Not that Complicated

In a Wall Street Journal article centered on why 3% inflation isn’t close enough to 2% inflation, even for government work, there was this bit:

Anticipating the public’s reaction is tricky, not least because economists still argue about why people hate inflation so much in the first place. In textbook models and in many real-world instances—including during the 2020s—wages tend to catch up to prices, so inflation doesn’t, over time, erode the purchasing power of the average worker’s paycheck.
Even so, inflation makes people feel that they are falling behind….

It’s not that complicated.

This is a case where opportunity costs become real and realized costs. Wages do catch up over time, but during that time, people keep right on aging. By the end of the inflationary period, the time behind them has in concrete terms eroded their purchasing power. The opportunities to do the things they’d wanted to do are lost forever. The abilities to do many things for themselves or with family and friends may no longer possible as they now may no longer be young enough to do them, depending on when in their lives the inflation struck them. The opportunities to acquire many of the things they wanted to acquire are permanently lost as they have less time left in which to enjoy those acquisitions, or in the case of a larger house to better accommodate a growing family, some if not all the children have left the nest and the larger house no longer is useful to them.

Over that time, too, and beyond it, wages don’t necessarily exceed the inflation, so catch-up, practical, useable catch-up—the ability, for instance, to expand savings to get back to where folks would have been had their savings regime not been interrupted by the inflationary period—does not exist.

Inflation makes people feel like they’re falling behind, because during the inflationary period they are falling behind. Then people remain behind because even with after the fact rises in wages, their opportunity to catch up is so heavily limited, and especially is the time available in which to catch up much more tightly constrained.

All of this especially is the case for folks on the lower rungs of our economic ladder. They start out with narrow margins for things like savings and acquisitions of highly useful things—that larger home, for instance, or a car to replace the increasingly expensive to maintain beater—much less to do or acquire things are fun to do or to have. In the best of times, they have trouble keeping up; with the losses from an inflationary period, they only fall farther behind, with no hope of recouping even that arrearage.

Dealing with an Enemy Nation

The good editors of The Wall Street Journal wrote a piece on the challenges to Treasury Secretary nominee Scott Bessent, on the assumption he’s confirmed. The editors, though, have misunderstood some of those challenges.

Hitting China with enormous tariffs will compel Beijing to dig in, not change its economic model, but Mr Bessent might use the threat to urge China to recognize its self-interest in rebalancing.

It’s not important whether the People’s Republic of China changes its economic model. The nation is an enemy of the United States, openly averring its goal of supplanting us on the world stage, and from there controlling our actions on that stage. The PRC needs to be isolated and contained.

By contrast, a mercantilist purchasing deal would fail to address China’s fundamental problem. The Trump administration would be better positioned to rebalance with China if it weren’t simultaneously declaring economic war on the rest of the world.

Mercantilism is irrelevant to the PRC’s fundamental problem, which the editors don’t recognize in their piece. The PRC’s fundamental problem is their shrinking population which is caused by their birth rate being far below even the replacement rate necessary to maintain an existing level. A critical subset and outcome of that problem is that its population is aging and already doesn’t have enough workers to sustain their retired and aged citizens, much less to man its factories. Aside from raw bigotry, this is another reason for the forced labor of Uighurs in PRC factories.

There’s less than no need to rebalance with the PRC: that nation is an enemy nation bent on replacing and controlling us. Rebalancing, along any dimension that doesn’t include gaining, regaining, and expanding our superiority, would only facilitate its effort.

It’s true enough that an economic war with the rest of the world is counterproductive, but it’s relevant to the need to isolate and contain the PRC only to the extent that mercantilist tariffs on so much of the rest of the world waters down the effects of foreign policy tariffs on the PRC and our ability to get other nations to support that isolation.

At bottom, the editors have confused tariffs used to influence an enemy nation—foreign policy tariffs—with mercantilist tariffs—protectionist tariffs used to make other nations’ exports to us more expensive relative to our domestically produced products. I’m surprised that the editors do not understand the distinction.

SALT Tax

Short, brief, sweet, and redundant.

One thing threatening serious tax reform—which is to say making permanent the tax rate reductions that otherwise expire near the end of this year, reducing those rates further, and flattening the rates further—is the kerfuffle over the SALT (State And Local Tax) tax deduction cap, currently at $10,000.

I sympathize with the Representatives and Senators, especially the Republican ones, in those States most impacted by the cap. Their wealthier constituents want the cap raised significantly if not eliminated. These politicians, though, must understand that as members of our national Congress, their responsibilities to our nation as a whole runs a very close second to their responsibilities to those individual constituencies.

The business of cap raising/eliminating is nonsense for a couple of reasons. One is that there is no reason at all for the rest of us taxpayers to subsidize those in States with profligate spending and already high taxes. Those Congressmen would do better using their Federal influence and bully pulpit to convince their State and local governments to mend their spendthrift ways and lower their tax rates—the latter which several States (tellingly, mostly Republican led) already have done or are doing.

The other reason is that, aside from empirical evidence that lowering tax rates actually increases revenues to the Federal government from the increased private economic activity that results from more money being left in the hands of us private citizens, revenue reductions—if any—from lowered tax rates is easily covered by reduced spending in general and reduced, if not eliminated, subsidies and tax credits for “green” energy solar and windmill farms, battery cars, federal deductions for non-federal tax collections, and other such tax engineering froo-froo.

Indeed, with sufficiently reduced spending, badly needed increased spending on national defense still could occur.

Raising the SALT tax cap wouldn’t be tax reform, it would be tax deform. In fact, reform here would be eliminating the SALT deduction altogether.

An Independent Greenland’s Budget

Amid President-elect Donald Trump’s (R) rhetoric regarding buying Greenland from Denmark, there is concern in Greenland about that, but maybe not so much. Greenland already is a largely self-governing island within the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland already has been pushing for independence, and the Danish government, along with its monarch, is open to considering that, given sufficient interest in independence on the part of Greenlanders.

Greenlanders strongly want independence, they don’t want to be part of the US, but they are highly interested in a closer relationship with us than is politically possible as long as they’re part of the Kingdom—another factor underlying their push for outright independence.

One concern about independence is that with independence, the annual $600 million in transfers from Denmark to Greenland, roughly half the current Greenlandic budget, would stop. What to do about that?

Greenland is rich in a broad variety of natural resources, from oil and natural gas to rare earth minerals to graphite to uranium to precious stones, and on and on. These resources remain largely untapped. The fishing waters around Greenland and in what would become an independent Greenland’s Exclusive Economic Zone also are rich.

Extraction royalties from mining those land based natural resources would easily fill the budget gap, and more. Alaska has been paying dividends to its citizens for nearly 50 years just from oil and natural gas extraction. Texas charges a severance tax—its extraction royalty—on natural gas, oil, and condensate (a byproduct of natural gas production with its own commercial value) production. That tax covers a significant fraction of Texas’ annual budget. With proper (Greenlandic) management the fisheries (and undersea minerals) in Greenland’s EEZ would become another source of national revenue.

Greenland’s budget would more than make up for the loss of Denmark transfers with its own extraction royalties and exploitation fees—which needn’t be all that high to put the nation’s budget well into the black. A trade arrangement with the US that addressed all, or even most, of that would be highly beneficial to both nations.

Beyond that, the US is highly concerned about Russia’s and People’s Republic of China’s moves in the region and in the polar seas and so is interested in expanding existing bases and adding more. Basing rights could come with fees for Greenland, also.

A freely negotiated trade and basing arrangement with an independent Greenland would be a winning arrangement all around. That also would be more revenue positive for us than taking on Greenland as a territory, or even a protectorate.

What’s the Value?

Cities in the People’s Republic of China are running out of cash while their debts, already vastly excessive, are rapidly growing.

What to do?

In August, a gas supplier [Xinjiang East Universe Gas] in China’s far western Xinjiang region struck a solution to settle $25 million [¥183.3 million] of overdue gas bills racked up by a few state-owned entities in Changji city. Instead of cash, the gas supplier will effectively take over 260 unfinished apartments in a French-themed residential compound being developed by its clients.

That’s become the go-to technique for city governments to welch on settle their debts.

Starting last year, Monalisa Group, a Guangdong-based ceramic tiles manufacturer, accepted apartments as payment instead of cash from its real-estate clients. By September, it had accumulated $19 million [¥139.3 million] worth of investment properties on its balance sheet.

More recently in June, Shanghai Urban Architecture Design proposed to take over 115 apartments from developer Greenland Holdings—a Fortune 500 company that defaulted on its bonds in 2023—to settle some $10 million [¥73.3 million] of debts. In December, Sunfly Intelligent Technology, a producer of LED lighting and other electrical equipment, settled $50 million [¥366.6 million] of debts with a group of developers including Country.
In the past three months, three unusual debtors emerged—the county-level police departments in China’s poor, mountainous Guizhou province.

The PRC already has accumulated as many as 90 million empty housing units, units still unsold after all this time.

For companies like Xinjiang East Universe that provide services to China’s cash-strapped local governments, getting half-built apartments “is better than getting nothing[.]”

But only if those structures actually get sold. These unsold apartments are unsold for a reason. How does using them to pay debts make their creditors whole? All the move does is unload the borrower’s white elephant onto the creditor, leaving the creditor still out in the cold with no functional, practical repayment.

White elephants, indeed: most of those apartment structures aren’t even completely built. It’ll cost those creditors additional money to finish them and make them habitable. With that glut of finished housing units already clogging the market, peddling these for less than anything like what might pass for market rates, a depressed price necessary to get them sold, or even rented, will only further depress the PRC’s housing market.

That’s not good for an economy where so much private wealth—family wealth—already is tied up in real estate from the housing boom of a few years before the Wuhan Virus Situation. Residential property represents some 25%-30% of the PRC’s GDP.