Another Thought on Privacy

David Kravets, writing in ars technica had one concerning a couple of cases coming before the Supreme Court dealing with the legitimacy of warrantless searches of cell phones and other digital devices pursuant to an otherwise legitimate arrest.

President Barack Obama’s administration and prosecutors from states across the country have lobbied for police officers to be able to search arrestees’ gadgets—at or about the time of arrest—without a warrant. Such action, however, demands an examination of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” If nine out of 10 American adults own mobile phones and the devices have advanced to become virtual extensions of our personal and private lives, at what point does law enforcement’s access to their call logs, photos, and cloud-hosted data become “unreasonable” invasions of constitutionally protected privacy?

Indeed. It’s also necessary to keep such ancillary searches in context. The courts long have held that when a man is arrested, the police can pat him down, even do cursory inspections of his car if that’s where he was arrested—look in the trunk, for instance—to be sure he has no weapons that would enable him to harm the arresting officer(s) or devices that would facilitate him attempting to escape from them.

It’s clear, though, or it should be clear, that the electronic contents of a cell phone or of a laptop or…can present no danger of either of those possibilities.

It’s also apparent that the two characters in the cases before the Supreme Court are unsavory at best. It’s also clear that the cursory search of the car David Riley was driving at the time of his arrest was both legitimate and fruitful—the police found weapons secreted in it. However, the persons’ unsavoriness is not an excuse for proceeding with the illegitimate, in my view, searches of their cell phones—there were no dangers to be found in those electrons; a search warrant should have been obtained before the searches conducted.

If such warrantless searches are allowed, what’s to stop government from expanding the scope to the less unsavory among us? To the entirely savory, other than those of whom government disapproves (IRS, anyone)?

There wasn’t even any danger of evidence contained in the phones being destroyed before the warrants could be issued; the cells were safely in police custody.

In one of the two cases, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli Jr made explicit a part of the Federal government’s rationale for such warrantless searches:

[J]ustices “should not deprive officers of an investigative tool that is increasingly important for preserving evidence of serious crimes based on purely imaginary fears that police officers will invoke their authority to review drug dealers’…’appointments with marital counselors’ or armed robbers’ ‘apps to help smokers quit.'” (Verrilli was citing examples lodged with the court by the Center for Democracy & Technology.)

Yet in making this argument, Verrilli has shown his utter lack of understanding of our social compact. Our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution are designed to carry out exactly that prior restraint, because ultimately government cannot be trusted to restrain itself. This is what John Adams was talking about when he wrote to his wife

Liberty, once lost, is lost forever.

“Not Private, Not Protected”

A brief comment, just for clarification; although the point being clarified isn’t trivial.

Colorado has a bill wending its way through the state legislature that would tighten restrictions on government access to an individual’s private information. The bill would refer

a question to voters in November asking whether law enforcement should get warrants to search electronic data, such as phone and email records, or personal data stored in a cloud. If approved by lawmakers and voters, the requirement would be added to the state constitution.

Senate President Morgan Carroll (D), who supports the bill/amendment had this to say about the matter:

I think a lot of people weren’t necessarily aware of how much their information may actually be not private, not protected.

No. Carroll’s heart is in the right place, but he misunderstands the crucial thing. Private and protected are not the same thing. It’s often (usually) necessary to protect private things, like our electronic data, but a lack of protection in no way eliminates the essential privacy of the thing. To give up privacy, a separate act is necessary: the thing must explicitly and affirmatively be placed into a public venue.

Even the act of explicitly and affirmatively placing the thing into the hands of a third party does not cancel the essential privacy of the thing: we expect that third party to take sufficient measures to protect, not just the thing itself, but its privacy also.

What Personal Data? It’s Government’s Data

And we don’t care about its security.

Security experts worried that 35 state health exchange websites were vulnerable to hackers and were rated as “high risk” for security problems before ObamaCare’s launch….

Fears that the health law’s websites could put consumers at risk have plagued the program’s rollout from the beginning, but the administration told The Associated Press that the documents offer only a partial and “outdated” snapshot of an improving situation.

Never mind that “improving” now doesn’t alter the fact that the security failures existed at the time of the rollout.  And HHS rolled out their ObamaMart, anyway.  For example:

In order to connect to Federal computers, state and other outside systems must undergo a security review and receive an “authority to connect.”

With [Obamacare], states needed approval to connect to a new Federal data hub, an electronic back room that pings Social Security, the Internal Revenue Service, Homeland Security to verify personal details….  The hub handles sensitive information, including income, immigration status and Social Security numbers.

[In an] email from Sept 29, a Sunday two days before the launch, Teresa Fryer, chief information security officer for the Federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, wrote of the state security approvals, “The front office is signing them whether or not they are a high risk.”

…CMS administrator Marilyn Tavenner approved nine states to connect although the approval document noted that “CMS views the October 1 connections to the nine states as a risk due to the fact that their documentation may not be submitted completely nor reviewed…by Oct. 1.”

The Obama view of citizens’ personal security: “Hey, we got away with it; nothing bad happened.  We think.  It’s all good.”

Health Plans vs Emergency Cash Savings

In light of the rapidly rising cost of health “coverage,” courtesy of Obamacare, I thought I’d offer a few thoughts comparing health plans with emergency cash savings.  To concretize things, let’s say a medical emergency costs $50,000.  A three-person household consisting of 43- and 41-year old parents and a 16-year-old child, a family with an $85,000 annual income in Collin County, Texas might select a Silver Plan from the ObamaMart that has a $681 monthly premium and that pays 70% of covered medical expenses after deductible and copays (this Plan has a $12,700 annual deductible with copays of $500 for ER and $250 for a hospital stay of any length, but let’s ignore these for this comparison.  On the other hand, let’s say the $50k medical event is a comprised of items that are covered under the Plan.  Also, it should be clear that, even though I’m positing a three-member family, the principles illustrated would apply to a family of any size, from a single person on up).

Health Plan Pros:

  • provides all the coverage it ever will with the first premium

Health Plan Cons:

  • only useable for the covered items
  • premiums paid are lost forever from the perspective of the family—they can’t be recalled and redirected
  • covers low probability, high cost events (under Obamacare, routine, minor expenses, like annual checkups, contraceptives, and so on also are covered; I’ll come back to that below)
  • guaranteed to cover only a fraction of the covered item(s)’ actual expenses—70% of them under this family’s Plan; under Obamacare generally, the per centage can go as low as 60%

Emergency Cash Savings Pros:

  • accumulates money to cover those same low probability, high cost events
  • usable for any expense, and there are no arguments over whether the item is a covered item
  • have chance of paying for 100% of the emergency expense
  • entirely under control of family doing the saving, including how the money is held or invested.  Also, the person doing the saving gets the proceeds of any investing plan, not a Plan provider

Emergency Cash Savings Cons:

  • must be accumulated before there’s enough money to cover the emergency/medical event

Now consider how Health Plan providers (and the insurers in the remaining insurance industry—life, property, etc—generally) make their money.  First they estimate the likelihood of a payout for a covered event (and their actuarial statisticians are very good), then they aggregate that over the number of customers they have for that event coverage, and they arrive at a premium that exactly covers the expected payouts.  That is, if their numbers are right, the collected premiums will exactly pay for the most likely total payouts in, say, a year’s time.  Then the insurers plus up the premium actually charged so as to cover additional costs like R&D, marketing, and so on, and a profit.  The result of this is that the Health Plan buyer (for instance) pays a bit higher premium than he’s expected to collect on the actual occurrence of the medical event(s) for which he bought the Plan.

It seems to me that, at least for a family that’s fundamentally healthy and doesn’t take too many risks with that health (e.g., they eat moderately well and they exercise moderately regularly), they’re better off funding their own Emergency Cash Savings fund.  The pros and cons above favor the ECS, if the family is willing to run the risk of having such an event before their fund is fully loaded.

But look at what’s expected of the family, if it buys the Plan described at the outset: it’s expected to pay to the provider $681 per month, month in and month out, year in and year out, even if the covered medical event(s) never happen.

It occurs to me that if the family can afford to make those payments, it can afford instead to sock them away in its own ECS, ultimately fully funding it.  Doing that, at essentially 0% return (e.g., sticking the money into a bank savings account or a money market fund), means the family will accumulate the $50,000 of the posited medical event in six years.  Oh, and in those six years, the 30% not paid by their Plan also is covered.  Just getting to the $35,000 paid by the Plan will take a skosh over four years.

Now, invest that at a nominal rate, seed it with some startup money, and the family’s ECS is accumulated much more quickly.  And will continue to grow.

Notice, too, that that fund, under the sole control of the family, is not limited to a medical event, or to any particular purpose.  It’s available, also, to repair/replace the roof that got nailed in one of those Texas hail storms.  Or it can be drawn on to replace the car that failed catastrophically.  Or….  You don’t have that flexibility with a Health Plan.  And the Plan costs the same.

A Pending Blow for States’ Rights

A group of legislators in Maryland has introduced the “Fourth Amendment Protection Act” in the Maryland state legislature, a bill that would deny state support to Federal agencies engaged in warrantless electronic surveillance.  This bill is aimed directly at the National Security Agency and its warrantless monitoring and tracking of US citizens (secret warrants?  C’mon), and it would block the provision of “material support, participation, or assistance in any form” by any state entity or any entity of a political subdivision of the state, or by companies with state contracts.

That “material support, participation,…” ban would include providing water and electricity via public utilities to the NSA at its Ft Meade HQ.  Other parts of the bill would prohibit the use of evidence gathered by the NSA in state courts and prevent state universities from partnering with the NSA on research.

The bill would have state or local officials who violate the ban subject to as much as a year in a county jail and a $5,000 fine.  Such officials also would be fired from their jobs and be barred from public service

Delegate Michael Smigiel (R, Dist 36):

I want Maryland standing with its back to its people holding a shield. Not facing them holding a sword.