Category Archives: markets

The Cost of Price Supports

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They’re disastrous for our food costs, which harms our poor especially, and they drive the “need” for food stamps.  Here are some numbers, from a recent op-ed by Burleigh CW Leonard in The Wall Street Journal.  The parity prices for some farm products are these:

  • corn: $12/bushel vs actual market price of $7.01
  • wheat: $18.30 vs $8.33
  • rice: $42.20 per hundred weight vs $14.80
  • milk: $52 vs $21.10.

We care about parity prices because the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Agricultural Act of 1949 require, unless other temporary support prices  are specified by subsequent Congresses, that farm support prices be set to parity according to a formula based on farm prices extant in 1910-1914 [sic].

Notice that: farmers (read: agribusiness, who are the vast majority of our modern farm industry, not the mom and pops over whom our politicians shed so many crocodile tears) can get three times the market price of rice from those supports so they produce to their heart’s content and sell the excess to the government.

This doesn’t actually happen to a great extent, though, because of an epicycle in the government’s Ptolemeic orrery of controls: the government imposes on each farmer (agribusiness) limits on how much (rice) he can produce.  I won’t get into the inconsistent manner in which such limits get applied across farm products.  Nor will I get into the interference such controls represent in each man’s right to choose for himself what he will produce with his labor (and what price he will charge for that produce, or that labor).  (Nor will I get into the mandatory diversion of food into fuel products, which is what the ethanol mandates are.  That’s for another discussion entirely.)

It’s sufficient, here, to see that the price distortion remains.  And the “need” for food stamps remains.

Leonard is on the right track with the solution he offers:

…craft a new long-term farm bill.  Its first step should be to repeal permanent law that governs commodity price support programs.  Then the default setting for US agriculture would be a free market….

He goes too far, though.  There’s no need for a new “long-term bill.”  His proposed bill’s first step is nearly sufficient by itself: repeal the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, the Agricultural Act of 1949, and associated laws.  Then take the only additional step necessary: stop instituting other price support legislation.

Watch the need for food stamps fall precipitously.

There is nothing to fear from free market competition but fear itself.

An Out of Control CFPB?

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But we knew that would be the case with a budget funded by on-demand calls to the Treasury and a deliberate lack of Congressional oversight.  Here are three examples, from Skadden Arps, the “second best global law firm,” according to Spirit of Enterprise.  In each case, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau imposed enforcement orders that charged both restitution payments and civil penalties for the miscreancies that wanted restitution.  Those miscreancies generally centered on “deceptive marketing and sales practices” and “deceptive debt collection practices.”

Capital One: Required to pay $140 million in restitution and a $25 million civil penalty.  The penalty was nearly 18% of the restitution.

Discover Bank: Required to pay $200 million in restitution and a $14 million civil penalty.  The penalty was 7% of the restitution.

American Express: Required to pay $85 million in restitution and a $27.5 million civil penalty.  The penalty was 32% of the restitution.

Assuming the restitution amounts are reasonable assessments of the severity of the banks’ misbehaviors, those civil penalties seem to bear no relation at all to the…crimes.  They seem, in fact, to be capricious and out of control—just a grabbing of what an unaccountable bureaucrat felt like taking.

Skadden’s complete report (it’s long and wide-ranging) can be seen here.

Obamacare and Insurance Costs

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Here are some of those costs.

No less a light than The New York Times reports that

…health insurance companies across the country are seeking and winning double-digit increases in premiums for some customers, even though one of the biggest objectives of the Obama administration’s health care law was to stem the rapid rise in insurance costs for consumers.  Particularly vulnerable to the high rates are small businesses and people who do not have employer-provided insurance and must buy it on their own.  In California, Aetna is proposing rate increases of as much as 22%, Anthem Blue Cross 26%, and Blue Shield of California 20% for some of those policy holders.

OpenMarket notes that

Obamacare resulted in hikes of 41%-47% in health insurance premiums for some policyholders in Connecticut.  …in other states, like Florida and Ohio, insurers have been able to raise rates by at least 20% for some policy holders.

Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, writing in Huff Post Business, says

Your medical plan is facing an unexpected expense, so you probably are, too.  It’s a new, $63-per-head fee to cushion the cost of covering people with pre-existing conditions under President Barack Obama’s health care overhaul.  The charge, buried in a recent regulation, works out to tens of millions of dollars for the largest companies….

On top of this, The Washington Post reminds us that President Barack Obama slid into his Obamacare a 3.5% surtax on those insurers that participate in Obamacare’s Federal health insurance exchanges.  Of course, this fee will be passed through to their customers in the form of higher health insurance premiums.

There are causes for these sharp increases, as we might expect.  Merrill Matthews and Mark Litow, in The Wall Street Journal, have some ideas on this.  They point out, for instance, some costs that Obamacare imposes, willy-nilly, on insurers—transforming them from companies that accept risk for a fee into Federally mandated, privately funded welfare programs:

Central to ObamaCare are requirements that health insurers (1) accept everyone who applies (guaranteed issue), (2) cannot charge more based on serious medical conditions (modified community rating), and (3) include numerous coverage mandates that force insurance to pay for many often uncovered medical conditions.

There is no risk-based fee allowed here.  Just take all comers, and don’t “overcharge” them—HHS’ definition of “overcharge.”  Folks won’t need to buy insurance until they’re actually sick—the risk has been realized—but the insurers won’t be able to charge a premium commensurate with the empirical fact of illness; they can only charge the premium in effect for a low risk, healthy population that hasn’t gotten sick yet.

Matthews and Litow also note that this outcome was well-known long before Obamacare was dreamed up post-2008:

Eight states—New Jersey, New York, Maine, New Hampshire, Washington, Kentucky, Vermont and Massachusetts—enacted guaranteed issue and community rating in the mid-1990s and wrecked their individual (i.e., non-group) health-insurance markets.  Premiums increased so much that Kentucky largely repealed its law in 2000 and some of the other states eventually modified their community-rating provisions.

They also note that, based on empirical evidence—i.e., facts already known to the authors of Obamacare—states with currently low insurance rates will be the most punished by Obamacare:

We compared the average premiums in states that already have ObamaCare-like provisions in their laws and found that consumers in New Jersey, New York, and Vermont already pay well over twice what citizens in many other states pay.  Consumers in Maine and Massachusetts aren’t far behind.  Those states will likely see a small increase.

By contrast, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming, and Virginia will likely see the largest increases—somewhere between 65% and 100% [a different estimate than the lower one of OpenMarket].  Another 18 states, including Texas and Michigan, could see their rates rise between 35% and 65%.

Finally,

Although President Obama repeatedly claimed that health-insurance premiums for a family would be $2,500 lower by the end of his first term, they are actually about $3,000 higher—a spread of about $5,500 per family.

It’s the Progressive New Math, from the Orwell School of High Finance: cost increases are premium cuts.

Compromise in a Free Market

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Me: I have this bushel of corn to sell you.

You: I have this fifty-cent piece I’ll give you if you give me that corn.

Me: Can’t do that; this corn cost me more than that in time, money, and equipment to grow.  Ten bucks works.

You: Too much.  You can amortize those costs over all your corn; you’re only trying to sell me a single bushel.  Six-fifty.

Me: Done.

But that was a case where both parties were willing and interested in reaching an agreement.  In DC, Progressive compromise means “Do it my way, or no deal.”

Middle Class, Luck, and American Power

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George Friedman, writing for Stratfor (he’s also their Founder and CEO), has an article out concerning the American middle class and American global power.  The whole article is well worth reading, but for now, the relevant remark comes near the end:

It would seem to me that unless the United States gets lucky again, its global dominance is in jeopardy.  Considering its history, the United States can expect to get lucky again….

The luck to which Friedman refers concerns some fortuitous unintended consequences, and he offers three examples:

The GI Bill was designed to limit unemployment among returning serviceman; it inadvertently created a professional class of college graduates. The VA loan was designed to stimulate the construction industry; it created the basis for suburban home ownership. The Interstate Highway System was meant to move troops rapidly in the event of war; it created a new pattern of land use that was suburbia.

The threat to our status as a global power—and by extension to our freedom of action as a nation—stems from a generation of the failure of a long-standing belief in American culture—the faith in the availability of economic upward mobility.  For instance, median household income in 2011 was $49,000, just below the level in 1989 in real terms; it seems that upward mobility has stagnated.

Luck matters, but to a very large extent, we make our own luck.

Underlying this making is individual responsibility, individual initiative, and individual risk-taking.  In all of our past booms, including those in which fortune played a role through those unintended consequences, the freedom to exercise those individual characteristics was both broadly present and not very much circumscribed by government intervention.

Here’s a present example of the role played by fortune, this time negatively: those individual characteristics, and parallel ones in business, are severely circumscribed by government regulation in all aspects of our lives.  We’re restricted in what we’re permitted or required to buy or to throw away (see Obamacare and CFL bulbs), in the decisions businesses are permitted to make in their own interests rather than government’s (see Obamacare and Dodd-Frank with its CFPB abomination), in what businesses are permitted to release as by-products of production or sales.

Our ability to make our own luck, today, is severely limited by government.  Fortuitous unintended consequences are a lot less likely in an environment of rapidly increasing government control over the economic environment which underlies the making of that luck.

There’s another factor at play, too: those government restrictions also have the unintended consequence of restricting upward mobility.  The poor become trapped in their stratum and cannot move up into the middle class due to those restrictions’ effect on job creation and hiring.  This not only works to the detriment of those poor, it shrivels the remaining middle class.