A Judge’s Ruling on Female Genital Mutilation

Charges related to female genital mutilation were dismissed last week against Detroit doctor Jumana Nagarwala, who has a history of performing such “surgeries.”  Federal District Judge Bernard Friedman, of the Eastern District of Michigan, ruled that Congress had overstepped its authority in passing a law banning this FGM.

Sadly, the judge was right.  That law, passed in 1996, was done under our Constitution’s Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce (along with trade with foreign nations and with the Indian Tribes).

However, Friedman wrote,

That clause permits Congress to regulate activity that is commercial or economic in nature and that substantially affects interstate commerce either directly or as part of an interstate market that has such an effect. … There is nothing commercial or economic about FGM.  As despicable as this practice may be, it is essentially a criminal assault…. Nor has the government shown that FGM itself has any effect on interstate commerce or that a market exists for FGM beyond the mothers of the nine victims alleged….  There is, in short, no rational basis to conclude that FGM has any effect, to say nothing of a substantial effect, on interstate commerce.

The law as passed is plainly unconstitutional.  But why not allow the law to stand, anyway, given its attempt to bar [a]s despicable [a] practice as FGM?  Because, as Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote 100 years ago in the Child Labor Tax Case,

The good sought in unconstitutional legislation is an insidious feature because it leads citizens and legislators of good purpose to promote it without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant or the harm which will come from breaking down recognized standards.

As Friedman noted, seemingly in consistence with Taft, in his 21st century opinion,

As laudable as the prohibition of a particular type of abuse of girls may be…federalism concerns deprive Congress of the power to enact this statute.

And

FGM is “local criminal activity” which, in keeping with longstanding tradition and our federal system of government, is for the states to regulate, not Congress.

Here, though, Friedman has understated the case.  This is a Federal concern, and it is within the scope of Congressional authority to address FGM.

Congress must repass this law—though why it chose the Commerce Clause as the underpinning is beyond me—and it must address Friedman’s Federalism concerns.  One obvious path is that the protection of all Americans collectively and the liberties of each American individually are the role of the Federal government; some protections cannot be left to the individual States to effect—or to choose not to effect.  This is why free speech and religion, the right to keep and bear arms, protections against excessive searches—indeed, the entirety of our Bill of Rights—are Federal concerns, with only the means of implementing them left to the States.

Certainly, there needs to be a limit on what is considered a Federal crime (or civil prohibition or requirement)—even murder is a State crime and not a Federal one, as it should be.

But surely our inalienable right to the pursuit of Happiness, which John Adams explained so eloquently carries within it the rights of personal property and of personal security, is a Federal concern, not a matter to be left, federalistically, to the States.  That property right necessarily includes the property every individual has in his own person, and that security right necessarily includes the safety of that property in person (and more generally, the safety of the person himself), especially.  This was acknowledged overtly when we fought—and won—a civil war over slavery.

It must be the case, too, that that property and that security must include control over what is done with any part of an individual’s body and who permits the doing or refuses it, and FGM can and must be as protected against as the evil of enslaving the whole of an individual’s body or mind.

Accordingly, Congress must repass this law, or something very like it, but it ought to be passed under 5th Amendment’s due process clause

nor shall any person…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

and under the 14th Amendment’s due process clause

…nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

And that due process plainly allows a Congressional bar against clitorectomy/female genital mutilation.

That won’t put Nagarwala back on the hook for her past practices of mutilation—criminal laws that are retroactive are anathema to liberty—but it will allow for criminal prosecution and jailing of future such butcheries.

 

Friedman’s ruling can be read here.

A Bogus Beef

Recall CNN‘s Jim Acosta striking a White House intern (albeit lightly) and actively preventing her from doing her job.  In consequence of that, the White House suspended Acosta’s accesses to the White House.

Now CNN is suing the White House to get Acosta’s credentials back.  They’re doing it, too, on the risible grounds that the suspension violates Acosta’s 1st and 5th Amendment rights of free speech and due process.

Sure.

Acosta is in no way restricted from speaking his piece or from asking questions, either personally or in his capacity as a member of the press, although for the time being, he can’t ask his questions at White House pressers.  With regard to that last, the freedom of…the press, here personified by CNN, is in no way restricted since the suspension applies to Acosta personally: CNN is free to appoint another of its employees to attend such gatherings and ask such questions as CNN might consider useful.

Furthermore, getting credentials for access to the White House is a privilege, not a right; due process plainly does not apply.  On the other hand, striking White House personnel—or anyone else—however firmly or lightly is neither a right nor a privilege for anyone, much less for members of the press.

In my view, Acosta should not have his suspension lifted until his boss publicly apologizes for Acosta’s misbehavior.

The EU and National Sovereignty

Poland enacted a law at the start of the year that lowered the mandatory retirement age of all of its judges from 70 to 65.  This resulted, among other things, in the required retirement for 27 of the nation’s 72 Supreme Court judges (a too-big Court, anyway IMNSHO, and they ought not be replaced, but that’s a separate story).

The ruling Law and Justice (PiS [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość]) party says the changes are necessary to a justice system they say is controlled by an untouchable “caste” of judges steeped in communist-era mentality.

The European Union has demurred.

The Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice said Friday that Poland must delay implementation of a law that came into force earlier this year requiring early retirement for nearly 40% of the court’s judges. Poland could face fines if it doesn’t comply, but more significantly such a move would represent an unprecedented threat to the authority of the bloc’s top court.
The Polish judges sent into retirement must be allowed to return to work, the ruling said.

That supposed threat to the ECJ may, in fact, be the crux of the matter: the EU must reign supreme over the member nations.

Whether retiring the judges is a good idea or not is a good idea or not, it’s an internal, domestic affair for Poland to decide.

Joining the EU plainly requires the surrender of a potful of national sovereignty far beyond such outward looking matters as national borders, trade rules, and the like.

Future Nominations for Judgeships

A denizen of flyover country—Jan Graham of Nebraska, in fact—had a thought in her Letter to the Editor of Wednesday’s Wall Street Journal:

Every one of those Harvard and Yale law students protesting Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment should have their names written down and kept in case they want to be a judge someday. At that point their college-age record can be used to show that they don’t believe in due process and shouldn’t ever be considered for the bench.

Nor can they be considered, legitimately, for any prosecutorial office, Federal, State, or count/parish.

Full stop.

The ABA and Judicial Ratings

Judge, now Justice, Brett Kavanaugh is on the Supreme Court and hearing cases.  The American Bar association is still looking for relevance here.  The ABA, after first giving Kavanaugh glowing marks as a judge wrote to the Senate Judiciary Committee that it was “reopening” its evaluation—timing its letter for 5 Oct, just before the Senate’s floor vote on Kavanaugh’s confirmation.

The ABA was ignored when Kavanaugh, et al., were being evaluated for a Supreme Court nomination and again when Kavanaugh was nominated. That prior ABA endorsement was simply the association’s jumping on the band wagon.

Now its irrelevance is manifest, and the ABA is squalling and trying to get back in the game.  That’s all this is.  That’s all that lately letter was all about.

Now the chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, Paul Moxley, is claiming he’s being bullied by Association President Robert Carlson, and that lately letter was an example.

[I]f he’s [Paul Moxley] being bullied by Mr Carlson or Democrats on his committee, he ought to resign and say so publicly.

That’s what the worthies on the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal claim.

No. Bullies only have the power their putative victims choose to give them. If Moxley thinks “Carlson or Democrats” are trying to bully him, he should have the integrity to stay put and call them out publicly.

In the meantime, the ABA needs to figure out what it means when it says something, and stick to it.  That’s the road back to relevance.