Category Archives: foreign policy

America’s Future—Foreign Policy Principles, Part V

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I have posted here (which has links to my other posts on this subject) on other aspects of our necessary future foreign policy.  In this post, and as a segue to an upcoming series on defense policy and force structure, I want to talk about the meaning of “war” and “state of war”  from a diplomatic perspective and then suggest some things that such an understanding might imply for foreign policy.  There is far more to war than shooting and exchanging missile fire; although overtly military actions are certainly central aspects of war, especially in the end game.  A clear understanding also is necessary if State and Defense are to work together as the unified whole they must in order for the United States to effectively defend itself in wars of any type.

“War” or “state of war” are more than just formalistic, legalistic conditions involving Congress announcing that we’re at war.  A “declaration of War” by Congress under Article I, Section 8 is in the end only an acknowledgment that we’re already in a war.  For instance, FDR’s 8 December 1941 request for Congress’ declaration of war against Japan closed with this acknowledgment:

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.

Congress’ subsequent declaration also acknowledged that it was simply codifying with its declaration that war was already in progress:

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America….

and

That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared….

Thus, with the legalism of a declaration, we merely acknowledge that a state of war has existed and that we’ve been in a war for some time.  A formal declaration finds use only insofar as it triggers certain legal conditions and parameters that exist in a formal state of war that do not exist in an on-going war that has not been officially announced.

It’s necessary, at this point, to understand what an “act of war” is.  An act of war has meaning on three levels: one is a precipitating action that triggers a formal acknowledgement that a war is in progress: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for instance.  A second meaning includes an action conducted within the confines of an ongoing, declared war and in prosecution of it: shooting down enemy aircraft, or foot soldiers fighting a battle against each other, for instance.  A third meaning is an action conducted within the confines of an ongoing war that is as real as the formally declared war but which has not been formalized by the participants’ public declarations of war.  A terrorist attack by a non-national organization on buildings and the occupants of them (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, various centers in Mumbai, India) and the killing of terrorists for these and in preempting other attacks are examples of this third meaning.

It’s this third meaning that is of interest in this series of foreign policy principles, and it is the non-national organizations, the terrorist organizations, with which this post is primarily concerned.

Being at war, from a diplomatic perspective, is more than just the tautology of Carl von Clausewitz’ remark about war being an extension of diplomacy.  There are diplomatic considerations applicable during war, including the not-formally-declared war, as well.  These begin with understanding the goals of the nation or non-national organization that is attacking us, a critical matter of catch-up if the strike was unpredicted, and an equally critical matter of anticipation when the enmity has been well-known for some time, and the tensions observed to have been building through that time.  But the diplomatic considerations also apply to hidden wars, especially when we finally realize that we are under attack (vis., cyber war.  This and other forms of “hidden” war are described briefly below).

For instance, the goals Islamic terrorists have for their war on us are not well understood, not least by our politicians.  The present administration, and its predecessors, have long shown little interest in understanding their goals, satisfying themselves with bringing the perpetrators to “justice.”  The Clinton administration considered terrorist acts simply to be crimes.  The succeeding Bush administration understood that we were at war, in some sense, but did not look into the terrorists’ purposes, satisfying itself solely with making war on Al Qaeda and “every terrorist group of global reach;”  although President Bush did understand one goal of Al Qaeda, in particular: “Its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.”   The Obama administration has been even less investigative of terrorist goals, satisfying itself with killing Al Qaeda leaders and “bringing the troops home.”

Yet buried in the incuriosity is a statement by a terrorist leader, Hussein Massawi, a former leader of Hezbollah:

We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you.

And there’s this from Sayyed Hassan Nasralleh, Hezbollah’s Secretary General:

“Death to America!” was, is, and will stay our slogan.

Within this clear, but not yet internalized by our government, statement of the purpose of a terrorist war, for instance, we can gain a clearer understanding of what’s included in “acts of war.”

Beyond the overt actions of forces invading another nation, or bombing its harbors and ports, or the like, acts of war also include, within this third meaning, such things as the following, which is an illustrative list, only (other examples are described here):

  • attacking another nation’s embassy and imprisoning the diplomats, staff, and families within it
  • sending personnel—terrorists—into another nation to murder citizens of a third nation
  • sending personnel—terrorists—into another nation to murder diplomats of a third nation
  • actively supporting piracy

In addition to these plain acts of terrorism, which are a subset of acts of war, are these additional acts of war—acts that often begin as part of a hidden war:

  • shipping, as part of ordinary trade, poisoned products: formaldehyde-laced gypsum board, or toxic baby food, for instance.
  • manipulating currency values so as to damage our economy.
  • attacking our computing and/or communications networks, or our computer-controlled infrastructure, with cyberware capable of damaging/destroying those targets, or planting malware that will be used “later” for that purpose.
  • actively supporting nations and non-national organizations that do the above

With this understanding, from a diplomatic perspective, of the nature of war, what can foreign policy do to support the successful prosecution of such a war thrust upon us?  It’s important to understand that these are actions that occur in parallel, and in coordination, with military actions; they are not limited to being prior to military action, nor are they conducted instead of military action.  They are not merely a point of departure from which military action extends.

The first thing foreign policy can do is to guide our efforts to help our enemies find a way to stop being our enemies.  They do not need to become friends or allies, although this certainly would be desirable, but by no longer being our enemies, they will no longer be getting killed by us, and more importantly, they will no longer be killing us (or trying to).  In practice, this will most likely apply to our enemies’ allies, but it does not automatically exclude the enemies themselves.  Plainly, this must begin with an understanding of our enemies’ motive in attacking us.  In the case of Islamic terrorists, it would seem that convincing our enemies will not occur; we can, though continue to work on their allies and supporters.

Along with this, foreign policy can guide our efforts to convince other nations to allow us entry into their jurisdiction so as to bring down enemy individuals—terrorists—or gain other nations’ cooperation in their bringing to justice those individuals.  Additionally this can facilitate our efforts to engage foreign intelligence and law enforcement organizations to share information and to obtain assistance in identifying, tracking down, and capturing active terrorists before they can strike.

Finally, foreign policy can guide our efforts to understand the needs and imperatives of relevant nations and non-national organizations (both outright enemies and those who, by supporting our enemies have demonstrated their own enmity and complicity), the better to target such other actions as embargos of critical resources and isolation from the global network (or outright disruption) of their financial systems, including the central banks of relevant nations.

Update: Corrected some (egregious) formatting problems.

Deterrence

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Deterrence is one means of influencing another nation’s behavior.  It is, by its nature a passive activity, relying as it does on persuading another nation not to do something by threatening a response so powerful that any gain from the undesired behavior is overwhelmed by the loss from the threatened response.  One nation might deter another from initiating a nuclear attack, for instance, by threatening a nuclear response of devastating effect.

But deterrence, to be successful, relies on a number of factors, only some of which are under the control of the deterring nation.  One of those factors is actually having the ability to deliver the threatened response and the ability to defeat the other nation’s initiating action.  This is generally within the control of the deterring nation.  Either the United States, for instance, has the ability to deliver a devastating response and to defeat sufficiently the initial action, or we do not, and within limits, only we make the determination acquire/maintain those abilities.  Another factor in deterrence is the will to use that strength, should the nation we’re trying to deter act anyway.  This is a shared factor, though, depending not just on our actual will, but on the other nation’s perception of our will.  We can manage that perception only by acting meaningfully and decisively with lesser consequences in response to lesser actions.  If we do not deliver those lesser consequences, the nation we wish to deter will have no reason to believe we’ll respond with our described deterrence actions.  A third factor on which deterrence depends is the clarity of our position.  The consequences of the other nation’s action must be well understood by that nation.  This also is a shared factor: communication is a two-way street, and we must ensure that the other nation does get the message.  A fourth factor in deterrence is the other nation’s tolerance for the damage we’ll inflict should they strike and we respond as our deterrence position says we will.  The moment the other nation decides the cost is worth the gain, our deterrence ceases to exist, and we must adjust our deterrence—and defensive—posture.  And we must recognize the other nation’s tolerance for pain in order to make the adjustments.  This factor, other than our understanding, is entirely under the control of that other nation.

With these thoughts in mind, let’s look at our ability to deter today.

We say we do not want Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, going so far as insisting that such a thing is unacceptable.  How have we gone about pursuing that goal?  This administration began by extending an open hand to Iran, if only they would unclench their fist: we would negotiate with them, offer them incentives, including help with enriching uranium to the level that an Iranian nuclear power plant needs in order to function effectively.  In truth, the negotiation attempts did not originate with the Obama administration; prior administrations had been pursuing this path all along.  When it became clear that the open hand, the negotiations, were failing, then this administration began a parallel course of threatening ever stronger sanctions, and repeated attempts to apply them.

Indeed, President Obama insists that “this administration has systemically imposed the toughest sanctions on…Iran ever.  When we came into office, the world was divided.  Iran was unified and moving aggressively on its own agenda. Today, Iran is isolated and the world is unified in applying the toughest sanctions that Iran has ever experienced and it’s having an impact inside Iran.”

The Iranian response, though, has been continued effort, and progress, toward nuclear weapons acquisition.  The “toughest sanctions” were ineffective, and part of their ineffectiveness was the active interference with global sanctions by Russia and the People’s Republic of China.  Indeed, Iran has taken to openly attacking diplomatic missions in Teheran, and they’re dispersing their medium range missile systems, making them harder to target should Iran take overt military action.

Our deterrence effort vis-à-vis Iran has failed on a number of fronts.  We did not demonstrate any particular will to apply serious consequences at any stage of our interactions with Iran.  We have not demonstrated even the capability to apply serious consequences.  Even our message is muddled: we’ve never really spelled out the consequences of their continued efforts or of their actually getting nuclear weapons: we’ve only made fatuous remarks about sanctions and vague threats of “no option is off the table.”  Finally, Iran has determined that it’s willing to bear the costs we might inflict.

With Russia, it’s a slightly different story.  The question here is who is actually deterring whom.  The Russians object to our having a missile shield to protect against Iranian missiles (against northern Korea’s missiles, too, but Russia’s public objections have centered on a defensive deployment in Europe).  Shortly after President Obama took office, Russian objections became quite vociferous as we concluded agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to install components of the shield in each nation.  The Russians said that if we persisted, they would move nuclear weapons into western Russia from where they could strike Europe.  They also made direct threats to destroy Poland with nuclear strikes.  We canceled those agreements and agreed not to deploy a missile shield there.  (As an aside, keep in mind that this missile shield would have been part of that larger deterrence against Iranian use of their nuclear weapons—an ability to defeat a strike by them.

Now The Weekly Standard reports that

The Obama administration is…undertak[ing] what amounts to an off-schedule Nuclear Posture Review—one that ices out Defense and State Department experts usually consulted on nuclear issues.  It is also beginning a new round of talks with Moscow here in Washington next week that many observers believe will result in the United States offering to trade U.S. strategic weapons in exchange for reductions in Russian tactical weapons.

Further,

[T]he Obama administration is looking to make unilateral cuts….  Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has suggested that to save money the administration might have to eliminate America’s land-based 450 single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs (though ICBM sustainment is but a rounding error in the DoD budget)….”

It may be that Panetta’s threats are mere polemics in an attempt to protect the Defense budget from the cuts mandated by the Super Committee’s failure.  However, against the backdrop of Russia’s just concluded success at deterring us from deploying a defensive system—the flip side of which is our appeasement of them (which itself comes against the backdrop of our acquiescence in the Russian partition of an American ally, Georgia), it’s reasonable to ask whether we’re being further deterred, this time from having sufficient offensive weapons with which to respond to an attack against which we no longer can defend ourselves.  Understand: whether we’re conning the Russians (or conning ourselves) into accepting the decommissioning of supposedly obsolete ICBMs in return for their decommissioning of (obsolete) tactical missile systems or we’re being deterred from maintaining an offensive leg of our triad makes no difference.  We’ll lose a major fraction of our offensive capability.  Further, the tactical systems will be faster and cheaper to replace in the event of a breakout and arms race than will be the strategic systems.  And they will be more immediately decisive in a fight, especially one in which we have no defenses.

With no missile defense capability and with such reductions in our offensive capability, where is our ability to satisfy either the first factor in deterrence: the capability to respond?  And with the reduced capability to respond at all, the pain threshold is much harder to cross, also, giving Russia much less pause as they consider an offensive move.  Russia seems to be moving our behavior in directions satisfactory to it, however.

It’s different yet with the PRC, but not optimistically so.  We have a legal obligation to keep the Republic of China well enough armed with modern weapons that they can defeat an attack by the PRC.  Yet when we began the latest round of talks with Taiwan, the PRC objected so vociferously that we walked away from an initial sale of 66 modern F-16s, and agreed only to sell our ally a couple dozen of outmoded F-16s.

Further, the PRC is increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea, threatening American allies (vis., the Philippines) and potential allies (vis., Vietnam) and seizing key islands—including those that belong to the Philippines and Vietnam—and claiming them for itself.  The American response to this has been…silence.

Finally, DoD is on record as saying that the PRC is developing their own road-mobile ICBM (a capability which the Soviet Union had developed in the early days of mobile ICBMs), and they’ve dug a 3,000 mile tunnel system in which to hide their ICBM force.  They’ve also dismissed out of hand an offer of a joint weapons verification facility proposed by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Here, it’s clear that the PRC does not consider that we have the will to act, and so any ability to act does not concern them.  Nor have we said anything at all about consequences for their continued aggressiveness.  Finally, as they demonstrated with their human wave attacks in the Korean War, they’re perfectly willing, literally, simply to throw bodies into a fight until we run out of ammunition.  The degree of damage they’re willing to absorb is quite high.

So here we are with our deterrent capability.  Iran is about to acquire nuclear bombs, and it already has the missile systems with which to deliver them.

Russia has convinced us not to deploy a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic.  Russia threatens our allies and any new, potential defensive systems we might deploy with nuclear attack, and it does so with impunity.  Indeed, the imbalance has reached the point where we can’t even determine for ourselves whether we will acquire/maintain the strength necessary for us to deter Russia.  We’re negotiating our arms levels with them.

The PRC threatens our allies and potential allies over sea resources and key islands in South China Sea and over our erstwhile willingness to provide the Republic of China the resources with which to resist a PRC invasion.

Given all of this, what happens when Iran gets its nuclear weapons?  Which of us will be deterred then?  From what else will we be deterred by Russia and the PRC?  What will we deter these three from doing?

Finally, a closely related aside on the question of appeasement: President Obama insists “Ask Osama bin Laden and the 22 out of 30 top al-Qaida leaders who have been taken off the field whether I engage in appeasement.  Or whoever is left out there, ask them about that.”

Let’s also ask Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vladimir Putin, Hu Jintao, and Kim Jong-il, how American strength and steadfastness is working out.  Oh, and congratulations to President Obama on his success in carrying out President Bush the Younger’s drone and bin Laden policies.

Apologies

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The US ambassador to Belgium, Howard Gutman, made some truly appalling remarks the other day, but what followed is even more so.  Gutman’s remarks were these:

There is and has long been some amount of anti-Semitism, of hatred and violence against Jews, from a small sector of the population who hate others who may be different or perceived to be different, largely for the sake of hating. Those anti-Semites are people who hate not only Jews, but Muslims, gays, gypsies, and likely any who can be described as minorities or different.

It is the area where every new settlement announced in Israel, every rocket shot over a border or suicide bomber on a bus, and every retaliatory military strike exacerbates the problem and provides a setback here in Europe for those fighting hatred and bigotry here in Europe.

Peace in the Middle East would indeed equate with a huge reduction of this form of labeled “anti-Semitism” here in Europe.

It seems, then, that at least some anti-Semitism results from tensions between Israel and the Palestinians.  Israel is condemned as a participant in the bigotry for the crime of insisting on defending itself.  Anti-Semitism, more generally, is trivialized by the attitude that “there always are haters.”  Gutman’s remarks, though, reverse the situation: the bigotry, which predates the existence of modern Israel and Palestine by some centuries, is the cause of the conflict, not the result.  The remarks demand a clear, unequivocal apology.

The official responses to this were worse.

To digress, for a moment, an apology consists of three things, as any child knows: first, a prompt acknowledgment by the one owing the apology of the wrong done; second, an expression of regret for that wrong and for the harm caused by that wrong; and third, the first two must be sincere.  Measures of sincerity include whether the apology occurs without prompting of any sort, the promptness of the apology, and the clarity of the expressions.

In response to the hue and cry over his remarks, Gutman had this to say:

I strongly condemn anti-Semitism in all its forms and deeply regret that my words were misinterpreted.

My personal history and the history of my family testify to the importance I attach to this subject and my unwavering commitment to fight anti-Semitism.

He regrets his audience misunderstood him, but he’s not the least sorry for what he said.  And we’re supposed to give extra credit because of his family history.

Then President Obama spoke up through his spokesman, Jay Carney:

Q    I’m wondering if you could explain what the U.S. ambassador to Belgium meant in his comments about anti-Semitism, tying them to Israel’s policy.

MR. CARNEY:  The fact is, as you know, we condemn—this administration and the United States condemns anti-Semitism in all its forms, and believe that there is never any justification for prejudice against the Jewish people or against Israel.  Ambassador Gutman has expressed his regret, noting that he, quote, “strongly condemns anti-Semitism in all its forms.”

And I would just point out, Jake, that this administration has consistently stood up against anti-Semitism and efforts to de-legitimize Israel, and we will continue to do so.  Our record on this speaks for itself.  Whether it was opposing one-sided efforts to single out Israel at the Human Rights Council, speaking out against incitement in the Arab world, or opposing efforts to shortcut negotiations at the United Nations.

Specifically to your question, I think the ambassador himself has addressed this, so I would direct you to his statements, in terms of interpreting what he meant.  But our position is quite clear.  And our record is even clearer.

Not a word of condemnation of, or even remonstration against, Gutman’s remarks, nor an apology from Obama for his ambassador’s words.  Just an injunction to go see what he said.

The State Department couldn’t even figure out what the problem was, as this confused exchange demonstrates:

Q: I’ll start with Ambassador Gutman’s speech from last week.  Does the—did the administration sign off on this, or was it vetted by anyone in EUR or NEA? And does the administration agree with the sentiments that he expressed in his speech?

MR. TONER: I think you saw—actually, let me start again. I’m not aware that his remarks were cleared back here in Washington. He made very clear in a subsequent statement that they were his thoughts or his remarks. He did condemn—he—and was very vocal about condemning anti-Semitism in all its forms, and I believe he expressed regret that his words might have been taken out of context….

Q: I don’t know—it’s a pretty easy question. Yes or no?

MR. TONER: It is a—it is—it is—it was his remarks. It was his opinion—

Q: So he wasn’t speaking on—the ambassador to Belgium, he was not speaking—

MR. TONER: He was not speaking on behalf—I think he’s said as much. He said it was his remarks and he was speaking on his own—

Q: No, he didn’t. He did not say that. He—but he was not speaking on behalf of the U.S. government?

MR. TONER: I don’t believe so.

Q: So the—OK, the ambassador to Belgium shows up at a conference in Europe, in Belgium, and he is not speaking on behalf of the U.S. government. Is that correct?

MR. TONER: The ambassador was expressing his views on an issue.

Q: They’re not the view—so these—

MR. TONER: He subsequently—he subsequently issued a statement clarifying that he was—and expressing regret if his remarks were taken out of context. He then said that he does condemn anti-Semitism in all its forms and in fact pointed to his own family history as a—as a testament to that.

Q: So are you—well, I understand that. But you’re saying that he was speaking as a private citizen, not as the U.S. ambassador?

MR. TONER: Well, of course, when—any time an ambassador speaks, he is representing the United States….

Q: Can I just follow up briefly on that? Some Republicans have called for the administration to fire Ambassador Gutman. Is there—does the administration have a response to that, have a position on—

MR. TONER: We have full confidence in him.

“Could you repeat the question?”

No hint of an apology in any of the statements or exchanges.  There were only “clarifications” and deflections from Gutman, avoidance and deflection from Obama, and an inability even to understand the problem from State.  And it was all done in response to the uproar, and not at all out of any recognition of, and acceptance of responsibility for, wrong-doing.

Even worse, this failure is not unique to any particular party; it seems to be the modern vogue.

US and Russia: Relations Re-reset

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Spiegel Online International‘s Matthias Schepp provides an interesting view of US-Russian relations, via his quasi-interview with the Russian ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin.  The nominal topic was the US missile defense shield that President Obama keeps chattering about installing in New Europe against rogue states like Iran.  But there’s far more in the subtext.

Ambassador Rogozin asks the question, “If space aliens were to completely disarm Iran, would Washington continue with its plans to build a missile defense system in Poland?”  Of course, this is a cynically disingenuous question: given the Russian obstruction to any sort of effort to prevent the Iranians from getting nuclear weapons—which obstruction they have claimed to be based purely on Russian economic self-interest—they’d only attempt to interfere with their space aliens, also.

Instead, Russia demands that we not install a missile defense capability; it demands a written guarantee that our overall military capability will not increase to the point that Russia won’t have a chance against us, even with nuclear weapons; and it demands that our missiles be unable to reach Russian territory.

Rogozin objects in all seriousness that, “For America, it is all about making itself impregnable.”

Here’s the backdrop to the present Russian demands.  President Bush the Elder was at pains to avoid anything that might embarrass surviving Russia in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union; he took great care for Russian sensibilities, including delaying contacts with, and aid to, the ‘Stans that had just been freed from Soviet Union dominance.  We supported Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization.  We extended economic aid, and economic policy advice and assistance—at its request—to Russia.  The Obama administration has appeased Russia concerning their domestic human rights abuses.  The Obama administration even has accepted Russia’s Anschluss-like occupation and partition of Georgia.

But it’s unacceptable to the Russians that we should want to ensure our survival in a hostile world.  In essence, the Russians want to continue to be assured that they can destroy us at will.

In support of their demands, the Russians have threatened Poland with nuclear immolation if that ally goes ahead with a proposed deployment of an arm of our missile defense shield, they threaten to target our missile defense capability with nuclear weapons, they threaten Europe with nuclear targeting, and they threaten to withdraw from the just-negotiated START treaty.

Russia both actively supports Iranian nuclear weapons development and actively obstructs our efforts to derail that development.

Russia even threatens a new arms race if we persist in being rude enough to wish to protect ourselves.  This, though, contradicts that claimed Russian economic self-interest—it’s a race we can win as decisively on economic, technological, and military grounds as we won the last, which economic competition destroyed the Soviet Union.  The Russians know this.

No, the motive behind their support for Iranian nuclear arming and their insistence that we take no measures to protect ourselves and our allies is nothing more than their continued, naked enmity toward us.

Censeo Carthagem esse delendam, was Scipio the Elder’s constant refrain.  The Russians actively support a nuclear-weaponed Iran.  The Russians actively demand that we be unable to defend ourselves against missile attack or to respond to one.

Hmm….

Iran “Sanctions”

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By a vote of 100-0, the Senate last week passed its most stringent Iran sanctions bill to date. The vote was on an amendment by Senators Robert Menendez (D, NJ) and Mark Kirk (R, IL), and it would:

  • Prohibit [maintenance of] accounts on foreign financial institutions engaged in non-petroleum-related transactions with the Central Bank of Iran after 60 days;
  • Impose sanctions on foreign financial institutions, including central banks, engaged in petroleum-related transactions with the Central Bank of Iran after 180 days…
  • Provide a humanitarian exception for food, medicine and medical devices; and
  • Provide the president with an unclassified (with classified annex, if necessary) national security waiver authority every 120 days.

The administration opposed it.  Their beef this time is that it might raise the price of oil.  It might antagonize nations that do business with Iran and support the acquisition by Iran of nuclear weapons.

The Obama administration has opposed anything firmer  than very stern finger-shaking where Iran is concerned for the last three years, preferring instead “engagement” and chit-chat, which the Iranian regime has alternately rebuffed or ignored.

With the Obama administration so determined to appease a non-nuclear Iran, to what will it stoop after Iran obtains nuclear weapons?