Category Archives: Courts

It’s Not My Fault

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In his diatribe against the Supreme Court over its potential (not realized) to overturn the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, President Obama is not demonstrating a breathtaking ignorance of our Constitution or of the Federal Courts’ power of review of Congressional legislation.  Instead, he’s just beating an old familiar drum: any failure is somebody else’s fault.

In “framing the court as a potential villain that substitutes its judgment for that of elected legislators,” he’s just setting up the next set of villains in his serial pulp novel, I Didn’t Do It.

Mr. Obama ticked off a string of popular benefits that would disappear if the law is shot down….

Thus, Obama cynically ignores the fact that, were they good ideas, they could have been enacted, after public debate rather than locked door deals, through constitutional legislation.  Or he could have let a free market agree that they’re good ideas and generate a (potentially large) niche for them.

But Mr. Obama…said he was confident the high court would not [strike down PPACA], partly because conservatives—who are in the majority on the court—have long argued against what some refer to as legislating from the bench.

He, just as cynically, conflates upholding the Constitution as judicial activism.  Also,

He said that without the mandate, it would be impossible to require insurance companies to cover everybody, including those with pre-existing conditions, at a reasonable price.

He ignores the fact that it’s impossible to require this at any price.  A free market, however, would allow such coverages at costs commensurate with the risks being transferred.

President Obama, through his Press Secretary Jay Carney, even argues with a straight face that for the Court to overturn PPACA would be to undo 80 years of precedent vis-à-vis the Commerce Clause.  This disingenuously ignores recent Commerce Clause overturnings that others have described.  Even more disingenuously, it ignores the fact that those “80 years of precedent” began with Supreme Court’s overturning of 100+ years of Commerce Clause precedent in Jones & Laughlin and Wickard—the former by a Court thoroughly intimidated by FDR’s court packing effort, and the latter carried out by an FDR-packed Court, a Court in which 8 of the 9 Justices were FDR appointees.

And it puts Obama in the strange position of implying that Brown was wrong because it overturned 80 years of precedent flowing from Plessy.

It’s not my fault.  The devil made me do it.

The Supreme Court and Rule By Law

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Steven Hayward, at Power Line, wonders whether the Supreme Court could take a mulligan on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act case before them.  The background for his question is this:

What people forget is that Citizens United was reargued, because the Justice Department also could not give a coherent answer to a killer question, this time from Justice Alito, as to whether the campaign finance laws that prohibited the distribution of Hillary, the Movie wouldn’t also allow the Federal Election Commission to regulate the distribution of books near election day.  Then-solicitor general Donald Stewart answered Yes, notwithstanding that pesky little First Amendment thingie.

Alarmed, the Court ordered the case reargued, specifically expanding its scope to ask whether certain previous cases that provided the basis for Stewart’s answer had been erroneously decided and should be overruled.  During the second oral argument, a new solicitor general—Elena Kagan—was asked the same killer question, and answered: “No [we can’t regulate books]; the government’s position has changed.”

Stop and dwell on that one phrase for a moment: “The government’s position has changed.”  That says about all you need to know about the rule of law in the liberal wonderland of today’s administrative state.

The question in the Court’s present PPACA case that raised Hayward’s concern was Justice Kennedy’s “Can you create commerce in order to regulate it?”

The question I have, though, concerns the Court’s position on the rule of law vs rule by law.  Why did the Court need to wait on the Executive’s instruction to it of the distinction between one form of free speech and another form of the same speech?  Surely it knows that there is no distinction, and it can rule on its own initiative.  Surely, it could have recognized on its own judgment that a proper ruling in Citizens (i.e., that speech really is a matter of freedom) would require acceptance that it had decided erroneously on earlier cases, and that those opinions would have to be overruled.  How many times was Brown argued on the recognition that Plessy would have to be overruled?

Surely the Court knows that when commerce does not exist, there is nothing to regulate, and by extension, government cannot create commerce out of the æther in order to have something to do.

That this Court needs these answers makes me wonder about its own attitude toward rule of law.  It got Citizens right, but it shouldn’t have needed additional (and in the event both erroneous and irrelevant) instruction from the Executive in order to do so.  It shouldn’t need additional instruction here, either.

One for the Good Guys

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“The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant by ‘any person,’ without a permit, into ‘navigable waters’,” noted the Supreme Court in the summary of its just concluded ruling in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency.  It went on in that summary:

The Sacketts, petitioners here, received a compliance order from the EPA, which stated that their residential lot contained navigable waters and that their construction project violated the Act.

A little background at this point: the case got to the Supreme Court because Mike and Chantell Sackett began construction on their dream home in 2007, on a lot completely surrounded by a developed residential neighborhood, complete with lots of already existing sewer lines.

The EPA decided that this completely residentially surrounded lot had wetlands on it connected to navigable waters, and it issued a compliance order to desist from construction and to restore the wetlands (violation of the order carried potential penalties of $75,000 per day—for those keeping score at home, that works out to an accrued penalty of $130 million).  Rather than rolling over and giving up on their dream, the Sacketts sought relief in Federal District Court for the District of Idaho (their property was in Bonner County, ID), arguing among other things an illegal taking under the Constitution’s 5th Amendment.  The Court dismissed and the Ninth Appellate (of course) sided with the EPA and upheld the District Court.  After all, the Ninth held, the CWA has no mechanism for a private citizen to object to the EPA’s diktat, and so there was no standing to sue.  The Sacketts appealed to the Supremes.

The Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling was short and sweet in its essence:

The Sacketts may bring a civil action under the APA to challenge the issuance of the EPA’s order.

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, also had this to say about the government’s arrogance, particularly its claim that were EPA compliance orders subject to judicial review, the EPA’s ability to enforce clean water protections would be interfered with [emphasis mine]:

The Government warns that the EPA is less likely to use the orders if they are subject to judicial review.  That may be true—but it will be true for all agency actions subjected to judicial review.  The APA’s [Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for judicial review of agency rulings and orders] presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all.  And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into “voluntary compliance” without the opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.

Justice Samuel Alito, in a concurring opinion, added this about the government’s arrogance [emphasis added]:

The position taken in this case by the Federal Govern­ment—a position that the Court now squarely rejects—would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees. …

Until the EPA sues them, they are blocked from access to the courts, and the EPA may wait as long as it wants before deciding to sue. … In a nation that values due process, not to men­tion private property, such treatment is unthinkable.

Although this particular EPA abuse began under another administration, it remains a glaring example of the unbridled self-importance of the agency and of its routine reach for additional power.

It’s also clear example of the necessity of abolishing this agency: it’s too far, and for too long, out of control, and it is irredeemable.

2nd Amendment and the Fifth Circuit

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The Wall Street Journal‘s Law Blog has a description of an egregious gun rights case.  It seems that, when Errol Houston was arrested in New Orleans in 2009 on drug and firearm charges, the police seized a properly registered gun that he had.  So far, so good—when the police arrest someone, they’re allowed to disarm him, too.  However, when the charges were dropped, the city refused to return his weapon to him.  He sued for the return, and amazingly, the district court found for the city.  Even more amazingly, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ruling, with this…logic…written by Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale:

Just as some regulation of speech–e.g., of obscenity and defamation–is “outside the reach” of the First Amendment, so, too, is some regulation of firearms outside the reach of the Second.  The right protected by the Second Amendment is not a property-like right to a specific firearm, but rather a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.

Houston has not alleged defendants prevented his “retaining or acquiring other firearms.”  Therefore, he has not stated a violation of his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod dissented.  In addition to pointing out the degree of legality of the majority opinion, violating as it does the Supreme Court’s prior rulings in similar cases (vis., District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago), she also correctly explains the nature and meaning of the 2nd Amendment:

In the context of other enumerated constitutional rights, an equivalent per se exception for particular exercises of the right at stake (so long as other exercises of that right are permitted) would be intolerable.  Consider, for example, a court holding that the Free Speech Clause affords no protection against the government preventing the publication of a particular editorial in the New York Times because there are plenty of other newspapers that might publish the piece.  Or consider a court holding that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to the unreasonable seizure of a specific automobile so long as the government does not prevent the owner from borrowing, renting, or purchasing a replacement vehicle.  These examples should suffice to show the absurdity of courts recognizing categorical exceptions for each particular exercise of those rights.  In carving out such an exception from the Second Amendment, today’s majority impermissibly treats the Amendment as a “second-class right.”

Judge Elrod is right that the accessibility of alternatives is irrelevant—those alternatives are not the item itself, and the item itself remains the legitimate property of the owner.

Both the majority and Judge Elrod miss a larger point, though: the “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is, indeed, a property right, but it is a different and more fundamental kind that that alluded by Judge Barksdale and accepted by Judge Elrod.  This property is one flowing from the endowment imbued in us by our Creator, a property of our being.  As such, Judge Elrod is right, but she doesn’t go far enough.  It is the regulation of our endowed rights that is the exception, not the possession of this or that particular item in a realization of one or more of those rights.

A Ruling on the 2nd Amendment

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US District Judge Benson Everett Legg (Maryland District), in a Monday ruling has said that Maryland residents are not required, as a Marayland had had it, to convince authorities that they have a “good and substantial reason” to own a handgun.

Judge Legg wrote, among other things,

…the Court finds that the right to bear arms is not limited to the home. The signposts left by recent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law all point to the conclusion that Woollard‘s ―claim to self-defense—asserted by him as a law-abiding citizen…—does implicate the Second Amendment, albeit subject to lawful limitations.

He went on [emphasis mine]:

A law that burdens the exercise of an enumerated constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be considered “reasonably adapted” to a government interest, no matter how substantial that interest may be.  Maryland‘s goal of “minimizing the proliferation of handguns among those who do not have a demonstrated need for them,”…is not a permissible method of preventing crime or ensuring public safety; it burdens the right too broadly.  Those who drafted and ratified the Second Amendment surely knew that the right they were enshrining carried a risk of misuse, and states have considerable latitude to channel the exercise of the right in ways that will minimize that risk.  States may not, however, seek to reduce the danger by means of widespread curtailment of the right itself.  “[E]ven the most legitimate goal may not be advanced in a constitutionally impermissible manner.”

At bottom, this case rests on a simple proposition: If the Government wishes to burden a right guaranteed by the Constitution, it may do so provided that it can show a satisfactory justification and a sufficiently adapted method.  The showing, however, is always the Government‘s to make.  A citizen may not be required to offer a “good and substantial reason” why he should be permitted to exercise his rights.  The right‘s existence is all the reason he needs.

Maryland’s Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Fader, says he’ll appeal, saying “we” disagree, and taking note of the “very important implications of the ruling for public safety.”  He’s wrong, though, on two counts: in the first place, the public safety is maximized by hewing to the Constitution, not by deviating from it.  In the second place, he apparently wasn’t paying attention to the Legg’s ruling:

States may not, however, seek to reduce the danger [of misuse] by means of widespread curtailment of the right itself.

Judge Legg has the right of it.