Tag Archives: foreign policy

Will the West Proceed?

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In the face of the Group of Seven Club’s moves to impose a price cap on Russian crude exports globally, Russian President Vladimir Putin now threatens

to curtail the export of grain from Ukraine and said Moscow was ready to extend its rationing of natural-gas exports and cut off oil and refined products if the West went ahead….

And

Mr Putin said Wednesday that Russia had contractual obligations on energy deliveries but would reconsider them if a price cap were imposed.
“We simply will not fulfill [our contracts]. In general, we will not deliver anything if it contradicts our interests,” he told an audience of officials and business leaders. “We will not deliver gas, nor oil, nor coal, nor heating fuel. We will not deliver anything.”

This would result in temporary near-term pain for the West, to be sure, with winter a few months away. But it would result in permanent and disastrous pain for Russia.

Near-term for the West: that winter (which so far looks to be relatively mild, but weather forecasts…), and tight supplies of natural gas being squirreled away, along with iffy potentials for bringing recently shut down nuclear power plants back on line and keeping others scheduled for closure on line.

Temporary: Europe can find other sources of natural gas, oil, and coal (including, regarding the first two, plussing up North Sea production and building additional pipelines) for their power production plants and move away from Russian sources altogether and permanently. Especially if the West can get President Joe Biden (D) out of the way of American oil and natural gas production and export.

Long-term pain for Putin: he needs a minimum of $70-$80 oil in order to pay for his war against Ukraine—replacing equipment combat losses, providing food, fuel, ammunition, and other consumables for his surviving forces—along with the rest of his economy, which is almost entirely extractive, which potentiates his long-term vulnerability.

Permanent: he’ll have lost permanently his Western markets, leaving him with selling into the People’s Republic of China—and President Xi Jining will be forcing his own purchase price on Putin, a price made the firmer by the PRC’s own current economic strait. Further, those sales will require PRC assistance to develop: new Siberian oil and natural gas wells and pipelines (presently nearly non-existent) to deliver well output to the PRC. All of which will exacerbate Russia’s subordination to the PRC.

Aside: it’s true that Putin has markets in India and Turkey, but with Turkey, drastic as that nation’s needs are, its economy is too small to take up much of Putin’s oil. India has too ready access to too many alternative markets to be taken for much of a ride by Putin.

The salient question is whether the West has the stomach for what it takes to achieve victory. The jury is still out on that. Especially given who’s the nominal leader of the West.

“Putin Will Adapt”

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In Holman Jenkins’ opinion piece in Tuesday’s Wall Street Journal concerning Russian President Vladimir Putin’s energy war against Europe (as a secondary front in his war against Ukraine), he offered this regarding Europe’s stick-to-it-iveness vs Putin’s:

Mr Putin will quickly adapt once it’s proven to him Europe’s governing parties can’t knuckle under to Russian blackmail and retain their democratic viability.

If Europe doesn’t surrender in the face of Putin’s energy war, it will be the Russian people who feel the resulting economic, and other, pain.

Jenkins is incredibly naive to think Putin cares about that. He’ll persist until he is militarily driven out of Ukraine. And he’ll persist elsewhere for as long as he’s in power. The situation is all about Putin and his angst over the “greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century” and his obsession with redressing that.

Europe needs to defeat Putin in his energy war, not only to save themselves (and Ukraine) in the near term, but also to greatly mitigate the costs of Putin’s aggressively pushed obsession in the longer term.

I Have Questions

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It seems the US and the People’s Republic of China have reached a secret agreement regarding US audits of PRC companies as a prerequisite for those companies being listed on US stock exchanges. This putative agreement allows the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspectors to travel to Hong Kong or mainland China for inspections, and it’s officially signed by the PCAOB, the PRC’s Securities Regulatory Commission, and the PRC’s Ministry of Finance.

I also have an observation: inspecting audit papers is not the same as auditing the company.

My questions:

  • In what way will the inspectors know that the audit papers are accurate reflections of the audit that was done?
  • How much advance notice will be required before access to the audit papers is allowed?
  • Will the inspectors be allowed to make notes/copies of the papers and take the notes/copies with them on departure?
  • In what way will the inspectors know that all of the audit papers have been made available?
  • To which audit papers will access be allowed?
  • Via what mechanism will the inspectors know which audit papers to inspect?
  • In what way will the inspectors know that all of the subset of audit papers allowed actually have been made available?

There are more, but these will do for a start.

Secret agreement because:

Officials from the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the US Securities and Exchange Commission said they agreed with their Chinese counterparts to not make the language of the deal public.

No coverup there. Not a bit of one.

Logistics Matters…

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…far beyond the process of getting soldiers and consumables to a battlefield and to the battlers.

In the aftermath of Germany’s—and much of Europe’s—considered decision to make themselves dependent on Russian natural gas and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s equally considered decision to limit and cut off natural gas supplies to Europe to try to coerce behaviors acceptable to Putin, Germany, et al., are (re)discovering the need for better logistics and logistical execution.  The lessons are available to the US, too, if the government is willing to learn.

Europe’s energy crisis has unleashed a global battle over natural-gas tankers….

And [emphasis added]

European countries ramped up their purchases of liquefied natural gas from the US, Qatar, and other sources this year as Russia cut supplies to the continent. They are competing with peers in South Korea and Japan—where gas demand has surged during a heat wave—for a finite amount of supply ferried by a limited number of vessels.

LNG-capable tankers are long-lead items that take specialized equipment to keep the natural gas cooled and under pressure. They’re also expensive, hence the interest in only limited inventories of such ships—they’re expensive even simply to have, if they’re just sitting around in port unused.

It’s not just the complexity of the ships, though, that contribute to the present long-lead times.

Shipmakers in South Korea, the world’s biggest producer of LNG tankers, don’t have free capacity for new orders until 2027[.]

However, the wonders of Europe have known for some time that they needed more LNG tankers.

LNG and the tankers that carry the fuel were in high demand even before the conflict, as extreme weather curtailed hydropower, and many economies sought to ditch coal to reduce carbon emissions.

The complexity of these logistics is further illustrated by this little fillip: the price of steel is rapidly rising, an accelerated increase driven by demand from a broad reach of needs in addition to simply making boats.

The lessons for the US?

The need for more natural gas (and oil) production, more flexible production, better and expanded distribution grids to refiners, and in the present context, expansion of port facilities able to convert natural gas to liquid natural gas and then to transfer that LNG to LNG-capable tankers.

And maybe build some of our own LNG tankers. And get rid of the Jones Act.

Equilibrium

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Laura Secor had a Wall Street Journal Weekend Interview with Henry Kissinger, and a number of letter writers in the WSJ‘s Letters commented on Kissinger’s espousal of a need for some sort of equilibrium among the world’s powers as the means of world stability (redundancy deliberate).

Kissinger operates from a false premise—the need for international equilibrium.

An equilibrium that balances American enemies—Russia, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, even northern Korea—with American national security is dangerously detrimental to American national security.

We—to use Khruschev’s phrasing—buried the Soviet Union, and we did it entirely peacefully by being superior to it in every meaningful way, and exploiting those superiorities aggressively in the economic sphere in the end game. We would have won that contest much sooner had we been more aggressive much earlier, but in those earlier years we were stuck with the likes of Kissinger and former President Jimmy Carter (D).

We have only to return to that aggressiveness in order to continue securing our safety and weal. And to achieve the only equilibrium that’s even remotely safe for us.