Obama’s Stimulus Promise Revisited

James Pethokoukis at AEIdeas did the visit, and this graph is the highlight of it.

The red dots on the right axis reveal the Obama tale.  It’s an especially humorous, if simultaneously mendacious, one, given that in this auspicious quarter we were supposed to be in the same prosperous state with or without Obama’s promised stimulus benefit.  The benefit, after all, only was supposed to ameliorate the pain of the last five years.

Instead, those red dots demonstrate, not just the failure of Obama’s stimulus, but the active damage that “stimulus,” in concert with the rest of Obama’s economic and jobs policies, have done and still are doing to our economy.

In case the dots’ captions are hard to read, here they are, from highest dot to lowest, all for December 2013:

  • unemployment rate based on the 2009 Labor Force Participation Rate: 11.8%
  • unemployment rate based on CBO’s then forecast for 2013’s LFPR: 10.1%
  • unemployment rate based on 2012’s LPFR: 7.9%
  • unemployment rate, actual: 6.7%

These compare with Obama’s promised rate of 5%, or roughly full employment.

Can we really afford another five years of these destructive Progressive policies?  Or even two more years?

Here Come the Insurance Company Bailouts

Humana is taking point on this one.  This from Dr Scott Gottlieb at AEIdeas:

Humana announced that it expects to tap the three risk adjustment mechanisms in Obamacare for between $250 and $450 million in 2014.  This amounts to about 25% of the insurer’s expected exchange revenue.  This money is needed to offset losses that the insurer will take as a result of slower enrollment in its Obamacare plans, and a skewed risk pool that weighs more heavily toward older and less healthy members than it originally budgeted.

And

More than half of the money will come from the $25 billion reinsurance pool that Obamacare provides (collected through a tax on employer-sponsored health plans). The other half will come mostly from the risk corridors.

Of course, President Barack Obama was counting on the “migration” of folks in the private health insurance market to the plans pushed through ObamaMart.  However, as Humana is experiencing, and as other health plan providers (I hesitate to call them insurers, anymore) are discovering, that “migration” isn’t happening, and those that are buying have the wrong demographics for the law’s operation.

We know, though, that the “migration” was intended to be a forced migration, because during the 2010 Obamacare summit which our President hosted in the run-up to its party-line passage, he told [especially the first 30 seconds] then-Minority Whip Eric Cantor (R, VA) that “8 to 9 million people…might have to change their coverage….”

And those that are “changing” still aren’t responding in the Obamacare-required demographic breakdown.

Hence bailouts.  Unless we get serious in the upcoming primaries and the fall elections.

Junk Bonds and Preexisting Conditions

What do these have in common?  First, a caveat.  Junk bonds are so rated because of the very high likelihood that the bond issuer will default on that debt for any of a number of reasons, including bankruptcy.  Preexisting conditions have no such uncertainty; they exist.  Let’s assume the likelihood of bankruptcy on a junk bond is certain.  That certainly would make the junk bonds more expensive in the bond market than they are presently, but they’d still be marketable.

Now, in the case of a preexisting condition, the risk getting coming down with that condition has been realized, there’s nothing left there to transfer to an insurer in return for a fee or premium.

Notice, though, that the timing of a default on any particular junk bond remains uncertain, even though default itself is certain, and so there are buyers—insurers, if you will—who are willing to buy a pool of junk bonds.  These buyers are willing to assume the risk of default for some subset of the bonds in the pool in return for the likelihood of netting a profit on the aggregation of interest payments from the remaining junk bonds.

In the same way, while having a preexisting condition is certain for the afflicted person, the risk of any particular person’s condition flaring and so requiring medical treatment, remains uncertain.  This risk can be pooled and transferred to an insurer: the expectation here is that the insurer, after paying out on the flareups of some subset of the preexisting conditions in the pool, still can net a profit on the aggregation of premium payments from the preexisting conditions.

Without government’s interference in a (restored) health insurance industry marketplace, insurance products could be developed that would pool those with particular preexisting conditions (or a collection of similar preexisting conditions, or…).  Aggregating the risk of preexisting condition flareups (as opposed to attempting to deal with the preexisting condition itself) into large enough pools would bring premiums into the reach of most folks having the condition.  This is the same risk spreading technique used by junk bond mutual funds: these funds spread default risk across a large enough pool that the cost of buying into the fund comes within reach of ordinary investors.

Of course, in this simple analogy, there are a couple of contaminants.  One is the fact that, in reality, default even on a junk bond isn’t certain; it’s just very likely.  Thus, the price of junk bond pools is lower than tacitly assumed in analogy.  This is balanced to some extent, though, by the fact that while a bond, once defaulted, ceases to exist for all practical purposes, this is not the case with a preexisting condition.  In general, a flareup of a preexisting condition subsides, the condition continues to exist, and the premiums on it would continue to be paid against the next flareup (of uncertain timing).

Is Government Intervention in the Market Counterproductive?

There have been many iterations of the boom and bust cycles inherent in a free market economy; standing out in national memory are the series of recessions and panics/depressions through the 19th and 20th centuries and the early parts of the current century in the US.

What’s the history of those cycles, though, in the context of government intervention?  In the 19th and early 20th centuries, there wasn’t any government intervention to speak of.  Every one of those bust periods ran their natural course because government had no means of intervening, and that was deliberate.  The worst of those cycles, the panics, were, to be sure sharp and deep.  But they also generally were short-lived (frequently one or two years, although the Panic of 1837 lasted seven years), as the free market recovered on its own: people saw those periods as opportunities—the creative destruction of which some economists speak.  Every time, too, our economy came out of those periods of creative destruction stronger than it was when it entered them.

A couple of the more extreme examples illustrate.  The Panic of 1907 was cut short by the intervention of a banker, JP Morgan, who put his own money on the line to rebuild confidence in the banking system of the time.  (Imagine that happening today: 100 years ago, wealth was concentrated at the top sufficiently to enable one man to do this.  Today, the blatherings of the Liberal political class to the contrary, no one man or small group of men has the concentrated wealth to achieve such a thing.)

The Depression of 1920-1921 (remember that one?  I didn’t think so) lasted all of 18 months, and the Federal government’s intervention was limited to an early instance of—small—unemployment insurance payments.

Contrast that with the boom/bust cycles since the early- mid-20th centuries.  Franklin Roosevelt had the Federal government intervene massively in the Great Depression, instigating farm price controls, labor price floors, relocation of failed farmers (including onto functioning farms worked by black farmers, but that’s for a different post), and so on.  In fact, his most serious intervention, those price controls, occurred just as the economy was beginning to recover on its own, and that intervention snuffed out the recovery.

There’s more.  The long recession and stagflation of the Nixon through Carter years was exacerbated by Federally implemented price controls and rationing of key commodities like oil.

The Panic of 2008, although nominally over in 2009, still is having its depressive effects on economic and employment growth as a direct result of Federal government intervention: “stimulus” spending of trillions of dollars, regulation of commodity production (particularly coal, oil, and natural gas), and a vast expansion of the national welfare program.

Government intervention isn’t a neutral failure of no effect; it’s a positive failure: it slows recovery if it doesn’t block it outright.  It does have the positive effect, though, of giving elected politicians and their agency bureaucrats an opportunity to claim to be doing something “for the sake of the poor,” and so of garnering votes for the next election.

Friday’s Jobs Report

…again shows the failure of President Barack Obama’s economic ideology.  And it comes in conjunction with the CBO’s report that Obama’s Obamacare is destructive of American employment.

The jobs report showed that we added all of 113,000 jobs in January.  Oh, and the headline unemployment rate fell to 6.6%.  That drop in unemployment is a thing about which to brag?  Not so much.

In 2013, we added (an inadequate) 194,000 jobs per month.  Adding December’s numbers, the two months of December and January contained a total of 188,000 jobs.  We really need to be adding in the range of 330,000-350,000 per month in order to have a decent recovery from any recession, much less the Panic of 2008 (which ordinary Americans think still is in progress, albeit at the level of recession rather than panic).

Also buried in the numbers is a broader measure of unemployment: a statistic that also includes part-time workers who’d rather work full-time and folks that are marginally attached to the labor force (those unemployed who are on the verge of giving up but haven’t yet).  This broader measure of unemployment was 12.7% for January.  That’s a drop from December’s broader unemployment rate (of 13.1%), but it’s still abysmally high.

This is, for all that, improvement–how is that a failure?  We’re where we should have been four years ago, even according to President Barack Obama’s own predictions back then.

Or, as James Pethokoukis puts it at AEIdeas,

Before the Great Recession, there were 122 million full-time jobs in America. Now 4 1/2 years after its end, there are still just 118 million full-time jobs in America despite a labor force that is 1.6 million larger and a nonjailed, nonmilitary adult working-age population that is 14 million larger.

This graph which Pethokoukis reprinted from the Federal Reserve Economic Database paints the picture: http://www.aei-ideas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/020714jobs1.png