Tax Data Theft

A tax data thief stole Donald Trump’s tax data and transmitted them to various press outlets, many of which, in turn, promptly published the data. The thief was caught and has been sentenced to five years in jail. Congress is working on a bill that would make the penalty for such action much more serious.

That’s nice, but that legislation only addresses one side of the crime, and it only addresses one area in which such a crime might occur.

A more complete solution would include all instances of stolen information and the recipients of those stolen goods. If a journalist receives stolen material from any source on any subject and moves to profit from that—moves to publish the material—instead of returning the material to its owner or turning it over to relevant law authorities, that journalist must be held criminally liable for his crime. He is, after all, receiving stolen goods.

In most other cases, recipients of stolen goods who then move to profit from the receipt are criminally liable. There’s no reason to excuse the press from that liability. If no one is above the law, that must include journalists and the organizations for which they work or to which they contribute.

Only a Partial Solution

The editors of The Wall Street Journal correctly recognize the dangerous (and fatal to our nation if it’s not corrected) weaponization of commercial hardware and software. The solution they propose, though, is badly incomplete.

…we should first recognize that the Chinese Communist Party isn’t interested in cooperating on AI risks and safety.

Absolutely, and in so many other areas, as well. But….

Second, we need to wield the free-world technology stack more effectively. … America has the tools to build a software-defined manufacturing ecosystem, where we can find and fix bottlenecks. A digital twin of the entire defense supply chain would allow us to analyze, allocate, and accelerate production from the factory floor to the front line.

And

Third, a revitalized American technological industrial base should catalyze an interoperable free-world technological industrial base. To outcompete China, we must make it easy for allies and geopolitical swing states to adopt, contribute to, and innovate on top of our software.

I’ll leave aside, here, the risks to our own national security of exposing our technology and software even to friends and allies, much less to those uncertain swing states, only to have secrets and advantages further exposed to our enemies by leaks. Instead, I’ll emphasize that the finest software in the world is useless without the hardware to run it, and the farthest advanced technology does no good for us at all if it sits exclusively in one or two prototype models or in the horribly expensive few production models.

First after recognizing the inimical nature of the PRC, and Russia, and Iran, and northern Korea must be revitalizing our industrial base—that factory floor—so we can build the hardware—the weapons and weapons systems—which will house that wondrous technology and on which will run the bleeding edge (and proven, mind you) software in the vast numbers we’ll need, and our friends and allies will need, when our enemies attack.

After all, that next war will be fought with the forces in place. The speed of war has reached the point that there will be scant time, if any, for reinforcements to reach the theater (if they can survive the trip at all), and no time at all to produce, even from a thoroughly revived industrial base, combat loss replacements.

Rebuilding our industrial base will itself be terribly expensive, but what would be the cost of having our foreign, even domestic, policies controlled by our enemies after we lose the next war they start?