Category Archives: foreign policy

Chinese Governance

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The rumors of a coup in the People’s Republic of China serve to illustrate the PRC’s concept of governance.

Its economic success over the last generation and a half, or so (roughly 30 years), seems apparent.  It has accumulated the world’s largest stash of foreign currency reserves (some $3.2 trillion), and it has grown into the world’s second largest economy, albeit with the world’s largest population across which to amortize that economy.  Some even argue that this success demonstrates the superiority of the Chinese method of centrally managing an economy.  After all, those folks say, the Chinese government doesn’t waste time debating; they simply decide, and promptly.  Moreover, specific leadership candidates are selected carefully and only after a proven performance record.

But at what cost has come this success?  That’s what the coup rumors highlight.  The power struggle underway (whether it’s really a coup in progress or not is unimportant to this post) is purely a Party struggle; the people of China are not at all involved other than being stuck with living with the outcome.

The current showdown—of whatever form—threatens the carefully planned change in the party and national leadership, including seven of the nine positions on the Politburo Standing Committee.  The thrust of the argument seems to be whether China should go back to a more “revolutionary”—i.e., more directed from above—form of government or reforms should be instituted that lead toward a more constitutional state.

But even at best, whose constitution?  Notice where this argument is occurring: internally, at the top levels of PRC’s Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army government—not among the people.  In fact, the people may also be discussing this, but since they have no say in their own government, their discussions “are unimportant, and [government] does not hear them.”

The coup rumors illustrate another aspect of governance PRC-style.  The rumors began appearing about two weeks ago via Sina Weibo (“China microwave” or “China microblog”), the Chinese version of Twitter.  The government promptly deleted those messages.  Now, searches for key words like “gunfire” or “Changan Avenue” (where much of the Chinese leadership lives and where gunfire allegedly was heard during the “coup”) are answered with this message:

These terms are not being displayed in accordance with the applicable laws, regulations and political guidelines.

Here is Chinese free speech.

The PRC is a one-party dictatorship: there are no checks or balances, as from an independent judiciary or legislature.  The people are unrepresented by individuals of their own choosing in an elected government.   In sum, the people are not Sovereign in their own country—the government that has placed itself above them is.

And that economic success?  Yawning cracks in it have appeared.  The vast migration over the last several years from the hinterland to the coastal cities, where the jobs are, have led to severe housing shortages in those cities, shortages exacerbated by those cities’ governmental requirements that the people must be registered with the city government in order to get city services like utilities, housing, and so on.  The migrants are denied registration, though: they’re not residents of the city.

Additionally, those who do find jobs, including the original residents, are demanding higher wages, which hurts production, which hurts job availability.  On top of that, the lack of jobs for that massive influx of migrants leaves people without money to buy goods and services other than those basic city-provided services (which the migrants can’t get anyway).  This also hurts production, and job availability.  And on top of this, those migrants generally are their families’ bread-winners and were intending to send money back home to family members who didn’t make the move.  This lack deepens the impoverishment of the hinterlands.

All of these changes are easily handled by a flexible, free market, but a centrally managed one, even managed by carefully selected government leaders, simply cannot keep up with the dynamicisms of the country’s (any country’s) real-world economic evolutions.  It’s an edifice poised for a major retrenchment, drawdown of those reserves, or hard collapse.  Or all three.

Failure in Iraq

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I’ve written before about the contempt with which Europe views our President.  Here is another example of their view of our leadership, this time as it concerns our precipitous departure from Iraq.   The headline says it all: ” Iraq Is Neither Sovereign, Stable nor Self-Reliant.”

Spiegel Online‘s Bernhard Zand notes

[President] Obama conceded that Iraq was “not a perfect place,” but he also pointed out that the US military was “leaving a sovereign, stable and self-reliant country with a representative government elected by its people.”

Zand then lays it on the line:

…the circumstances of the US withdrawal, and the language Obama used to whitewash it, border on negligence. [That link is worth following, also.]

Here are the facts and specifics that Zand lays out.  Nebulously, without a formal—or even physical—presence, Iran sat in on yesterday’s Arab League summit meeting in Baghdad, along with the 10, or so, Arab members who attended (of 22 members.  So much for Araby’s view of Iraq’s national viability).  This occurred through  the summit’s central question: the degree to which Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, listens to Iranian input in Iraqi affairs.  Indeed, Iraq can’t even deal with its neighbor to the northwest just beyond Jordan, Syria, without “suggestions” from Iran.  The question about the depth of Iranian influence never was clearly answered at the summit.  As Zand puts it, it’s just

difficult to detect a sense of the kind of sovereignty Obama mentioned coming from the man in charge in Baghdad.

Al-Maliki’s move against the Sunnis isn’t contributing to national stability, either.  He isn’t just acting against a few key members of Sunni leadership in (or who used to be in) the Iraqi government.  Beyond things like the arrest warrant al-Maliki issued against (Sunni) Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi and al-Maliki’s firing of one of his three Deputy Prime Ministers, Saleh al-Mutlaq, for presuming to demur from al-Maliki’s policies, al-Maliki is conducting a full-blown anti-Sunni jihad that threatens explosion into a worse civil war than that experienced in 2005-2007 before the Bush surge retrieved the country.

In Iraq’s favor, the jihad is al-Maliki’s; it’s not endemic to the Iraqi Shia.  The general (Arab) population of Shia in Iraq distrust the Iranian (Persian) Shia even more than they distrust the once-dominant Iraqi Sunnis.  And, they remember the Sunni nations—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, for instance—who played an active role in freeing them from Saddam Hussein.  But that favor can have effect only in the far future, and Iraq must survive to get there.  In the meantime, the jihad is ripping at the core of Iraqi nationhood.

Confidence in Iraq’s stability also was not enhanced by terrorist bombs going off during the summit near the Iranian embassy, just outside Baghdad’s Green Zone–where the summit was held.

Nor can Iraq be called self-reliant.  Unemployment is rampant and rising, and without the individual or public reserves that more stable countries have with which to whether such conditions.  Exacerbating what otherwise would be only an uncomfortable economic dislocation is the lack of basic services.  Other than the Kurdish lands, where the Kurds have enforced a stiff measure of autonomy from Baghdad, no one has electricity for more than a few hours a day, and even the drinking water is (barely) sufficient only through the efforts of foreign entities.  This does not permit an economy to recover.

Would things be turning out differently had Obama gotten a SOFA that would have allowed us to stay, the way we did in an earlier century after a much more bitter war?  Maybe not.  But we’ll never know because Obama didn’t even try.

Some Thoughts on a Missile Shield

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Having gotten us to accede, back in 2009, to Russian demands that we not defend ourselves or our European allies against nuclear missile attacks from rogue states like Iran, the Russians are pushing the Obama administration around again.

Russian outgoing President Dmitry Medvedev is saying that any improvement to our—or to NATO’s—missile defense capability will be taken as breaking the existing nuclear parity with Russia, and they “will be forced” to retaliate.  Medvedev insists

No one has explained to me why we should believe that the new missile defense system in Europe isn’t directed against us.

He also has instructed his defense establishment that

By 2017-2018 we must be fully prepared, fully armed.

And he repeated an earlier threat to aim missiles at the U.S.-led NATO missile shield.  Left unspoken was his generals’ earlier explicit threat to immolate Poland with nuclear war if we were to put missile shield components there.  Never mind that the US has never been a threat to Russia or to Russian allies, while Russia has actively invaded and partitioned ours—Georgia being only the latest example, with Russian interference with Ukrainian elections their latest non-military interference.  And don’t forget the cyberwar they inflicted on Estonia in 2007.

President Obama’s response?  He hasn’t made one of substance.  “I don’t bluff,” he said in a different venue.  But what does that mean, if he has to protest that he doesn’t?

It’s clear to me that the Russian threats are a prime reason for going ahead with the deployment of a missile shield at our fastest pace.  And for updating and upgrading our military establishment generally, including our nuclear and cyber forces.

US and China’s Strategy

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Last week, Stratfor Global Intelligence published an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s emerging strategy for dealing with the outside world.  In sum, there are three basic tenets to the developing strategy:

  • Paramount among them is the maintenance of domestic security.
  • The PRC’s industrial base, by design produces more than its domestic economy can consume, so the PRC must export goods to the rest of the world while importing raw materials.
  • The third strategic interest is in maintaining control over buffer states.

These are sequential interests; that is, each depends on the one prior, and internal security is, as Friedman writes, paramount.  Internal security in a nation of vast wealth and wealth mobility differences between, in China’s case, the coastal regions and the interior depends on keeping the people employed.  (On a related side note, it’s useful to recognize that these differences are exacerbated, among other things, by growing cultural differences between a coastal region that trades externally and so is exposed to the influences of the West and of the Republic of Korea and Japan on the one hand, and an impoverished interior, on the other, that still is “old-school” and is seen, also, as existing to supply those coastal regions with goods for export trade).  Thus, a need not only for export customers exists, but relevant to this post, a need for ensuring China’s sea lane security.  That third imperative is driven by a need to protect the population of core Chinese—Han China—which is concentrated in those coastal regions and the eastern third of China that is near those coastal regions.  Among other buffer states, the PRC count Tibet, and they would like to count the Republic of China sitting off the southeastern coast on Taiwan (which, by the way, sits on the northern mouth of the South China Sea and the southern mouth of the East China Sea).

As alluded to above, sea lanes for trade are important to Chinese economic, and so domestic, security.  Overland trade routes are both physically fraught with danger, given the terrain that must be crossed and the distances involved, and politically fraught: the countries that control that land aren’t entirely sympathetic to Chinese interests.  Those sea lanes, though, must pass through the South or East China Sea.

Mainland China has historically had difficulty depending on others for its own sustenance, originating from China’s view that it sits at the center of Heaven and so has no need of outside cooperation—the cooperation should move in the other direction.  This position has gone through a number of evolutions but remains essentially the same: we’ll go it alone, thank you very much; you’re welcome to come with us if you wish.  The view of not depending on others also is smart: what others might give, they can also take away, and then where would a dependent state be?  So China looks to securing, itself, its sea lanes, rather than depending on the British, and for the last 80 years,  the US—to maintain freedom of the seas.  China looks, though, not for freedom, but dominance over its seas as the optimal means of maintaining security.

Unable to engage the US Navy in a direct confrontation, though, China is developing other means of countering our Navy; although Friedman suggests that those alternate means are flawed.

While China has a robust land-based missile system, a land-based missile system is inherently vulnerable to strikes by cruise missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles currently in development and other types of attack. China’s ability to fight a sustained battle is limited.  Moreover, a missile strategy works only with an effective reconnaissance capability.  You can’t destroy a ship if you don’t know where it is.  This in turn necessitates space-based systems able to identify U.S. ships and a tightly integrated fire-control system.

Friedman is right that this alone is insufficient, and he points out that China also is looking for sea ports in friendly (or at least “tradable with”) nations that are on the other end of some of those sea lanes.  China is paying, for instance, for most of or the construction of a sea port in Gwadar, Pakistan, as well as looking for similar accesses to ports in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and elsewhere.  But having anchorages on either end of the sea lane doesn’t address the security of the lanes themselves.

It’s easy enough, the thinking goes, to effect a blockade of China by sitting on the outside edge of the two Seas, but until those anti-shipping missile sites have been taken out, even at that range, the blockading ships would be at risk.  (I discount the reduction in risk from the ships being mobile targets: even given the relatively slow flights of cruise missiles, ships are even slower; besides, en route and target area guidance systems—even on board ones—aren’t that hard to do anymore.)

For our part, the US is in the beginning stages of implementing a major strategic change and moving to emphasize the Pacific, and in particular the PRC, and deemphasizing Europe and the Atlantic.  DoD is intending to realign our military so that, for instance, 60% of our Naval assets will be focused on the Pacific and China, vice the current 52%.

But what does this mean in practical terms?  DoD, under President Obama’s instruction, is reducing its ship total from 285 as of last September to 220 by 2020, including a reduction from 11 carriers to 8, 53 attack submarines to 40, and eliminating altogether our guided missile submarines.  Worse, the average age of our Navy’s ships will be allowed to increase from its current 14 years to 19.  From a back of the envelope estimate, that “increase” of 52% to 60% of the Navy’s assets concentrating on the Pacific results in an actual reduction from 148 ships to 132.

It also ignores another part of the equation: while we’re busily becoming a threat (in Chinese eyes) to China’s nearby sea lanes, what about China’s more distant sea lanes—the ones that pass through the Indian Ocean, the North and South Atlantic, the Panama Canal?  And what about our own, more nearby sea lanes—those traversing the same North and South Atlantic Oceans and the Panama Canal?  And the Indian Ocean, which is important to us not only for commerce, but to support our allies and friends in the Middle East, western Asia, eastern Africa?  And to get to our allies and friends that form the rim of the South China Sea and to support our own Navy operating in theater?

So the question for the Chinese, and for our administration, comes down to this: in the event of a conflict between the PRC and the US that gets serious enough that we’d need to consider a blockade, what happens next?

China will look at the conflict between us and northern Korea and between us and Iran over whether either of those two should possess nuclear weapons (and in one case, then destroy, utterly, a life-long ally of ours), and it will decide to press ahead with its actions and run a US blockade, at gunpoint, if needs be—even with their inferior navy.  Indeed, given our administration’s repeatedly demonstrated penchant for shaking its finger very firmly at our adversaries and then accommodating them, on what basis would China take our Navy’s still superior capability seriously?  When have northern Korea or Iran—or Israel recently—taken our capabilities seriously?  What is the value of military superiority, or capability of any sort, when there is no will to use it, and China, northern Korea, Iran, and now Israel know that?

Our Feckless Foreign Policy

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The Progressive line on American foreign policy was first brought to light by Presidential candidate John Kerry in 2004 when he insisted, with a straight face, that America’s military policy must pass a “global test” before it can be implemented.  That’s a policy that’s alive and well in the present administration, as this exchange during last week’s Senate Armed Services Committee hearing between Senator Jeff Sessions (R, AL) and Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, demonstrates (the exchange begins at about the 2:00 minute mark) [emphasis mine].

SESSIONS: Do you think you can act without Congress and initiate a no-fly zone in Syria without congressional approval?

PANETTA: …our goal would be to seek international permission, and we would come to the Congress and inform you and determine how best to approach this; whether or not we would want to get permission from the Congress, I think those are issues we would have to discuss as we decide what to do here.

SESSIONS: Well I am almost breathless about that because what I heard you say is, “we’re going to seek international approval and we will come and tell the Congress what we might do, and we might seek congressional approval” … Would you like to clarify that?

PANETTA: I have also served with Republican Presidents and Democratic Presidents who have always reserved the right to defend this country if necessary.

SESSIONS: But before you would do this, you would seek permission of the international authorities?

PANETTA: If we are working with an international coalition or NATO we would want to be able to get appropriate permissions in order to be able to do that.  All of these countries would want to have some kind of legal basis on which to act.

SESSIONS: What “legal basis” are you looking for?  What entity?

PANETTA: If NATO made the decision to go in, that would be one.  If we developed an international coalition beyond NATO then obviously some kind of UN security resolution would be the basis for that.

SESSIONS: So you are saying NATO would give you a “legal basis?”  And an ad hoc coalition of nations would provide a “legal basis?”

PANETTA: We would seek whatever legal basis we would need in order to make that justified. We can’t just pull them all together without getting the legal basis on which to act.

…

SESSIONS: I’m all for having international support, but I’m really baffled by the idea that somehow an international assembly provides a legal basis for the United States military to be deployed in combat.  I don’t think it’s close to being correct.  They provide no legal authority.  The only legal authority that’s required to deploy the U.S. military is the Congress and the president and the law in the Constitution.

PANETTA:  Let me, just for the record, be clear again.  When it comes to the national defense of this country, the President of the United States has the authority under the Constitution to act to defend this country, and we will.  If it comes to an operation where we’re trying to build a coalition of nations to work together to go in and operate as we did in Libya, or Bosnia, or for that matter, Afghanistan, we want to do it with permissions either by NATO or by the international community.

So, what do we have, then?  Panetta has gone even farther than Kerry, now insisting that “international permission,” rather than the Constitution (which includes authorization by Congress), is the “legal basis” for American use of our military capability in an international effort.  The administration seems to accept foreign control, foreign permissions, over whether we will use our military to conduct national defense activities in conjunction with foreign groups of countries; we have no authority of our own to employ our forces in that environment.  The President, intimates Panetta, executes his national defense obligations absent Congress’ involvement, although there is a willingness to discuss “whether or not we would want to get [Congressional] permission.”  Notice, also, that, even after Panetta’s “clarification,” neither the Constitution nor the Congress enter into it.  Ever.

It seems as though, given the entirety of Panetta’s responses, that he didn’t even understand the questions.

As Sessions said, international support is good.  But a sovereign nation needs no one else’s permission to use its military forces, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations.  Period.  That’s not the same as having an agreement with those others to engage in a joint action of some sort.  Those agreements, though, only outline the various responsibilities of the members of the coalition (ideally founded on the individual capabilities of those members); they do not constitute permission for employment.

At least General Martin Dempsey (those first two minutes of the video) understands for whom he works.

h/t Power Line