Don’t Return to the Go-Go Days

But do accelerate mortgage lending regardless of credit risk.  That’s the conflicting position Fed Governor Elizabeth Duke seems to be taking.

She doesn’t want to return to the days of easy mortgages that obtained in 2005-2006, a run of money that the graph below illustrates.

But she adds

But I also don’t think it would be a good idea to go back to the quite restrictive credit conditions of the early 1980s[.]

Hmm….

The Wall Street Journal points out that

[t]he drop in purchase mortgages—loans for buying a home rather than refinancing an existing loan—has been most pronounced among borrowers with low credit scores.  Originations have dropped by 30% for borrowers with credit scores above 780 between 2007 and 2012, but they’ve dropped by 90% for borrowers with credit scores between 620 and 680.

And

[T]he trend…”has disturbing implications for potential new households” because younger borrowers typically have credit scores that are more than 50 points below older borrowers[.]

What does this mean?  It means that poorer credit risks have a harder time getting loans than better credit risks.  What’s the downside of that?

Is Duke still holding out for the CRA debacle that anyone should be able to get easy credit for no better reason than that they exist?

The problem, says Duke, is that the economy may actually be worse off if the pendulum stays stuck at too tight….  The ability of newly formed households that are more likely to have lower incomes and credit scores to get loans “will make a big difference in the shape of the recovery[.]  Without first-time homebuyers, the move-up market will be sluggish, new and existing home sales will be more subdued, and purchase mortgage volumes will return only slowly.”

But this is a static view.  A dynamic analysis shows pretty clearly that this is just a path to a new equilibrium, at which point the pipeline of first-time buyers will be back at a “normal” level; they’ll just be older, with better incomes, and with those two characteristics established, more stable, and so better, credit risks.

Owning a home is certainly the American dream, and it remains a worthy dream.  But it’s not an inalienable right.  Those who work hard, develop good credit—and manage their finances so as to maintain that good credit—do get mortgages today.  Those who don’t haven’t done anything to earn the same rewards as those worked hard.

It’s just that simple.  Even a Federal Banker ought to be able to keep up with that.

Are Bank Depositors’ Funds at Risk?

…from yet more government confiscation schemes?  It seems that Euro Group President Jeroen Dijsselbloem’s remark that raiding Cypriot depositors’ deposit accounts to bail out failed banks in that country ought to be the model for the rest of the eurozone wasn’t so far off the mark after all, the publicly pronounced opprobrium notwithstanding.  This condemnation, for instance, came from Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker:

It disturbs me when the way in which they tried to resolve the Cyprus problem is held up as a blueprint for future rescue plans.  It’s no blueprint.  We should not give the impression that future savings deposits in Europe might not be secure.  We should not give the impression that investors should not keep their money in Europe.  This harms Europe’s entire financial center.

Yet this seems to be the plan, according to Spiegel Online International reporting.

[I]n the European Parliament, politicians are considering ways to make banks bear greater responsibility for their own financial problems.  …  The discussion includes the possibility of future compulsory levies on major depositors[.]

…

Under the proposal, deposits of up to €100,000 would be excluded from any loss participation at a bank.  Any deposits over that amount would only get hit if the losses couldn’t be fully covered through a bank’s shareholders and other creditors.

Why would anyone deposit their money with banks in a political regime in which those deposits are at such risk of confiscation whenever a government finds it…useful?  Wouldn’t such placement be a violation of the fiduciary responsibility of the depositor toward his own investors and creditors?

More Obama Sequester

Recall that the Department of Transportation under President Barack Obama warned a week or two ago that nearly 150 control towers at small regional airports will close down, ostensibly due to sequester budget cuts.  DoT also warned of furloughs at major airports, cynically noting that resulting delays could be “very painful for the flying public.”

To alleviate this, Senator Jerry Moran (R, KS) proposed replacing the $50 million of Obama Sequester cuts from the FAA with savings from unspent balances, a kind agency slush fund that all agencies squirrel away against various exigencies, and by reducing other low-priority spending.

Enter, stage left, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D, NV).  He pulled Moran’s amendment and refused to allow it to come to the floor for a vote.

Thus, as The Wall Street Journal puts it,

…in the weeks ahead travelers will likely experience the frustration of flight delays, cancellations and closed airports.  It won’t happen by accident or out of fiscal necessity, but because Washington Democrats refuse to prioritize federal spending.

Competition and Cadillac Insurance

Under Obamacare, writes Emily Chasan in The Wall Street Journal, employers will be required by 2018 to pay a tax of 40% on health care plans that President Barack Obama and his minion, Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, decide for themselves are somehow “excessively rich” in the benefits they pay out.

The excuse these two and other Progressives make for this is that these Cadillac plans, with their low deductibles and “generous” medical coverage, will encourage overuse of our health-care system.  Sure.  Everyone needs to be covered.  But only to a government-approved degree.  And never mind that those low deductibles make the policy purchasers ineligible for Health Savings Accounts—Progressives don’t want Americans to have those, anyway.

But these folks also ignore—or don’t understand—another aspect of their interference.  Competition in a free market for health insurance, including an ability for insurers to charge risk-based premiums, and for health services would address that “overuse” concern much more efficiently than a 2000 page law with its tens of thousands of pages of HHS rules ever could.  Such an environment would directly impact the costs born both by suppliers and their customers/patients.

The competition would drive down the prices charged, and risk-based premiums within that environment would enable insurers to bill for the coverage offered in accordance with the actual likelihood of payout.  Yes, some high-risk coverages would get more expensive, but the vast majority of coverages, by not having to be priced so as to subsidize those high risks, would get a lot cheaper.

Also, customers and patients would gravitate to the combination of policy coverage and medical service usage that actually interested them, instead of having to buy a government-approved policy that included things only a bureaucrat could love.  An equilibrium would develop that had customers and patients getting the policies and services they wanted at prices that suited them with insurers and providers offering those services and policies at prices that would let them stay in business.

There’s no need of a tax to manage demand and supply.  Americans are fully capable of doing that for themselves in a free, competitive market.

The Aftermath Begins

Spiegel Online International is describing it, albeit with some misconceptions.

Not even savings accounts are safe, as was recently seen in Cyprus. Such deposits are actually guaranteed to up to €100,000, but the euro rescuers cared little about this as they desperately searched for funds.  Cypriot small savers may have escaped this time around, but the realization remains, even beyond Cyprus, that a state teetering on the edge of bankruptcy will resort to all available means to raise money—and a guarantee is only worth something as long as the entity that stands behind it remains solvent.

Nothing is safe from being seized by the state, no savings account, but also no house or apartment.  …  Governments have even banned the possession of gold during currency crises, forcing citizens to exchange the precious metal for the national currency.

That’s the nub of the aftermath.  No one’s private property is safe from an overweening government.

Those paragraphs, though, carries SOI‘s first misconception: the original demand to expropriate private savings came from the Euro Group, not Cyprus.  Cyprus’ Parliament rejected it at the start.  However, Cyprus’ government, including its Parliament, is complicit in the present theft—it could have rejected that attempt, too.

Then there’s this:

Greece and Cyprus have millionaires and billionaires of whom many profited from the artificial boom fueled by low interest rates after the introduction of the euro—a boom that subsequently went bust.  Why shouldn’t they help finance efforts to deal with the aftermath?  Is it fairer to place the burden on the euro bailout fund, and thus distribute it among the taxpayers of other countries?

Why shouldn’t they?  The question is a demonstration of the lack of understanding.  Why should folks who played by the rules placed before them, and with no other responsibility for the companies, have to pay for the failures of the companies, at least as part of the first resort?  Why should not the companies’ investors and creditors be the only ones to suffer the consequences of the failure of their investments and loans—or at least be wiped out entirely  before depositors—those not responsible at all—suffer any loss?

Is it fairer to place the burden on the euro bailout fund?  To ask this is to demonstrate, again, a lack of understanding.  The euro bailout fund should not exist at all.  The taxpayers of other countries should not even be under consideration of paying for the failure of one country.

Finally, this:

A levy on assets would immediately reduce the debts of crisis-stricken countries, whereas bailout packages pool risks and shift them to the future.

Those risks can become dangerously explosive.  The more countries that have to be bailed out, the fewer countries remain that have to bear the burden—as long as they are able to.  This could even prove to be too much for Germany at some point.

The second answers the first, but only partially.  A levy on assets does not cure the reason the crisis-level debts exist in the first place, but it does destroy property rights.  Neither does any bailout address the underlying causes.  Levy or bailout, they merely perpetuate the situation—as we’re seeing in the euro zone and in the US.