Tag Archives: foreign policy

Resetting with Russia and China

Posted on by
Reply

Given Russia’s and the People’s Republic of China’s veto of an Arab League motion before the UN’s Security Council “aimed at ending the violence in Syria that called for Mr. Assad to hand over his powers to his vice president and allow creation of a unity government,” vetoes that came hours after Assad’s murderous artillery bombardment of the Syrian city of Homs with an estimated 200 civilian deaths )about which Russia and the PRC surely knew), it may be time to “reset” relations.

Plainly, these vetoes are motivated by either, or both, of two things.  Others have written of Putin’s reluctance to admit that a dysfunctional, even dishonest, much less a murderous government should be susceptible to abolishment by the people: for one thing, Syria is important to a Russian naval presence in the Med, for another, Putin doesn’t want to encourage the Russian people along the same lines, and so on.  Other Chinese motives also seem apparent: Iran is a convenient source of needed oil, and Syria is an important, if not critical, ally of the Iranians.

Another motive is much more stark.  A butcher in charge of Syria hurts the US.  American impotence in dealing with this butcher, especially after the benign (compared to the Syrian situation) affair of Gadhafi, hurts the US.  Vetoes of American-backed (if Arab-led in the present instance) public initiatives demonstrate that impotence.

Following these vetoes, we’re getting some unusually strongly couched statements from President Obama’s State Department.  UN Ambassador Susan Rice has said of the vetoes

The United States is disgusted that a couple of members of this Council continue to prevent us from fulfilling our sole purpose.

and

The people of Syria…have been slapped in the face by several members of the Security Council today.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said

What happened yesterday at the United Nations was a travesty.

and

Faced with a neutered Security Council, we have to redouble our efforts outside of the United Nations….

and

We will work to expose those who are still funding the regime and sending it weapons to be used against defenseless Syrians, including women and children….

The question becomes, then, is this a sign that resetting is beginning?  Or is it just more idle chit-chat and firm finger-shaking from the Obama administration?

Sanctions and Trust

Posted on by
Reply

Does his own party trust him anymore on sanctions against Iran—or anything else?

In a letter to President Obama (formally to his Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner), two Senators, Robert Menendez (D, NJ), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs, and Mark Kirk (R, IL), Member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, felt constrained to remind Obama and his administration of Congress’ intent when it passed (and Obama signed into law) the recent Menendez-Kirk Amendment to the Comprehensive Iran Sanction, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISAD).  This amendment authorized oil and financial sanctions against Iran should Iran insist on continuing on their course to obtaining nuclear weapons.

We understand that the administration is drafting rules to guide the implementation of the law and we hereby seek to convey the legislative intent underlying certain terms and phrases in the amendment and to ensure that the positive developments that have occurred as a result of the amendment are buttressed  by the administrative rules[.]

The Senators opened their letter with the above.  Their concern arises from Obama’s attempt to eviscerate the amendment to CISAD while it was being developed, even though it was an amendment that Obama had urged and to which Menendez and Kirk had agreed, and then after that agreement, Obama’s repudiation of it (interestingly, following that repudiation the amendment passed the Senate by a 100-0 vote).  Menendez has separately advised Obama that, as a result of Obama’s…behavior, “This certainly undermines your relationship with me for the future.”

The Senators, via their letter, laid out the specifics of some of their concerns.  These included the administration’s definition of the “significant reductions” other nations might claim as a means of continuing to do business with Iran’s Central Bank and to trade for Iranian oil while avoiding the US response mandated by CISAD—the cutting off of those nations’ banks from the US economy.  The strict definition was laid out in that underlying law; the Senators do not trust the administration to hew to that definition in its new implementing rules.  The Senators spelled it out in their letter:

To ascribe more variable terminology to the definition of “significantly reduced” would diminish the ability of countries to understand and comply with the amendment.  An unevenly applied interpretation would also call into question the seriousness of the sanctions policy and send mixed signals to both Iran and our allies.

Menendez and Kirk also are concerned that Obama will use the “national security” waiver in the sanctions law to completely weasel out of applying the sanctions: they fear he won’t apply any waiver on a case-by-case basis, as the amendment requires, attempting instead a blanket waiver that prevents any sanctions anywhere.

It was not our intent that the term “waive the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1)” as meaning only one waiver is needed to waive the imposition of all sanctions.  In other words, with one report to Congress, the President could decide that not institution will be subject to sanctions….

They concluded,

We would welcome an opportunity to discuss these points with you prior to the publication of the final rule for the Menendez-Kirk amendment.

The Senate no longer trusts this President; his own party no longer trusts him.  Where is the basis for trust on the part of anyone else?  In any event, Obama’s rules are due out this week.  Maybe we’ll see the effect of the Senators’ letter.

The Caliphate

Posted on by
Reply

Is it being established after all, and with the present administration’s acquiescence through ignorance?

There’s this from the Pittsburgh post-gazette (h/t to BLACKFIVE):

The war in Afghanistan may end this year in thinly disguised surrender.

“The Taliban per se is not our enemy,” Vice President Joe Biden said in an interview with Newsweek magazine Dec. 15.

We went to war in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime because it had sheltered al-Qaida. Perhaps Mr. Biden forgot.

and [link added]

A story in an Indian newspaper Dec. 29 suggests the reason for the vice president’s memory lapse.  The Obama administration apparently is conducting secret negotiations with the Taliban and has recruited Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading jurist, to mediate them.  “Earlier this month, Mr. al-Qaradawi helped draw a road map for a deal between the Taliban and the United States aimed at giving the superpower a face-saving political settlement ahead of its planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is due to begin in 2014,” wrote reporter Praveen Swami, citing “Indian diplomatic sources.”

Mr. al-Qaradawi seeks the establishment of a worldwide caliphate ruled by Islamic law.

(Mr Swami also goes on at some length about al-Qaradawi and the threat he poses to India as well as to the West.)

BLACKFIVE points out this:

The bottom line is we have been severely weakened by Obama….  We can start w/ losing one war and one peace [respectively, Afghanistan and Iraq],…the Arab Spring installing Islamists in Egypt, Libya and much of the rest of the Middle East….

Spain surrendered to the Islamists some years ago when it was driven from Afghanistan with its tail between its legs after a series of train bombings followed by instructions from the bombers’ handlers to depart forthwith.

Withal, we have the Umayyad Caliphate being rebuilt from the Middle East west across north Africa and back onto the Iberian Peninsula to the Pyrenees, and east through Pakistan and back into Afghanistan.  The lone holdouts seem to be Portugal and the Sarkozy French in and above Iberia, and a seemingly abandoned Israel in the heart of the redeveloping Caliphate.  It’s true enough that the present reconstruction is no more monolithic than were the Umayyads, but that doesn’t reduce the present threat any more than it did with the Umayyads.  Especially given the current Islamist goals.

Misunderstanding the Threat

Posted on by
Reply

Former CIA Director Michael Hayden (USAF Gen, ret) is reported by FoxNews as saying,

But externally it [closing the Straits of Hormuz] just doesn’t make any sense.

Number one, they [Iran] need the straits as much, perhaps more, than anyone else, the free flow of oil, otherwise their economy is more in the tank than it is today.  Number two, does closing the straits make Iran more or less isolated? … Does closing the straits make it more or less likely that someone will think it’s a legitimate step to attack the nuclear facility at Natanz?  I think it makes it more likely.  So why would the Iranians do that?

Our government’s blinders here (yes, Hayden isn’t any longer in the government, but those who are think similarly) is the utter misunderstanding of Iran and its goals.  As Hayden also says, “This government and its decision-making processes are incredibly opaque.”

I offer some clarification, from my lofty perch on my navel.

“Number one, they need the straits as much, perhaps more, than anyone else, the free flow of oil, otherwise their economy is more in the tank than it is today.”  Number one, the sanctions going into place have the potential to seriously threaten their ability to export oil due to a lack of buyers.  In that scenario, no, they won’t “need the straits…”.

“Number two, does closing the straits make Iran more or less isolated?”  Does Iran care about its isolation?  Certainly the lack of international intercourse can hurt, but is the Iranian government’s pain tolerance the same as ours?  Plainly not.  Nor does the Iranian government care about its isolation as isolation.  Finally, do the Iranian people have any capacity to act, should they disagree with their government?  Those people watched while a previous American administration seemed to incite Iraqis to rebellion against Saddam after our first Iraq war and then stood by while Saddam butchered the Shiites and Kurds.  Lately, they did try to act against their government and experienced the present administration standing by and watching the present Iranian government butcher them.

“Does closing the straits make it more or less likely that someone will think it’s a legitimate step to attack the nuclear facility at Natanz?”  The Iranian government, after years of loud and vociferous chit-chat and firm finger-shaking by the rest of the world, and after years of active support by Russia and the PRC for the Iranian nuclear program, has no reason seriously to think anyone will do anything at all along these lines.  Oh, and not being complete fools, they have been dispersing and bunkering their nuclear weapons facilities.  They think the Israelis might have the stones to act, even though an Israeli mission is fraught with difficulties and has an uncertain outcome.  The Iranian government isn’t too worried about strikes; a greater or lesser likelihood of one is irrelevant to them.

Understanding the threat from a nation begins with understanding that government’s goals.  Let’s broaden Hayden’s question of “why would the Iranians do that?”  One overriding goal of Iran’s is the utter destruction of Israel.  To that end, a successful nuclear weapons program gives them the tools with which to achieve that.  They don’t care the cost to themselves of achieving that destruction; indeed, Iran (at least those who populate the government; the only ones whose goals matter) will simply view their own fate as honored martyrdom.

Another overriding goal of theirs is the destruction of the United States.  To that end, a successful nuclear weapons program also is useful for arming terrorist groups who then will attack the United States (and Europe, and the hands that feed their armorer, Russia and the PRC).  Again, both the terrorists and the Iranian government will simply view their own destruction as a  martyrdom to be sought after.

This threat doesn’t think like we do.  Basing our assessments on the premise that they do is fatally flawed.

America’s Future—Foreign Policy Principles, Part V

Posted on by
Reply

I have posted here (which has links to my other posts on this subject) on other aspects of our necessary future foreign policy.  In this post, and as a segue to an upcoming series on defense policy and force structure, I want to talk about the meaning of “war” and “state of war”  from a diplomatic perspective and then suggest some things that such an understanding might imply for foreign policy.  There is far more to war than shooting and exchanging missile fire; although overtly military actions are certainly central aspects of war, especially in the end game.  A clear understanding also is necessary if State and Defense are to work together as the unified whole they must in order for the United States to effectively defend itself in wars of any type.

“War” or “state of war” are more than just formalistic, legalistic conditions involving Congress announcing that we’re at war.  A “declaration of War” by Congress under Article I, Section 8 is in the end only an acknowledgment that we’re already in a war.  For instance, FDR’s 8 December 1941 request for Congress’ declaration of war against Japan closed with this acknowledgment:

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.

Congress’ subsequent declaration also acknowledged that it was simply codifying with its declaration that war was already in progress:

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America….

and

That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared….

Thus, with the legalism of a declaration, we merely acknowledge that a state of war has existed and that we’ve been in a war for some time.  A formal declaration finds use only insofar as it triggers certain legal conditions and parameters that exist in a formal state of war that do not exist in an on-going war that has not been officially announced.

It’s necessary, at this point, to understand what an “act of war” is.  An act of war has meaning on three levels: one is a precipitating action that triggers a formal acknowledgement that a war is in progress: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for instance.  A second meaning includes an action conducted within the confines of an ongoing, declared war and in prosecution of it: shooting down enemy aircraft, or foot soldiers fighting a battle against each other, for instance.  A third meaning is an action conducted within the confines of an ongoing war that is as real as the formally declared war but which has not been formalized by the participants’ public declarations of war.  A terrorist attack by a non-national organization on buildings and the occupants of them (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, various centers in Mumbai, India) and the killing of terrorists for these and in preempting other attacks are examples of this third meaning.

It’s this third meaning that is of interest in this series of foreign policy principles, and it is the non-national organizations, the terrorist organizations, with which this post is primarily concerned.

Being at war, from a diplomatic perspective, is more than just the tautology of Carl von Clausewitz’ remark about war being an extension of diplomacy.  There are diplomatic considerations applicable during war, including the not-formally-declared war, as well.  These begin with understanding the goals of the nation or non-national organization that is attacking us, a critical matter of catch-up if the strike was unpredicted, and an equally critical matter of anticipation when the enmity has been well-known for some time, and the tensions observed to have been building through that time.  But the diplomatic considerations also apply to hidden wars, especially when we finally realize that we are under attack (vis., cyber war.  This and other forms of “hidden” war are described briefly below).

For instance, the goals Islamic terrorists have for their war on us are not well understood, not least by our politicians.  The present administration, and its predecessors, have long shown little interest in understanding their goals, satisfying themselves with bringing the perpetrators to “justice.”  The Clinton administration considered terrorist acts simply to be crimes.  The succeeding Bush administration understood that we were at war, in some sense, but did not look into the terrorists’ purposes, satisfying itself solely with making war on Al Qaeda and “every terrorist group of global reach;”  although President Bush did understand one goal of Al Qaeda, in particular: “Its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.”   The Obama administration has been even less investigative of terrorist goals, satisfying itself with killing Al Qaeda leaders and “bringing the troops home.”

Yet buried in the incuriosity is a statement by a terrorist leader, Hussein Massawi, a former leader of Hezbollah:

We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you.

And there’s this from Sayyed Hassan Nasralleh, Hezbollah’s Secretary General:

“Death to America!” was, is, and will stay our slogan.

Within this clear, but not yet internalized by our government, statement of the purpose of a terrorist war, for instance, we can gain a clearer understanding of what’s included in “acts of war.”

Beyond the overt actions of forces invading another nation, or bombing its harbors and ports, or the like, acts of war also include, within this third meaning, such things as the following, which is an illustrative list, only (other examples are described here):

  • attacking another nation’s embassy and imprisoning the diplomats, staff, and families within it
  • sending personnel—terrorists—into another nation to murder citizens of a third nation
  • sending personnel—terrorists—into another nation to murder diplomats of a third nation
  • actively supporting piracy

In addition to these plain acts of terrorism, which are a subset of acts of war, are these additional acts of war—acts that often begin as part of a hidden war:

  • shipping, as part of ordinary trade, poisoned products: formaldehyde-laced gypsum board, or toxic baby food, for instance.
  • manipulating currency values so as to damage our economy.
  • attacking our computing and/or communications networks, or our computer-controlled infrastructure, with cyberware capable of damaging/destroying those targets, or planting malware that will be used “later” for that purpose.
  • actively supporting nations and non-national organizations that do the above

With this understanding, from a diplomatic perspective, of the nature of war, what can foreign policy do to support the successful prosecution of such a war thrust upon us?  It’s important to understand that these are actions that occur in parallel, and in coordination, with military actions; they are not limited to being prior to military action, nor are they conducted instead of military action.  They are not merely a point of departure from which military action extends.

The first thing foreign policy can do is to guide our efforts to help our enemies find a way to stop being our enemies.  They do not need to become friends or allies, although this certainly would be desirable, but by no longer being our enemies, they will no longer be getting killed by us, and more importantly, they will no longer be killing us (or trying to).  In practice, this will most likely apply to our enemies’ allies, but it does not automatically exclude the enemies themselves.  Plainly, this must begin with an understanding of our enemies’ motive in attacking us.  In the case of Islamic terrorists, it would seem that convincing our enemies will not occur; we can, though continue to work on their allies and supporters.

Along with this, foreign policy can guide our efforts to convince other nations to allow us entry into their jurisdiction so as to bring down enemy individuals—terrorists—or gain other nations’ cooperation in their bringing to justice those individuals.  Additionally this can facilitate our efforts to engage foreign intelligence and law enforcement organizations to share information and to obtain assistance in identifying, tracking down, and capturing active terrorists before they can strike.

Finally, foreign policy can guide our efforts to understand the needs and imperatives of relevant nations and non-national organizations (both outright enemies and those who, by supporting our enemies have demonstrated their own enmity and complicity), the better to target such other actions as embargos of critical resources and isolation from the global network (or outright disruption) of their financial systems, including the central banks of relevant nations.

Update: Corrected some (egregious) formatting problems.