Category Archives: foreign policy

Peace in our Time

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Republic of Korea’s envoy trip to northern Korea has produced a Baby Kim promise to play nice with the RoK and to talk with us about nuclear weapons.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un promised to not use nuclear or conventional weapons against South Korea and expressed willingness to hold talks with the United States on denuclearization, Seoul said on Tuesday after a rare two-day visit to Pyongyang.

The Hermit Kingdom added that it’s willing to give up its nuclear weapons if military threats against North Korea subsides….

RoK National Security Director Chung Eui-yong said after his safe return to Seoul

The North side clearly affirmed its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and said it would have no reason to possess nuclear weapons should the safety of its regime be guaranteed and military threats against North Korea removed[.]

We believe Baby Kim because he’s never lied to us before, and northern Korea always kept its past commitments to stop their nuclear weapons programs and never attacked RoK assets and islands without provocation.  Nor have they ever threatened Japan (which just happens to be an ally of ours) by flying ICBMs over its home islands.

Too, with northern Korea as close as it is to getting nuclear warheads onto its missiles, this…promise…from Baby Kim couldn’t possibly be just another attempt at distraction until they finish the task.  Not at all.

No, everything’s jake.

The Russian Attitude Toward Rule of Law

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And the value of any contract with Russia.  These are demonstrated by Russian behavior regarding Russian natural gas flowing through Ukraine to western Europe.

Having won an arbitration dispute with Russian-controlled Gazprom over natural gas shipments to Ukraine, Gazprom and the Kremlin decided not to honor the ruling or the commitment:

Russia is tearing up its contracts to supply Ukraine with natural gas, sparking another stand-off between Moscow and Kiev and raising fears of new gas supply shortages across Europe during the winter.

In response,

European Commission Vice President Maros Sefcovic warned Friday that the situation raised “concerns not only for the direct supply of natural gas to Ukraine but possibly also for the transit of gas to the EU.”

Maybe he also should think about the wisdom of supporting the Russian pipeline across the Baltic Sea to Europe. Flows in that pipe will be just as fragile and vulnerable as the flows through the trans-Ukraine pipe. Russia is just setting up an additional weapon to use against the EU with it.

Tariffs and National Security

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In response to President Donald Trump’s of tariffs to be applied to imports of steel and aluminum at some unspecified in the (presumably relatively near) future and coming from as yet unnamed nations, Japanese Trade Minister Hiroshige Seko said

I believe there is absolutely no impact on America’s national security from imports of steel and aluminum from Japan, which is an allied nation.

I agree in principle with the generally negative attitude toward tariffs.

However, Seko has misunderstood the national security question. Stipulate that Japan (and the Republic of Korea, another staunch ally and key exporter of steel to us) is a strong and reliable ally.

  • Both rely on imports of raw materials in order to produce steel or aluminum
  • The supply lines from raw material sources to Japan and the RoK are long, vulnerable, and easily cut off by hostile action of the PRC and/or Russia
  • The supply lines from Japan and the RoK to us are long, vulnerable, and easily cut off by hostile action of the People’s Republic of China and/or Russia

Indeed, the RoK and our imports from them are even more vulnerable, with the PRC and Russia just a short hop away and the PRC’s client, northern Korea, just across a minefield.

Supply lines from other sources of our steel and aluminum imports—Canada, for instance—are much more secure.  While tariffs against nations like the PRC might be justifiable, I hope the tariffs will be suitably and tightly targeted and truly based on the illegality of dumping.

The national security question can be addressed through other means, by for instance mandating a certain amount of domestically produced steel and aluminum.  The difficult discrimination here is that the mandate must not be to “protect” American producers; they need to compete better.  The mandate must be for the demonstrable purpose of maintaining an American capability both to produce steel and aluminum and to ramp up that production capability when those supply lines get cut off.

What OPEC did to our oil supply, and so to our economy and national security, the PRC and Russia can just as easily do through our access to those metals.  And keep in mind the PRC already has attempted that with rare earth metals, which are critical to our digital capability.  One purpose of the PRC’s occupation of the South China Sea is to seize control of all those rare earth sources on the sea bottom.

“Dialog” with Northern Korea

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Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-in wants the US to “lower the threshold for dialogue” so that “dialog” with northern Korea can begin.  Adding offensiveness to the foolishness, Moon didn’t even suggest this to us; he said it to People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping via a meeting with an envoy of Xi’s.

No.  The onus is on northern Korea to “lower the threshold.”  Until Baby Kim agrees to discuss—seriously discuss, not just engage in idle chit-chat—the dissolution of his nuclear weapons program and of his nuclear weapons, there is no basis for dialog.

Full stop.

Telecommunications Security

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The US is concerned about People’s Republic of China’s cell phone company, Huawei, and the threat it poses to our national security, through an ability to use its equipment to conduct espionage and to shut down our communications networks, were it to get a significant foothold in our cell phone network, whether via its cell phones or its network equipment—its routers, switches, and cell-tower gear.  The concern stems from Huawei’s relationship with the PRC government, which makes the company an arm of that government.

The British government, on the other hand, is embracing Huawei with open arms, even as it seeks ever more intimate economic ties with the PRC.  Brit intel has warned the government of these risks, but the government has said to pay no mind.  After all, in answer to the concerns, Huawei set up and funds a lab that tests its equipment.

30 people with UK security clearances disassemble Huawei equipment and evaluate hardware and software for security vulnerabilities. Huawei funds and operates the lab, and the staff are Huawei employees. Overseeing the operation is a board composed of mostly senior British intelligence and government officials, as well as three Huawei representatives.

Does anyone seriously expect that “senior British officials,” as isolated from the actual work as they are, will be able effectively to oversee the “evaluations?”

The wolf is minding the flock. How braindead is that?