Presidential Authority

President Donald Trump (R) is moving to reassert a President’s authority over the Executive Branch of our Federal government, lately signing an Executive Order that imposes new White House supervision over so-called independent agencies.

The editors of the WSJ center their support for this on

Article II’s command that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” If Congress has charged such agencies with enforcing laws, then the President should be able to supervise how they do their job.

They’re right as far as they go, but the matter is far more basic than that. The first sentence of Section 1 of our Constitution’s Article II lays out the foundational nature of an American Presidency:

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.

Our Executive Branch is run by a single executive officer, not by a committee of board members, especially not by an executive and a number of other executives operating independently of him and of each other.

This is the unitary executive, as some legal scholars term it. It’s long past time it got restored. Trump is entirely correct in this matter.

Lazy Congress

This chart, via DOGE, shows the number of regulations that have been written for each law passed by Congress, just since 2010. (Right click on the image and from the drop-down menu choose “Open Image in New Tab” to get a bigger image.)

Go to the link, and mouse over the bars in the graph to get amplifying data beyond the appalling data visible in the image.

This shows how non-specific Congress’ bills are, and yet the President signs them into law. This laziness by Congress and the too-laissez faire attitude of Presidents are unconscionable. Congress needs to write laws to be complete and specific, rather than outsourcing specifity to Executive Branch entities, and Presidents need to veto these too-vague bills.

How to Handle Federal Lands

Terry Anderson, of Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, has some thoughts on how best to handle Federal lands, a unaggregated expanse of some 640 million acres, 28% of US land. In their essence, his ideas are to handle those lands in a business-like manner.

…three options: raise the price of goods and services (timber, minerals, visits to national parks), reduce labor costs and liquidate money losers.

He’s right, but those are the second steps that need to be taken, not the first step.

Twenty-eight percent is far too much of American land to be retained by the Federal government. The necessary first step is the transfer of those lands to their respective States.

Anderson’s ideas, fleshed out some in the fulness of his op-ed, does recommend [t]urn[ing] ownership of some federal lands over to the states, but that’s wholly inadequate. The vast majority of those lands should be turned over.

The amount that might be retained by the Federal government, to suggest a percentage for opening discussion, would be less than 5%, and the retention purposes might be limited to protecting some historical and scenic areas for public park use, to finishing cleaning up Superfund sites of their contamination—following which those sites should be returned to the States—to maintaining (and I say expanding) our Strategic Petroleum Reserve, to siting military installations, and to setting up, or finishing, nuclear waste storage sites.

The Federal government has no legitimate interest in withholding from State and private use so huge an expanse of our land. Selling it to the States and to private citizens would raise funds for paying down our national debt, too. The modern equivalent of a dollar an acre comes to mind for a suitable sale price—that original one dollar price wasn’t so much for raising money—though it did for that then small Federal budget—than to transfer the land to owners who, by paying for it, would have some incentive to make economic-based use of it.

The retained land then should be managed IAW business principles.

Bonehead Idea

Some Federal district judges, liberal activist judges for the most part, have issued temporary restraining orders against many of President Donald Trump’s (R) and his DOGE facility’s moves to root out empirically identified fraudulent and abusive spending and to physically downsize the Federal government through terminating Federal employees and eliminated whole agencies—the CFPB, for instance.

As a result of that,

Several House Republicans are preparing articles of impeachment against the federal judges who are blocking some of [those] President Donald Trump’s and Elon Musk’s key policies.

This is a textbook example of a bonehead idea.

Arizona Republican Congressman Eli Crane and Georgia Republican Congressman Andrew Clyde present the typical arguments for impeachment:

Our case for impeaching Judge Engelmayer is basically that he’s an activist judge trying to stop the Trump administration from executing their, you know, Article 2 powers to make sure that the laws are faithfully executed

and

I’m drafting articles of impeachment for US District Judge John McConnell, Jr. He’s a partisan activist weaponizing our judicial system to stop President Trump’s funding freeze on woke and wasteful government spending. We must end this abusive overreach

respectively.

It’ll be hard enough to prove, even in the House, much less at Senate trial, that these rulings are out of bounds for an Article III judge. Even were these Congressmen able to make the case that these judges, by their rulings, are violating their oaths of office—a certainly impeachable and convictable offense—it’ll be nearly impossible to get the two-thirds vote required for Senate conviction with so many Progressive-Democratic Party Senators in the Senate, given how knee-jerk opposed as they are to anything Trump or Republican.

In the end, these judges’ behaviors will be tacitly codified by the impeachments’ failures in the Senate, as those failures will lend credence to the judges’ naked activism. That would be even worse than the judges’ individual rulings.

The better answer is to exercise patience—something Republicans lack—and see the matters through the courts to the eventual appellate or Supreme Court rulings in their favor that will occur in the large majority of the cases.

Some Trash Removal Progress

With DoJ’s order to the Southern District of New York prosecutors in Manhattan to drop their bribery case against New York City’s Progressive-Democrat Mayor Eric Adams, six of those prosecutors resigned in protest. Exemplifying the trash cleanout nature of these failures and of their arrogant insistence that the prosecutors of that Southern District are independent of the DoJ, however, are the words of the seventh prosecutor to resign, Hagan Scotten, in his letter of resignation, as quoted by The Wall Street Journal.

Our laws and traditions do not allow using the prosecutorial power to influence other citizens, much less elected officials, in this way.
If no other lawyer within earshot of the President is willing to give him that advice, then I expect you will eventually find someone who is enough of a fool, or enough of a coward, to file your motion. But it was never going to be me.

The former often is true, but regarding the naked, uncaveated, nature of it, it’s also true that prosecutorial power is, in fact, often used to influence other citizens: such influence is the stuff of plea deals, particularly those involving agreements to cooperate here in return for prosecutorial discretion there. That discretion can reach as far as completely dropping the charges against the one agreeing to cooperate. That’s number one, as someone was wont to say.

The other thing is Scotten’s name-calling and virtue-signaling that is his latter bit. That he has to call names against those who disagree with him, including those misbegotten superiors of his so impudently insisting that the heretofore far too independent-acting district should actually be subordinate to the DoJ, merely demonstrates the intellectually and legally bankrupt nature of his objections.

These seven were members of DoJ’s Public Integrity Section, consisting of roughly two dozen lawyers.

In the end, Edward Sullivan, of that section agreed to be the one to sign the filing that would ask the presiding just to drop the case. His reason for doing so, here as cited by the WSJ, is instructive: to spare other career staff in the section from potentially being fired.

The insubordinates—all seven of them—are well removed from the Department. Sullivan’s rationalization for his going along, though, suggests that the entire Section wants close inspection and further rooting out, perhaps complete replacement of the remaining incumbents.