What’s in Store

…for the rest of us.  Kate Vershov Downing is a Liberal who has been mugged by reality.  She is—or was until she resigned—a member of the Palo Alto, CA, Planning and Transportation Commission, the city’s central planning facility for all things a private citizen might want to do.  Here’s an excerpt from her letter of resignation from that Commission, via PJMedia‘s Tom Knighton.  (Unfortunately, she’s not completely learned the mugging lesson; she and her husband are moving to another California city.)

After many years of trying to make it work in Palo Alto, my husband and I cannot see a way to stay in Palo Alto and raise a family here. We rent our current home with another couple for $6200 a month; if we wanted to buy the same home and share it with children and not roommates, it would cost $2.7M and our monthly payment would be $12,177 a month in mortgage, taxes, and insurance. That’s $146,127 per year—an entire professional’s income before taxes. This is unaffordable even for an attorney and a software engineer.

There’s more—much more—in her letter of resignation.

It’s clear that if professionals like me cannot raise a family here, then all of our teachers, first responders, and service workers are in dire straits. We already see openings at our police department that we can’t fill and numerous teacher contracts that we can’t renew because the cost of housing is astronomical not just in Palo Alto but many miles in each direction.

But Palo Alto’s fellow commission members, Liberal Planners all, either don’t care, don’t understand, or perhaps worst of all: they got theirs, and the rest can go hang.

Small steps like allowing 2 floors of housing instead of 1 in mixed use developments, enforcing minimum density requirements so that developers build apartments instead of penthouses, legalizing duplexes, easing restrictions on granny units, leveraging the residential parking permit program to experiment with housing for people who don’t want or need two cars, and allowing single-use areas like the Stanford shopping center to add housing on top of shops (or offices), would go a long way in adding desperately needed housing units while maintaining the character of our neighborhoods and preserving historic structures throughout.

But the P&T Commission as a whole Knows Better and has steadfastly refused to allow private citizens, private enterprises, to do these simple things.

This Council has…charted a course for the next 15 years of this city’s development….

Because the Commission members are fortune tellers and seers; they Know what’s going to happen before it happens.

Downing closed with this bit of irony:

We should take care to remember that Palo Alto is famous the world over for its residents’ accomplishments, but none of those people would be able to live in Palo Alto were they starting out today.

This Know Better attitude is what we can look forward to nation-wide if the Progressive-Democrat Party wins the White House this year and with it the Senate.

Is This Felony Perjury?

The perjury case officially has been referred to the US attorney for the District of Columbia by the House of Representatives.  In their letter to the DA, House Oversight Committee Chairman Jason Chaffetz (R, UT) and Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R, VA) pointed out that

[Then-]Secretary [now Democratic Party Presidential candidate Hillary] Clinton stated “there was nothing marked classified on my emails, either sent or received.”

But

FBI Director James Comey said July 5 that a “very small number of the emails containing classified information bore the markings indicating the presence of classified information.”  At least three emails had a (C) for Confidential which is the lowest level of classification. Fox News first reported in June that classified markings existed, despite Clinton’s public claims.

And

Clinton told [Benghazi Select Committee member Jim (R, OH)] Jordan that her team “went through every single email.”

But

The FBI Director said his investigators found that Clinton’s lawyers did not read all the emails, and relied on a narrow set of search terms to identify which emails were work-related.

“The lawyers doing the sorting for Secretary Clinton in 2014 did not individually read the content of all her e-emails,” Comey said July 5. Instead, they “relied on header information and used search terms.”

And

Clinton also testified to Congress there was only one server.

But

[T]he FBI Director said investigators found “Clinton used several different servers and administrators of those servers during her four years at the State Department and used numerous mobile devices to review and send e-mail on that personal domain.”

And

“I provided you, with all my work related emails, all that I had.  Approximately 55,000 pages. And they are being publicly released,” Clinton testified.

But

FBI investigators found “several thousand work related emails that were not in the group of 30,000 that were returned by Secretary Clinton to State in 2014.”

Keep in mind that Clinton’s claims made before those two committees were made under oath.

Second question: will President Barack Obama’s (D) DoJ, which owns the DC District Attorney and the James Comey FBI, do a more thorough job of investigating this than the DoJ and the FBI did of Clinton’s classified email handling gross negligence (which Comey was pleased to call “extreme carelessness”) with her private email server, which she used for official State Department business? Steven Pomerantz, “a retired assistant FBI director and 28-year-veteran of the bureau,” said that

…a perjury review is generally straightforward for agents.

“They look at the transcript of the testimony they provided in light of what they know to be, suspect to be the truth. They investigate both sides and take the aggregate and turn it over to the prosecuting authority for a decision.

“Since the Director (Comey) already established what she (Clinton) said and the investigation is complete, it would be a relatively simple matter to make a decision about perjury…given the history of this, it’s hard to say—it would seem to me a matter of weeks not months in this case.”

We’ll know soon, especially regarding the second question.

If You Like Your Plan

Aetna Inc will withdraw from 11 of the 15 states where it currently offers plans through the Affordable Care Act exchanges, becoming the latest of the major national health insurers to pull back sharply from the law’s signature marketplaces after steep financial losses.

This is playing out exactly as President Barack Obama (D) and his Democratic cronies knew it would ‘way back in 2010—they knew because health experts told them.  These experts advised the Democrats that mandating insurance purchases and paying the sick to get it (those Federal subsidies) while requiring plan providers (no longer can they be called insurers) to provide coverage to all at the same “low” price would emphasize the sick over the healthy getting coverage.  The experts also pointed out that this emphasis on sick customers relative to healthy ones would explode plan providers’ costs.  Obama and his, though, chose to disregard this advice and to go with what they wanted to hear: the self-serving huzzahs of the likes of AARP, who thought they could make money by fronting for the plan providers and collecting a piece of the resulting premium stream through referrals and reselling plans.

Recall, too, that Aetna has merger plans with Humana that Obama’s Department of Justice is suing to block on the speculative grounds that at some future date the new entity might engage in anti-competitive practices.  Never mind that the merger might also have allowed the combined insurers to be large enough to remain in Obamacare.

I wonder if anyone in the Obama administration might know of some beachfront property north of Santa Fe that they might be interested in selling us.

A Thought on Chevron Deference

Chevron Deference is a Supreme Court-created doctrine flowing from an appeal by Chevron Corporation to NRDC v Gorsuch, in which the Natural Resources Defense Council, during the Reagan administration, sued the EPA over a then-newly enacted regulation that allowed manufacturing plants to get pollution emission permits for new equipment that didn’t meet EPA emission requirements so long as the plant’s total emissions didn’t increase following the new equipment’s installation.

The Supreme Court found for the NRDC in Chevron’s appeal (Chevron USA v NRDC) and in the process created their Chevron Deference doctrine.  The heart of the doctrine, as articulated by Justice John Paul Stevens in writing for the majority, is this two-part test [citation and footnotes omitted]:

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created…program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”

Eliding the specifics of the case and appeal, what Chevron Deference says in essence is that the Court owes Executive Branch offices considerable deference in those offices’ interpretations of statutes and the regulations those offices implement to enact those statutes: the Courts’ opening position should be that those offices are correct in their interpretations and implementations.  The problem, though, is in Stevens’ last sentence and in the sentence he quotes:

…whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute[,]

and

The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created…program necessarily requires the formulation…of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.

Here is what the Constitution has to say on…gaps:

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Legislative powers—every single one of them—are the sole province of our United States Congress, and not any other body.  That Congress, too, consists solely of a Senate and House of Representatives; it does not include Executive Branch offices or Cabinets…or Agencies, administrative or otherwise.

What about those gaps in legislation?  All legislation, of necessity, fills gaps, whether those gaps exist de nihilo or they exist, or develop, as the law is seen in operation and/or as society evolves—else there’d be no legislation.  That includes, naturally, gaps in legislation.

When an (administrative) agency creates a rule to fill a gap in legislation that agency is authorized to administer, it is doing far more than formulating policy, or setting out rules for carrying into effect aspects of the legislation.  It’s legislating into that gap, which only Congress can (not may) do.

There’s also a problem with the concept of deference.  Regulating agencies are subordinate entities of the Executive Branch, and as such they cannot have any status but a subordinate one to each of the three branches of our Federal government.  From the other side of this relationship, the judiciary is a coequal branch of our Federal government, equal in status, hierarchy, and power and authority to each of the other two.  As such, Courts owe no deference at all to either of the other two branches, much less to agencies subordinate to either of those branches.  The mindset that the Courts do owe deference is a dangerous one.

The Chevron Deference doctrine is wrong.  The right answer for a Court in adjudicating a regulation has a different second step:

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is nearly the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress—so long as that intent is implemented in a constitutionally permitted manner, for if it has not then regardless of intent, the statute cannot stand.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, or allow an administrative interpretation to stand. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the answer for the court is to return the matter to the legislative (political) branch of the government so it can address what is strictly a legislative and a political question.

Prior Restraint

The EU has it.  And it doesn’t hesitate to reach overseas to try to inflict it outside EU jurisdiction.

The European Union’s antitrust authority on Thursday opened a full-blown investigation into plans by Dow Chemical Co and DuPont Co to merge, on concerns the deal would reduce competition [in] the global agricultural sector.

The European Commission said it would investigate whether the deal may reduce competition in areas such as crop protection, seeds, and certain petrochemicals. Announced in December, the proposed merger aims to create an American industry giant with a combined market cap of about $122 billion.

Never mind that the EU, like the US, has plenty of laws with which to deal with actual anti-competitive or monopoly abuse behaviors.  Never mind that prior restraint is destructive of innovation and of competition.

Never mind that this is an American merger between American companies, or that global markets reach far beyond the EU while the EU’s legal reach is limited to the EU.

Here’s a thought, one that takes advantage of the wide world beyond parochial Europe.  Dow and DuPont should simply ignore the EU and merge if they think that makes sense.  And then contribute to that global competition reduction by walking away from Europe (save post-leave Great Britain) and focus their competitive and innovative efforts on that wide world.