A Justice…Misunderstands

Justice Ketanji Br own Jackson dissented strenuously with a Supreme Court ruling that, in part, upheld the Trump Administration’s request for an emergency stay of a lower court’s blocking of NIH from canceling $783 million worth of grants.

The money part of the woman’s (dare I use that term on a person who doesn’t know what a woman is?) dissent:

the high court’s way of preserving the “mirage of judicial review while eliminating its purpose: to remedy harms.”

No. Not at all. The purpose of judicial review is critically—and solely—to ensure that the action before it, along with the statute(s) involved, follow the text of our Constitution and the text of those statutes. Nothing more and nothing less.

But the woman wasn’t done with shredding (to use the in-vogue term) “judicial review” [emphasis added]:

It would have been much simpler for the Court to just announce that, regardless of the plain text of the APA or what Congress intended to authorize, we no longer accept that the Government’s grant-termination decisions are subject to arbitrary-and-capricious review or that vacatur of an arbitrary grant-termination decision is an available remedy.

The greatest harm that is in play here is ruling on the basis of a particular judge’s or Justice’s personal definition of “harm.” Yet, this is exactly what Jackson presumes to attempt with her setting aside the petty text of a statute from which her august self demurs.

The Supreme Court’s ruling, including Jackson’s dissent can be read here.

An Alternative

Or two. The Trump administration is kicking around the idea of taking a stake in companies that receive Federal funds pursuant to the 2022 Chips Act (formally the Chips and Science Act), 10% in Intel being one of the ideas in play. I have an alternative, although it likely would require a legislative modification to the Chips Act: structure the funding as a loan, the [10%] stake as collateral, and dissolve the stake when the loan is repaid.

Another alternative, also likely necessitating modification to the Chips Act, would be to structure the funding as a grant, with the stake dissolved after a [five] year period on satisfactory performance under the grant—suitably boosted domestic research and manufacturing.

Either of these alternatives would mitigate the risk of government-run “capitalism” by getting government back out of these enterprises once performance has been confirmed durably established. They’re similar, too, to the government bailout program of the Panic of 2008, with the critical addendum of a hard withdrawal of government on clearly measurable achievement of tightly defined milestone.