James Mackintosh had a piece in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal concerning President Donald Trump’s moves to reduce our nation’s trade deficit, particularly our deficit in the goods trade. In his piece, he delineated what he believes must happen in order for the deficit to come down the way Trump wants it to.

Trump’s obsession is the goods deficit—and there are two ways it can come down.
The first is that the overall goods-and-services deficit remains unchanged, but services—about which Trump doesn’t seem to care and in which the US runs a surplus—are sacrificed for manufacturing. … This, though, would need shifts in domestic tax and regulation.
The second way for the goods deficit to shrink is to reduce the overall trade deficit. That will mean less foreign money coming in (remember, the balance has to balance). Combine that with more investment in manufacturing—because imported goods are made less competitive by tariffs—and it will mean America has to provide more of the savings to finance new assembly plants, clean rooms, and sweatshops.

Stipulate Mackintosh is correct. That’s from a purely fiscal perspective, though. Regarding his first way, Trump and the Republicans in Congress are working in that direction, albeit for broader reasons than just changing the trade emphasis on services.

It’s the second way that matters here, and related to that is this: Mackintosh claims to not understand—that no one can understand—Trump’s policy. I claim that there’s more to our national weal than just the fiscal.

It’s a Critical Item that we revive our manufacturing base, including sourcing its critical inputs from ore to components for finished goods to finished goods—not just build more assembly plants. That manufacturing base, too, must include making large goods like automobiles and weapons systems, it must include small-to-tiny goods like medicines, and it must include cheap energy sources to power all the factories we need in our new economy and to fuel those automobiles and weapons systems. Those autos can be powered, sort of, with batteries, but the weapons systems and factories—and the electricity needed to recharge those batteries—need cheap, reliable oil for the weapons systems, and cheap, reliable, always on oil, natural gas, nuclear power, and coal for the power generating systems.

See pre-WWII Japan and WWII Germany for the outcome of depending on other nations, enemy or not, for those Critical Items. That’s what’s missing in Mackintosh’s lack of understanding.

Paying higher prices for restarting and maintaining at least a core manufacturing base that can surge production and expansion in a crisis generated by an enemy nation, which we likely will, is simply part of the price of maintaining a defense establishment capable of answering that crisis on terms favorable to us. It’s the other side of the coin used to pay directly for the development and acquisition of those weapons systems.

It’s just barely possible that this is Trump’s policy goal.