Tag Archives: foreign policy

A Brazilian Extortion Move

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The headline of a Wall Street Journal piece regarding the Amazon forest, its putative role in Earth’s climate, and Brazil says it all: Brazil’s Climate Overture to Biden: Pay Us Not to Raze Amazon. The article’s lede lays it out in crystalline terms.

Brazil’s government, widely criticized by environmental groups as a negligent steward of the Amazon rainforest, has made an audacious offer to the Biden administration: provide $1 billion and President Jair Bolsonaro’s administration will reduce deforestation by 40%.

The article closed with a question for readers:

Should the US give the Bolsonaro government in Brazil $1 billion to slow deforestation in the Amazon?

No, I say. No, in spades.

Here’s my counteroffer to Bolsonaro: slow deforestation of the Amazon by 50%, and we won’t cut our imports of Brazilian goods and services by $1 billion. End your deforestation by 2030—your proposed goal—and we’ll continue, after that date, to import Brazilian goods and services at rates consistent with market demand.

Here are the Brazilian terms starkly articulated by Bolsonaro’s Minister of the Environment, Ricardo Salles:

If we don’t give these people this economic support, they will continue to be co-opted or incentivized by illegal activities.

Cute. Those are “activities” the Brazilian government condones with its own passivity. Hence the Bolsonaro/Salles threat: “Nice forest you guys got here. Be too bad if something was to happen to it. Be better if you was to pay up.”

“In two-war scenario, could US forces prevail against powerful enemies?”

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That’s a question Just the News‘ Susan Katz Keating asked in her recent article.

One of the “Pentagon war-planners” she interviewed had this to say about our military’s considerations of that sort of question.

We hold modeling scenarios about this on a regular basis. We work out the likelihood of what would happen in a multi-front war. In the scenarios, we do well.

Frankly, I’d have to see the scenarios before I could think this believable.

I wonder if any of their scenarios include cyber attacks on our national energy and water infrastructure and our financial centers, coupled with EMP strikes against our fleet afloat and against our land force command units and bases, coupled with attacks against our orbiting GPS and com assets, coupled with “kinetic” attacks on those sea and land—and air—forces and against our homeland.

I’d then like to see them run a scenario where we’re attacked in that broad spectrum way by two geographically separated enemies at least roughly simultaneously.

I note with dismay the emphasis (elsewhere in the article) on “major conflict” with little apparent consideration of “total war.” The war gamers also seem to limit their perception of our enemies’ goals to their desiring victory in limited war—a badly outmoded concept. Are they considering that our enemies don’t think like we do, have different value sets than we do?

The gamers simply seem oblivious to the likelihood that our enemies have different views of what constitutes victory than we do, that their war goals aren’t merely to force us to give them something, but rather to conquer us and occupy us. Or to destroy us altogether as a society, much less a polity; not considering that we have anything of value to give them but our deaths.

Regarding Russia and the People’s Republic of China in particular, another of Keating’s interviewees had this:

The two prospective opponents “conveniently pose very different military problems, allowing the United States to allocate some of its assets to one, and the rest to the other,” Farley wrote in an essay exploring whether the US could survive concurrent wars.

A conveniently posed scenario, with convenient assumptions built in.

All of that comes against the backdrop of our last several administrations eroding—deliberately or through disinterest or plain incompetence—our military capability:

The US previously approached multi-war scenarios with a doctrine to “defeat; defeat; deny” up to three enemies. Under that approach, US forces would defeat two opponents and block a third. Now, according to the Pentagon war-planner source, the aim is to “defeat; deny.”

What was that about one is none, two is one, three is backup? Now we’re down to one and a hope.

A Long-Standing Error

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President Joe Biden (D) seems to have identified a long-standing error regarding our nation’s response to espionage.

President Biden’s decision…to punish Russia for the SolarWinds hack broke with years of US foreign policy that has tolerated cyber espionage as an acceptable form of 21st century spycraft[.]

Espionage is espionage, spycraft is spycraft; the tools used are irrelevant to these simple facts.

Congressman Jim Langevin (D, RI) is continuing the misapprehension, though.

The SolarWinds incident that the administration today attributed to the SVR has had all the trappings of traditional espionage that, while unfortunate, has not historically been outside the bounds of responsible state behavior…. Mr Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken should “explain the contours of their new policy,” Mr Langevin said.

Not so much. While the SVR’s activity was, perhaps, not outside the bounds, neither was Biden’s response on this occasion a “new policy” so much as it may be the beginning of a correction of an erroneous policy. Most nations jail domestic spies and expel foreign spies (often jailing them domestically before expelling them at the ends of their sentences).

Biden is on track to getting this one right, for all that he needs to do more.

Sanctioning Russia

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Maybe. President Joe Biden (D) is acting like he’s taking action that would seem to respond to Russia’s SolarWinds hack and interference with the 2020 Presidential election. His potential action includes

  • expulsion of 10 Russian diplomats, includ[ing] representatives of Russian intelligence services
  • sanctions against “dozens” of people and companies
  • target[ing] Moscow’s ability to borrow money by prohibiting US financial institutions from buying Russian bonds directly from Russian institutions.

The sanctions will take effect on 14 June.

It turns out, on inspection that this move isn’t all that. Expelling some low-level diplomatic functionaries isn’t a very strong move. Neither is the action against Russian bonds very strong: that “sanction” explicitly allows US institutions to buy Russian bonds from resellers and elsewhere in the secondary markets. Rather than being a strong move, it just adds a trivial layer of bureaucracy.

And there’s the delay of a month-and-a-half before taking effect. It won’t take those diplomats six weeks to pack up and leave. It won’t take six weeks for business entities to adjust their relationships with the “dozens.” It won’t take six weeks for US institutions to adjust their buying procedures to focus on the secondary markets.

None of that even has to begin earlier than those six weeks.

However.

The Biden administration will have six weeks of distractions from the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China and from the Biden administration’s begging of Iran to let the US back into the nuclear weapons development deal.

The Biden administration will have six weeks in which to let its finger-wagging at the Russians die down, followed by quietly dropping the sanction threat.

Corporate Taxes

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Treasury Secretary and ex-Federal Reserve Chairman Janet Yellen opened her Wednesday Wall Street Journal op-ed with this:

When Congress enacted the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, the result was a dramatic reduction in corporate tax revenue. Over the past three years, corporate tax collections have fallen to their lowest level since World War II: 1% of gross domestic product.

Amazingly—shockingly—Yellen wrote that as if it were a Bad Thing.

Then she partially rationalized her disparagement with this:

Proponents of the TCJA said the US would get something in return for these tax cuts. Lower rates, the argument went, would lure production and investment to our shores, but that hasn’t happened—and for an obvious reason: other countries see what we’re doing and respond. When they see us lower our rates, they lower theirs to undercut us. In the end, no nation ends up more competitive. The result is a global race to the bottom….

Some of this is plain wrong. We did get trillions of dollars of corporate cash repatriated. We did get production and investment returned. And that spurred the outcome that Yellen so breathtakingly mistakes as a further Bad Thing. Other nations were spurred to compete on tax rates in order to retain their own businesses and to attract foreign investment.

Which drives the race to Yellen’s so-feared bottom.

But what is that bottom? Our Constitution specifies that the only things our Federal government is allowed, legitimately, to raise revenues for are three: to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. Those, with the general Welfare further specified by the remaining clauses of that Article I, Section 8, also, are the only things on which our Federal government may spend our taxpayer money. The other nations, particularly those competing with us on tax rates, have their own taxing (and spending) floors.

Racing to those bottoms may be bad for Government bureaucrats like Yellen, but they’re unalloyed Goods for the citizens of all of our nations, as we get to keep more of our money and make our own spending, saving, investing, and other allocating decisions with our money—and our decisions will be far better and far more efficiently done than any of our Governments can ever hope to do.

And at that natural bottom, nations can stop trying to compete on tax policy and focus on Adam Smith’s competition—providing better quality goods and services. Which is even better for us citizens, if not for the power of Government personages.

Only a Leftist or an entrenched bureaucrat can misunderstand that.