Clinton’s Signature

Much has been made of the fact that memos that, among other matters, denied requests for additional security for the Benghazi consulate went out over then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s signature.  In particular, the Left insists that it’s entirely routine for others to affix the boss’ signature to correspondence which the boss never actually sees, much less reads, before that correspondence goes out.

The Left is correct in this.  In large organizations, it is a commonplace practice for subordinates to generate and transmit correspondence that the boss never sees but on which, because of the subject matter involved, the boss’ signature is required in order to give the necessary weight to the correspondence.  State is no different in this regard.

What the Left omits to mention, though—and what the right has missed—is that when subordinates put the boss’ signature on a document, it’s done strictly in accordance with a carefully specified policy, developed and promulgated by that boss, that lays out the subjects and types of correspondence for which this is permissible.  And the boss is briefed, usually beforehand and if not as soon as possible after transmittal, on the content of what he just “signed.”

Clinton knew full well what sorts of correspondence were going out over her signature, and she knew full well the contents of the particular correspondence in question: that she was denying upgrades to Benghazi security that were being requested, repeatedly, by the Benghazi security team and by the Chief of Mission, the soon-to-be-murdered Ambassador Chris Stevens.  That correspondence was executed entirely in accordance with her carefully designed policy.  That she denied the requests of her experts on the ground, and now denies knowing that she denied, speaks volumes about her competence and her integrity.

Alternatively, it’s entirely possible that Clinton, as she claims, really didn’t know what was being sent out over her signature.  Since the policy governing those transmittals and their associated briefings was entirely hers, such a failure also speaks volumes about her competence.

A Thought on Taxes

As the idea of reforming our mendaciously Byzantine tax code starts to come up again—whether as a reform in its own right or as a bargaining chip in the coming debt ceiling debate (which debate properly focuses on cutting spending more than on taxes)—some thoughts occur to me, triggered by a couple of recent Wall Street Journal articles.

One thought concerns the purpose of tax reform.  The Progressives in government, led by President Barack Obama, Senators Chuck Schumer (D, NY) and Majority Leader Harry Reid (D, NV), and Congressman Sander Levin (D, MI, Ranking Member on the Ways and Means Committee) insist that the purpose must be to raise yet more revenue for government, while most Republicans and generally all Conservatives insist that the purpose must be both to make the system fairer and to leave more money in the hands of the folks who earned it—which does not include government.

Levin actually argues in all seriousness

I don’t see how you do it without a major tax cut for the very wealthy.  And to make [the revenue] up, I think that means a tax increase for the middle class. I don’t see how else you do it.

But Levin, and his fellow Progressives generally, don’t explain why they have such disdain for this group of Americans.  Their bias is well-established, but it’s less important than another Progressive failure: their decision not to justify the government’s—or their own—”need” for more revenue.  The Progressives’ need is well understood—it’s to feed both their addiction to the dependency of others on their own power to dole out goodies to those dependents and to consolidate their personal political power.  But based on what theory must government have more revenue?  These worthies cynically decline to explain that at all.

Progressives (and too many Republicans) complain that cuts in taxes (or spending, come to that) will hurt this or that or those programs, but this simply begs the question.  They have yet to demonstrate either that the programs actually are necessary, and subsequently, that government can do them better than the private sector: private enterprise, charity/church, local communities, NGOs, etc.

There is an alternative to “paying” for a tax reform that reduces revenue to the government (eliding the fact that the resulting burgeoning economy will, on net, produce an increase in the government’s revenue collections).  That is to cut spending to fit within the revenues collected.  But that’s inconceivable to too many in government.

Government certainly can, and should, fill the shortfalls and failures, but there must be failure or shortfall before government legitimately can act.

Congressman Kevin Brady (R, TX, Joint Economic Committee Chairman), in the other WSJ article wrote of a practical aspect inhibiting real tax reform, and that is the inaccuracy of the underlying data.  I won’t go into the statistical arcana that are at the center of this problem; suffice it to say that there is a difference between the meanings of the median and mean (what we normally think of with “average”) of a collection of data, in this case the tables of tax data broken out by various categories involving income levels and who pays taxes currently—what Brady refers to as Tax Distribution Tables.

These tables are used to assess the outcomes of various tax proposals (and their degree of progressivity, that is by how much the higher income are required to pay more than the middle and lower income).  Misuse of the data in these tables can lead to misleading assessments of proposal outcomes.  Brady wrote

The tables use averages—rather than medians—to characterize changes in tax liabilities by income groups (or quintiles).  But averages are wildly unrepresentative for this purpose.  For example, the study found that the average tax liability for the second quintile (with adjusted gross incomes between $11,100 and $24,000) represents just 1.1% of the taxpayers in that quintile.  The average reflects a mere 31.9% of taxpayers in the fourth income quintile ($42,600-$76,600).

The average adjusted gross income for all tax returns…was $59,800 while the median is only $32,200.  The average tax liability was $8,000 while the median is $1,500.  This dramatic difference suggests how much confidence one can place in these tables as a guide to policy makers.

And

The tables group taxpayers by income categories without regard to other relevant factors.  In reality, income alone has little in common with tax liabilities—that is, how much a taxpayer owes the government—because of differences in the size and composition of households, the type of income, and the amount of deductions and exclusions.

The tables miss two other important aspects of our tax code, also, stemming from the fact that they are static snapshots and so cannot illuminate the dynamics of an American taxpayer, or the collection of us.  For instance:

Tax-distribution tables cannot capture one of the most salient characteristics of the U.S. tax code—the decreasing share of taxes paid by the bottom 50% of taxpayers and the increasing share of taxes paid by the upper 1%.

And

Tax-distribution tables are momentary snapshots that ignore income mobility.  …  The nonpartisan Tax Foundation found in a study on income mobility in 2010 that nearly 60% of the households in the lowest quintile moved into a higher income group between 1999 and 2007, while almost 40% of households in the top quintile fell by at least one quintile. The…traditional tax tables [are] obsolete shortly after they are published.