Tag Archives: defense policy

There’s Always an Excuse not to Bother

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It’s not just the European governments that stand in the way of those nations’ efforts to rearm and to supply arms to Ukraine in the face of Russia’s attempt to conquer Ukraine and the barbarian’s designs on the rest of Europe. True enough, those governments have bureaucratic red tape that stands in the way, along with politicians disinterested in getting that red tape out of the way.

Months after the acquisition of the [ammunition-producing] factory, a majority in the Danish parliament demanded that the government open the process to bidders, rather than settling for the presumed favorite for the job….

Too often, though, it’s those nations’ private businesses that would be important, if not critical, to the rearmament effort, local governments, and the populations themselves.

…some banks won’t lend to defense contractors, making life particularly tough for small companies in the industry’s supply chain.

And

In the German city of Troisdorf, Diehl Defence said it has struggled to get permission to expand a factory in the city center to boost production of detonators and other parts for the Iris T missile-defense system, which has formed a crucial part of Ukraine’s air defenses since the war began.
Troisdorf’s mayor, Alexander Biber, said the community was in constructive talks with Diehl, but asked whether a city center is better suited for homes or businesses than for factories producing explosives.

And

A leading European tank maker, KNDS, was planning to expand a Munich testing range, but had to pause following local complaints, including one from a man who said the work interfered with his meditation, according to a person familiar with the matter. Other residents were concerned that noise from the testing site would affect housing prices.

These are anecdotal, but they illustrate the trends.

This lack of interest in defending themselves, much less help a nation under a barbarian invasion, just further demonstrates the uselessness of NATO and the importance of standing up a replacement mutual defense arrangement involving the Three Seas Initiative, the UK, and the US.

No One Is Answering the Question

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Or even asking it. During the ongoing Israeli effort to push Hezbollah into stopping its attacks on Israeli citizens, that nation continues to be pressured by folks in the West, most especially our own…administration…to agree a cease fire, as though this would cure everything, or at least stop things for some period of time.

This pressure, though wholly ignores (I don’t agree that these oh-so-smart folks are missing it) the environment and the broader context in which the fight is occurring—a fight, mind you, whose current round the terrorists in Gaza and Lebanon began ‘way last October and continue to prosecute against Israel. That environment, that context, is the terrorists’ Prime Directive to destroy Israel and exterminate the Jews in that nation.

Thus, the question, which is so obvious, it (I repeat) cannot be being missed; it’s being carefully, cynically ignored: how does any nation—here, Israel—have a cease fire, or any sort of negotiation at all, with an enemy whose avowed goal is the destruction of that nation? Especially when that enemy says it has no concerns for its own damage or how many of its own civilians die in the process?

Only a Partial Solution

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The editors of The Wall Street Journal correctly recognize the dangerous (and fatal to our nation if it’s not corrected) weaponization of commercial hardware and software. The solution they propose, though, is badly incomplete.

…we should first recognize that the Chinese Communist Party isn’t interested in cooperating on AI risks and safety.

Absolutely, and in so many other areas, as well. But….

Second, we need to wield the free-world technology stack more effectively. … America has the tools to build a software-defined manufacturing ecosystem, where we can find and fix bottlenecks. A digital twin of the entire defense supply chain would allow us to analyze, allocate, and accelerate production from the factory floor to the front line.

And

Third, a revitalized American technological industrial base should catalyze an interoperable free-world technological industrial base. To outcompete China, we must make it easy for allies and geopolitical swing states to adopt, contribute to, and innovate on top of our software.

I’ll leave aside, here, the risks to our own national security of exposing our technology and software even to friends and allies, much less to those uncertain swing states, only to have secrets and advantages further exposed to our enemies by leaks. Instead, I’ll emphasize that the finest software in the world is useless without the hardware to run it, and the farthest advanced technology does no good for us at all if it sits exclusively in one or two prototype models or in the horribly expensive few production models.

First after recognizing the inimical nature of the PRC, and Russia, and Iran, and northern Korea must be revitalizing our industrial base—that factory floor—so we can build the hardware—the weapons and weapons systems—which will house that wondrous technology and on which will run the bleeding edge (and proven, mind you) software in the vast numbers we’ll need, and our friends and allies will need, when our enemies attack.

After all, that next war will be fought with the forces in place. The speed of war has reached the point that there will be scant time, if any, for reinforcements to reach the theater (if they can survive the trip at all), and no time at all to produce, even from a thoroughly revived industrial base, combat loss replacements.

Rebuilding our industrial base will itself be terribly expensive, but what would be the cost of having our foreign, even domestic, policies controlled by our enemies after we lose the next war they start?

On Whose Side…

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…is the Biden/Blinken State Department?

Mistakes happen, even egregious ones, even with matters of security. This one, though, should get some folks fired, for cause, and charges brought for the breach [emphasis added].

The independent watchdog for the State Department says the agency deviated from standard policy in the security clearance suspension of Biden Iran envoy Robert Malley, permitted the advisor access to classified meetings, and allowed him to continue work on sensitive issues while he was under investigation.

How does that work, exactly? This is, however it works, sadly typical of the lackadaisical attitude toward national security across a broad range of security milieus held by this Biden-Harris administration and Antony Blinken’s Department of State.

The…screwup…in more detail, from House Foreign Affairs committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R, TX) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch (R, ID) [emphasis added]:

The State Department IG’s report is disturbing and sheds light on the multiple ways the State Department grossly mismanaged Mr Malley’s case and intentionally misled Congress. Mr Malley, a political appointee and close associate of the secretary, was treated very differently than a civil servant or foreign service officer.
Among the new revelations in this report, Mr Malley conducted sensitive government business and was allowed to utilize his official email account after his clearance was suspended. As the report noted, this was done out of fear that Mr Malley might “conduct government business on a personal email account.” This concern was valid because it is one of the primary things Mr Malley did to get his clearance suspended in the first place.

The illogic of that last—that it was necessary to let Malley have the access because without it he might have conducted his business through his personal communications (and which he already was doing, but let’s not talk about that)—is so ludicrous that it had to be deliberately done from malice toward our nation’s security.

Hence my opening question: on whose side are Malley’s supervisor, that supervisor’s supervisor, and the official who restored Malley’s accesses and clearance in mid-investigation? They’re plainly not on the side of the United States of America.

Malley’s supervisor and that supervisor’s supervisor should be fired, those who misled Congress on the matter belong in jail for their perjury in their testimony, and individual who reinstated his clearance in mid-investigation needs to be arrested and put on trial for his espionage-related behavior.

Sadly, no State Department personnel will be harmed in the making of this breach.

Disingenuous TikTok Arguments

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The law requiring ByteDance to divest TikTok entirely or have TikTok banned from the US is in front of the DC Circuit Court, and there are at least two arguments that TikTok is making that are…misleading.

The first is this one:

Never before has Congress silenced so much speech in a single act.

No speech is being silenced. Only a particular outlet—TikTok—used by the People’s Republic of China intelligence community is being acted against. That outlet would remain available were ByteDance to wholly divest TikTok, which ByteDance and the PRC, on their own initiative, refuse to do. There also are a plethora of speech pathways for precisely the same speech desires besides TikTok. ByteDance’s/PRC’s decision to let TikTok be closed will have no impact on speech.

The second is this one:

Our constitutional tradition leaves no room for the government to stop Petitioners from expressing their ideas through the editor and publisher they have chosen. The government could no more prohibit a freelance journalist from publishing in a magazine of her choice; forbid an actor from working with a particular director; or tell a musician what studio he can record in.

Of course, no one is making any prohibition of this. The decision to leave TikTok available to the freelancer (or any other journalist), the actor, or the musician is entirely in the hands of ByteDance and the PRC government. It’s their decision to refuse to let TikTok be divested that would deny access to TikTok.