for its misbehavior and had said it had stopped such practices.

Of course, the IRS had said it had stopped—sort of—only conditionally.  DC Circuit Judge David Sentelle, writing for the majority (the ruling can be seen here), noted that the IRS only had suspended the screening “until further notice.”

A violation of right that is “suspended until further notice” has not become the subject of voluntary cessation, with no reasonable expectation of resumption, so as to moot litigation against the violation of rights. Rather, it has at most advised the victim of the violation—”you’re alright for now, but there may be another shoe falling.”

Sentelle took issue with “suspended,” understanding that suspension is not cessation.  He took separate issue with that “until further notice” bit, as noted above.

In fact, too, the IRS had not stopped at all.  As Sentelle noted,

…it is absurd to suggest that the effect of the IRS’s unlawful conduct, which delayed the processing of appellant-plaintiffs’ applications, has been eradicated when two of the appellant-plaintiffs’ applications remain pending.

After how many years are these applications still pending? It’s been two years since the trial court made its erroneous dismissal.

Of course, the trial judge knew these things. Based on his logic, too (even if he had been as ignorant as he seemed to be claiming he was), it would seem he would have dismissed charges against Willie Sutton had that worthy only apologized and averred he’s stopped. No consequence should ensue, this judge would seem to insist, for the banks Sutton had already robbed.

How cynical is that?

These are the trial courts and the IRS that will be heavily impacted by the Presidential elections.

The Hillary Clinton Supreme Court

I’ll leave aside specifics of Democratic Party Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s goals in appointing Supreme Court Justices.  The overriding goal of Clinton is to appoint Justices who meet a series of litmus tests, none having to do with the Justice candidate’s view of the Constitution.  A potential appointee must explicitly agree that Citizens United must be reversed.  A potential appointee must explicitly agree that limits to individual Americans’ right to keep and bear Arms must be subject to further government restrictions—including Government determining what weapons are fit for Americans to have (no “assault” weapons—defined by her Government—for instance).  A potential appointee must explicitly agree that voter ID laws, which protect the sanctity of an American’s vote, are anathema.  A potential appointee must explicitly agree that religious freedom is a matter of government determination with nothing to do with individual conscience.

Clinton’s goal, then, is to turn the Supreme Court away from an impartial judicial institution into one that is explicitly political, and one that will serve Progressive goals.  Regardless of what the Constitution actually says.

It won’t take many Clinton appointments, either, to turn the Court into her completely political institution.  Four of the existing Justices already are political judges rather than judges who uphold the Constitution.  Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg have said they consider the Constitution to be a living document that lives through “updating” reinterpretations to fit their views of the times—Article V and We the People be damned.  Ginsburg has gone even farther, deliberately entering the political fray and publicly stating her views of the unfitness of one of the current Presidential candidates, thereby prejudicing in advance her decisions on any case in which that President’s administration might become involved.  Justice Sonya Sotomayor has said the Court benefits from her “wise Latina” and empathetic talents—again, a political position and not a legal one.  Justice Elena Kagan has said that a judge’s personal values must guide the judge’s development of her opinion, not solely what the Constitution says—still another political, rather than legal, position.

Elections have consequences, and this one’s will last far longer than just the term of one administration.