Tactically Sound?

Perhaps, but perhaps strategically disastrous.  British Prime Minister Boris Johnson asked the queen to prorogue the current parliament, and the queen agreed, in order to block it from blocking him from taking Great Britain out of the European Union on schedule 31 October without a deal in the likely event that the EU continues its intransigence in negotiating.  Prorogation is the formal end of an existing session of Parliament, and normally it’s done just prior to the beginning of the next session, to clear the decks for that session.

The current prorogation would run until 14 October, at which point the Queen’s Speech, which would reconvene Parliament, would lay out her (the PM’s) agenda for the new session. Existing bills, including those currently planned to interfere with Brexit, cease to exist with the prorogation; although, they could be reintroduced—to take their turn in the queue in those two remaining weeks.

There are a couple of reasons why Johnson’s move might be tactically sound.  Parliamentary sessions normally last for one year; however, the current Parliament has sat [sic] since June 2017, more than two years.  It’s time for this feckless band to get out of the way, go home, and contemplate their navels.

That brings up the second reason: prorogation would prevent this Parliament from blocking Johnson’s effort to bring the nation out of the EU with no further delay and associated economic uncertainty—and that uncertainty’s follow-on deleterious effects on the British weal.

The longer question that arises is whether prorogation is a strategically sound move.  It’s very likely that prorogation will result in an on-time departure from the EU, with or without a deal governing the terms of the exit.  However, it’s entirely possible that the associated hue and cry will lead to new elections (possibly triggered by a successful no-confidence vote in November) and a new, non-Tory government installed.

That government is very likely to go, hat twisting in hand, to Brussels and beg for reentry into the EU.  What then?

What would be the result on British sovereignty; British economic and political welfare; indeed, British self-respect in such an eventuality?

Even if that new government doesn’t go begging (or even if it does), what else could happen? The alternative to a Johnson-led Tory, sort-of conservative, government is a Corbyn-led Labour government.  That means the prosperity of a limited (relatively, within the constraints of present British concepts) government that Margaret Thatcher made so much progress toward and that Johnson would seek to preserve and extend would be entirely undone by the destructively socialist government that Corbyn would install.

What then of British economic and political welfare; of British self-respect?

Still, Johnson’s move is worth the risk, for the sake of British sovereignty.

Pro-EU

Too many Brits in Parliament plainly favor the European Union over their own nation.  That’s what opposition MPs seem to do, as they look to block a no-deal departure from the EU by Great Britain, even expressing a willingness to bring down the government to achieve that end.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson wants a (new) deal, for all that he’s willing to take Great Britain out of the EU on schedule if Brussels continues to refuse to negotiate at all, much less in good faith. The MPs’ obstruction serves only to undercut such leverage as Johnson might have in these post-May efforts.

The most that can happen from their obstruction is the preservation of May’s Northern Ireland border agreement that gives open and unfettered entry into Great Britain. This destroys British sovereignty by eliminating its control over its own border—which was a major motivation for the Leave vote.

Since those MPs know this full well—after all, they’re highly intelligent and at the top of their respective parties—their motive can only be their favoring the EU and subordinating their own nation and its sovereignty to that continental entity.

“Bow Respectfully”

That’s the latest demand from Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, which he made in response to rumors that President Donald Trump might be open to direct talks with the Iranian government.  Rouhani has said,

If you lifted all the sanctions, bowed respectfully to the Iranian nation, well then the conditions are different.

Conditions certainly would be different, but they would be even less productive.  The men of Iran’s government aren’t interested in discussions, serious or otherwise. Nor do they care about the people over whom they reign.  They just want nuclear weapons so they can destroy Israel.

Israel must be eradicated from the page of history.
—Ayatollah Khomeini

That’s Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei’s predecessor; the man has done nothing to move away from that.

Maybe, though—just maybe—Trump should hold out for talks with Khamenei. He won’t be any less obstructive than Rouhani, but he’s the one who’ll pass on any deal Rouhani might pretend to make, anyway.

Or not. Khamenei has said.

[W]e will not negotiate with this administration of the US under no condition, this is a lethal poison[.]

The only thing is to keep ratcheting up sanctions and isolation faster than Iran can respond and adapt. And firmer actions if Iran makes progress, anyway.

Standing Tall

Great Britain has said that it will abide by British law regarding cross-border movement of persons. European Union law will no longer have applicability, with effect from 31 October, Great Britain’s departure date from the EU.  Unless the EU agrees, and begins concretely, to negotiate in good faith a serious departure régime.

Oh, the hoo-raw.  How dare those Brits follow through instead of kowtowing to their betters in Brussels?

Rebecca Staudenmaier, writing at the link, also mischaracterizes the move.

The move is a departure from UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s predecessor, Theresa May, who had said the government would end free movement “as soon as possible” if the UK left the EU without a withdrawal deal, suggesting the rules could be phased out.

This is no departure from May. On the contrary, this is a solidification of her position: it clearly defines what “as soon as possible” means.  Phase out? That phasing has just begun, if Brussels will get serious about negotiating the departure.  Indeed, that transition period has been going on, tacitly, since Great Britain made clear its intention to go out from the EU.  Phasing merely has been formalized with this announcement.

Indeed, here’s what the British Home Office actually has said on this subject [bold face emphasis added]:

EU citizens and their families are welcome to stay and there are no changes to the deadline to apply to the EU Settlement Scheme.
This scheme covers all EU citizens and their families living in the UK by 31 October, and EU citizens have until at least 31 December 2020 to apply.
Here is a short explainer:
What is happening? Is freedom of movement ending on October 31?
We are leaving the EU on 31 October come what may. This will mean that freedom of movement as it currently stands will end on 31 October when the UK leaves the EU.

And

EU citizens will still be able to come to the UK on holiday and for short trips, but what will change is the arrangements for people coming to the UK for longer periods of time and for work and study.

Hmm….

Even though the transition period has begun, it will extend for 15 months after Great Britain leaves, and it’s quite a generous transition, to boot.  Much more so than Brussels’ departure demands and May’s meek acquiescence to.

Of course, there are problems with this.

In a phone call with the EU Settlement Scheme office helpline, activist and former Change UK candidate Nora Mulready said she was told that EU citizens would have difficulty reentering the UK if they hadn’t applied by the Brexit departure date.
Those who hadn’t applied “would no longer be entitled to [freedom of movement] rights to live and work and be in Britain,” she said the office told her.

That’s a very serious problem.  Mulready apparently thinks EU citizens are so grindingly stupid or otherwise incompetent that they can’t figure out that they need to make their applications—in the 71 days that they have.  That just isn’t enough time for an adult continental.  Wow.

Unnamed Liberal Democrats (here’s NLMSM policy again) claim this policy is reckless.

Not at all. What’s been reckless is the EU’s bad faith pretense of negotiation for a smooth exit, instead using the talks and outcome to punish the Brits for their effrontery and to serve as a warning to other nations contemplating the presumption of leaving.

Here’s hoping a Johnson government is good to its word.

Nice Things

President Xi Jinping and his cronies in the People’s Republic of China government look like they’re settling in for a long trade war with us. The claim, too, is that deteriorating relations with us, and allowing them to deteriorate further, are a sign of Xi’s strength as a leader of the government and of the Communist Party of China.

This misunderstands, though: those deteriorating relations are a good illustration of Xi’s weakness as a leader, not his strength. It takes strength, mind you, to be willing to change course when the chosen one proves…inopportune.

There’s this, too, from Shi Yinhong, Director of the Center on American Studies at Renmin University in Beijing:

Trump’s actions have seriously agitated the Chinese leadership, who now realize that there’s no chance of reaching a fair deal with the US.

Right.  Because it’s unfair of us to demand the PRC stop stealing our intellectual property and our technological secrets. It’s unfair of us to object to the PRC extorting tech transfers and domestic “partnerships” and requiring backdoors into proprietary operating software, all as a condition of doing business in the PRC.

Even the PRC’s wartime decision to devalue its currency, intended to counter the effect of tariffs on its exports to the US, cannot work well over the intermediate- to long-term. That devalued currency serves to make imports into the PRC—things like oil and natural gas both as energy for production and as fuels for home heating, transportation, marine shipping and things like components for assembly into larger components or finished products in PRC factories—more expensive, it lowers the return on US and other dollar-denominated debt instruments, and through those, it drives up the cost of domestic products that depend on those imports.

It also encourages capital flight into a host of suddenly more valuable currencies—primarily dollars, but yen, won, euros, and pounds, also.

And: whether tariffs cost us more than the PRC’s counters cost them remains to be seen. However, that’s not a matter that can be assessed solely in dollars or yuan. Our economy is much larger, wealthier, and more diverse than is the PRC’s; we can absorb more such costs than it can.  And I haven’t gotten to the costs of military buildups.

Finally, there’s this on the PRC’s trade war: as companies continue to move their supply chains away from the PRC in response to the stress of this war, as sellers (including farmers) find other markets than the PRC for their goods and services (and crops), the PRC’s war is weaning these enterprises off the PRC market, which can only work to the PRC’s long-term detriment.

All of this illustrates why the good citizens of the PRC can’t have nice things.