Teachers Pensions and Misapprehensions

State-funded teachers pensions are in peril around the nation from a combination of State governments over-promising, union demands and refusals to recognize economic realities, and those economic realities.  Kentucky provides an example of that, without going into the relative impacts of those three factors to the overall outcome, and of a critical misapprehension.

Kentucky has more than 175,000 active and inactive or retired teachers in the State’s teacher retirement program, and it has a $14.5 billion funding deficit—more than $85,000 per teacher.  The State was able to cover 88% of its agreed contribution to its program in 2007 and now can only cover 56%.  In response, Governor Matt Bevin (R) has proposed

switch[ing] many longtime teachers into a riskier defined-contribution plan and put an additional 3% of current teachers’ salaries toward retiree health care.

That’s the misapprehension.  Defined contribution plans are not riskier than State-run defined benefit plans, whether or not a State government mandates a per centage of a paycheck go into the defined contribution plan.

The vast degree of risk from a defined benefit plan is demonstrated by the failure of them in the private economy: the failure of corporations to adequately fund their defined benefit plans is well publicized and underlies their move to defined contribution, 401(k)-like plans.  That State-run defined benefit plans are even riskier than private enterprises’ is empirically demonstrated by the failure of States like Kentucky, which is otherwise a fiscally responsible one (see Illinois for an even riskier example).

Defined contribution plans put the responsibility for the plan’s performance where it belongs: on the individual owning the plan.  That person, with his own skin in that game, will take—or can be expected to take—much greater care with his own money and his own future than can a nameless bureaucrat managing a large collection of nameless (to him) people’s money.  Even a dedicated, honest financial manager bureaucrat (stipulate the vast majority of them are) has his hands tied by fiduciary duty rules: because he’s handling OPM, he’s forced to be more conservative with his investment moves, excessively so, than the individual who is responsible only for his own money.

Finally, the economic risks are the same for both State-run defined benefit and individually run defined contribution plans.  The Panic of 2008 hammered both types of plans.  The critical difference here, though, is the economic blow hit all 175,000+ members of Kentucky’s defined benefit plan the same.  Had those 175,000 been in their individual defined contribution plans instead, each of them would have managed their plan individually and differently from the others.  Each of them would have been hit by the Panic in different ways and to differing degrees.  The only individual hurt by the Panic’s impact on the defined contribution plan would have been that plan’s owner, not all 175,000 of his fellows.

A Fiduciary Rule

The Obama Labor Department, under the suzerainty of Tom Perez who is now the Progressive-Democratic National Committee Chairman, enacted a rule that allowed individuals to hale into court principals of employer or union retirement plans for the crime of charging commissions for their actions.  The rule also redefined “investment advice fiduciaries” to include broker-dealers and financial-insurance agents whose activities are limited to selling financial products.

The 5th Circuit struck the rule as illegal.  That’s good news for all of us.

However.

The Trump Labor Department has said it won’t enforce the rule and is working with the SEC on a new one….

The first part of that is good (and to be expected, since it’s unsavory to enforce an illegal rule).  However, with respect to the second part, it would be better if the Labor Department just sat down and shut up on this. This matter has nothing to do with Labor or with labor.

Banking Reform

The Senate has passed a bill that greatly diminishes Dodd-Frank’s interference with our banking industry by easing the regulatory burden on financial institutions lesser than the half-dozen or so that have been (mistakenly, IMNSHO) designated systemically important.

There’s concern about the willingness of the Progressive-Democrats who voted for it (including voting to get it past cloture) to vote for it again were it to come back from the House changed in any way.  Republican Senators, as a result, want the House to pass the bill as it is, without alteration or delay.

Many in the House, and The Wall Street Journal, whose op-ed prompted this post, demur and want more reforms added.

Republican Senators’ concerns about the timidity of the Progressive-Democrats and their willingness to vote favorably again is valid, though, and the House altering the bill and forcing that second vote in the Senate is unnecessarily risky. It might cost the entire bill.

Another path is for the House to take the bird in hand and pass it, preserving the partial reforms. Then they should pass their own bill containing the remaining items of interest. At that point Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R, KY) and his banking committee Senators should force a vote on the House bill, putting all the Progressive-Democrat Senators on the voting record as favoring or disfavoring banking reform.  In an election year.

An Unintended Consequence

The health coverage plan providers, companies like Humana, Aetna, Anthem, et al., are gaming the Medicare system to keep their Medicare bonuses coming in.  Surprise.

It seems that when Obamacare was passed, it included a system of paying bonuses from Medicare to those plan providers that got sufficiently high ratings on the quality of their plans.

But wait….

Medicare ranks privately managed plans…on a five-star quality scale and provides financial bonuses to providers of top-ranked plans. [A plan-holder’s] plan was set to be downgraded, which would have cost Humana its bonus. So the company merged plans covering [the plan-holder] and more than a million others into different contracts with higher scores. That preserved the bonuses.

That’s called cross-walking, and it’s entirely legal, if maybe a tad shady.

This is the sort of thing that happens, though, when Government intrudes itself too far into a marketplace.  Private enterprise is more agile than government bureaucracies can ever hope to be, and they can move much faster than any government bureaucracy can hope to do.

It’s also why black markets flourish in centrally planned economies.

The existence of this ability to cross-walk is a function of our Federal government’s intervention in what should be a free, competitive market.  The question wouldn’t even exist if we had an actual health insurance industry that operated free of Government fetters in an actual freely competitive market.