There’s a Hint There

President Donald Trump’s (R) National Security Council is being reorganized and downsized streamlined in a badly needed revamp. One demonstrated need is this:

The goal, according to one official, is to streamline processes within the NSC, which coordinates national security and foreign policy for the president….

This is a continuation of Fiona Hill’s (remember her?) anger over her ad hoc interagency coordination group foreign policy inputs not being obeyed by Trump I. It’s not the NSC’s job—or it should not be—to coordinate national security and foreign policy for the President. It’s the NSC’s job—or it should be—to coordinate national security and foreign policy inputs to the President’s own national security and foreign policy development and decisions.

The move is intended to increase DoD’s and State’s direct involvement in those inputs, and that’s entirely appropriate. Homeland Security’s inputs should be increased, as well, given that that Department was created long after the NSC. The three departments, too, already form—or should form—the core of all of those policy development inputs.

Not the Right Answer

Nvdia’s honcho, Jensen Huang, thinks the administration’s export controls on chips is a failure. He claims all the controls have done is to galvanize[] Beijing to push ahead faster with its own artificial-intelligence technologies.

The local companies are very talented and very determined, and the export controls give them the spirit, energy and the government support to accelerate their development[.]

No doubt. That’s not the whole story, though. Forcing the PRC to spend its own resources on those developments rather than importing the latest and greatest, and then reverse engineering them, copying them, skipping development steps—freeloading off our expenditures—is good for us.

Aside from that, ever since the beginning of the Industrial Age, Western political, economic, and intellectual freedoms have powered Western innovation far ahead of anything dictatorships have been able to achieve, from Russia, the USSR, mainland China, pre-WWII Japan. That’s why they were at such pains to copy Western developments rather than developing their own. The copying was, for a long time, a major component of post-WWII Japan, too.

Rather than giving up on chip export control, we need to tighten them further to the point of cutting off chip exports to the PRC altogether, and we need to get Europe to do the same. There’s no reason to doubt the fundamental innovative superiority of the West so long as we preserve those political, economic, and intellectual freedoms and expand them by getting our governments out of the regulatory way. Free markets always will do better at enhancing our innovative prowess than centrally planned markets in the long run, and in the intermediate run, as well.

Rome Said to Carthage

Rome Said to Carthage

“You don’t need those weapons,” in prelude to the Third Punic War, which ended in the complete destruction of Carthage.

The People’s Republic of China objects to the US’ Golden Dome plans, a defense system in orbit, among other places, that would defend our nation against missile attack from any direction and from any source or launch site. PRC Foreign Minister Mao Ning gaslights that Golden Dome has a

strong offensive nature and violates the principle of peaceful use in the Outer Space Treaty[.]

He neglects to mention, though, the PRC’s overt military threats against the Republic of China and each of the nations rimming the South China Sea. Those threats, too, come against the backdrop of the PRC’s massive and rapid buildup of the PLA[1], a buildup that consists exclusively of offensive weapons. That buildup has achieved, so far,

  • four million men under arms
  • world’s largest navy
  • world’s largest coast guard
  • world’s largest naval militia
  • huge fishing fleet whose ships are designed for rapid arming
  • world’s largest submarine fleet
  • third largest, second most advanced (and steadily growing and improving) air force
  • arsenal of ballistic anti-ship missiles
  • nuclear capable theater ballistic missiles
  • large, growing ICBM fleet
  • global reach hypersonic missiles that when fully deployed will give it first strike capability
  • stated willingness to use its “ordinary” nuclear ICBMs in a first strike without concern for the destruction it would absorb from return strikes
    • Mao Zedong: “What if they killed 300 million of us? We would still have many people left.” That promise remains unretracted

Now, Beijing is saying to us, “You don’t need those weapons.”


[1] Cotton, Tom, Seven Things You Can’t Say About China

“The best path to peace”

The august editors at The Wall Street Journal ended their piece decrying Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not show up for peace discussions with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (while trying to claim President Donald Trump (R) should be embarrassed by Putin’s absence) with this bit:

The best path to peace is to increase the pressure on Moscow. Mr Trump can start with secondary sanctions on countries that buy Russian energy. Former US Treasury chief economist Eric Van Nostrand wrote on these pages this week that removing a quarter of Russia’s oil exports from the market would cut the Kremlin’s oil revenue by 20%. Global oil production is high enough that it wouldn’t raise gas prices in the US by much.
Mr Trump could also announce his support for more military aid for Ukraine.

Sanctions hurt Russia, and increasing sanctions would hurt more. But the empirically demonstrated fact is that the pain is greater in western—and news opinionators—eyes than it is actually experienced by Putin. That’s because both Putin’s pain threshold is so much higher than that in the West and Putin’s give-a-hoot regarding pain suffered by his Russian subjects is so much lower than in the West.

Increase pressure on Putin? The only pressure he’s ever felt since he sent his barbarian hordes into Ukraine is the initial defeat at the gates of Kyiv and the mechanics of getting supplies of weapons and bodies to heave into the ensuing maelstrom. Those mechanics have long since been improved.

No, the best path to peace remains what it has always been: drive the barbarian hordes back out of Ukraine entirely.

That, however, requires more than empty words of “more military aid for Ukraine;” it requires actually providing more military aid, and rather than continuing the dribs and drabs and slow-walking of deliveries, that aid must be delivered in the types of weapons systems, ammunition, and logistic support needed by Ukraine; in the numbers needed by Ukraine; and at the rate needed by Ukraine—all as defined by Ukraine.

Full stop.

Another Reason Why

The People’s Republic of China is demonstrating yet another reason why the United States—and Western Civilization nations generally—must revamp our supply chains to remove them entirely from the PRC. The PRC has resumed shipments of certain rare earth-based components critical to national defense and to the weapons systems implementing our defense capabilities. That resumption, though, comes with the PRC government’s strict control over the licensing requirements for export of those components.

Neha Mukherjee, a rare-earths analyst at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence:

It’s basically like a tap. They can decide when to export and when to not, and the control is in their hands, completely[.]

The control is in their hands, completely, not just through that absolute control of the required licenses, but more importantly because the PRC

mines around two-thirds of global rare-earth minerals and processes about 90% of the world’s supply.

That’s what needs to change. We need to develop our own sources of rare earth ores (we have lots, as do most western nations), develop our own processing capabilities, and develop our own alternatives to rare earth centric magnets for our systems along with alternative forms of magnets, even alternatives to magnets altogether.

The news writers of the WSJ article at the link profess a lack of understanding of the PRC’s shift.

The reason for the recent granting of export licenses couldn’t be determined.

The reason is self-evident. It’s nothing more than the PRC telling us and the rest of the West, in no uncertain terms, that they can cut us off entirely, or they can export these things freely—depending on how “friendly” we are to it, how much we comport our activities to its wishes.

The rearrangement of our supply chains will cost us several pretty pennies, but even at that, it will be far cheaper than being controlled by an enemy nation because we cannot defend ourselves.