Fired or Resigned?

Ex-Veterans Affairs Secretary is making his case that he didn’t resign, he was fired.

Shulkin said he had not submitted a resignation letter, or planned to, and was only told of Trump’s decision shortly before the Twitter announcement.

Of course, the format of a resignation is immaterial to the act; in particular, letters are the polite, professional way to quit, but they’re not required, not at all.  Too, learning that your boss wants you to leave “shortly before the Twitter announcement” might be impolite, even impolitic, but again, learning the boss’ desire is not required for resigning.  Nor is desiring one to leave the same as firing that one.

The distinction in this context might seem minor, but it actually flows from a very serious legal matter.

The semantics could be relevant to Trump’s ability to name an acting VA secretary to temporarily fill Shulkin’s place. Last week, Trump named Defense Department official Robert Wilkie to the acting position….
Under federal law, a president has wide authority to temporarily fill a federal agency job if someone “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office.” There is no mention of a president having that authority if the person is fired.

The fact is, Schulkin may have felt considerable pressure to resign, and it’s common to conflate pressured-to-resign with being fired, but the two are not the same.  Especially here.  Cabinet Secretaries are nominated by the President, but they are confirmed by the Senate.  The President cannot fire a Secretary.  He must be impeached.  It may be that Secretaries serve “at the pleasure of the President,” but once confirmed, they serve “at the pleasure of Congress,” also.

Schulkin could have held out for being impeached, but he resigned—under pressure certainly, but voluntarily nonetheless.

I am Shocked, Shocked

Recall Amazon.com’s playing off of several cities against each other in order to maximize the tax breaks and other returns that company might get for building its second headquarters in the “winning” city.  Now we discover this in the offing:

US cities vying for Amazon.com Inc’s second headquarters risk facing an unexpected consequence to victory: other companies will demand the same hefty tax breaks conferred on the online retail giant.

How amazing is that?  Other companies want in on the goodies.

I’m not shocked at that; I’m shocked that those cities’ managers didn’t see this coming.  Their lack of anticipation speaks poorly of their ability to respond to those demands.

It also speaks poorly of the competence of those cities’ managers.

Agency Fees

These are fees unions in a raft of jurisdictions are allowed to charge non-union members as a condition of those workers’ right to work at all.  Ostensibly, the fees are for the unions’ labor efforts in negotiating wages, benefits, and working conditions for everyone in the workplace.  The Supreme Court is considering a case, Janus v AFSCME, concerning whether such fees are constitutional.

It’s already the case that

Agency fees already are forbidden from paying for advocacy and other political activity.

Money is fungible, though, and even though agency fees might be barred from the purpose, the existence of the fees allows unions to reallocate equivalent money from other sources to the purpose—making it impossible actually to say that agency fees aren’t being used for the illegal purpose.  After all, if a union has $100, it can’t afford to engage in political activity.  If the union also collects a $10 agency fee from a non-union member, it now has $110, and it can afford to spend $10 on political activity, even if it’s forbidden by dollar bill serial tracking from using the non-union member’s $10 for the purpose.  Those ten bucks went illegally, however indirectly, to the political activity.

Moreover,

…plaintiffs in the Supreme Court case argue that negotiating with public agencies requires taking positions on government’s size and scope, which is a political question, so forcing employees to pay for the negotiations violates the First Amendment.

There’s the crux of the matter.  Agency fees are eminently unconstitutional, but I’m not sanguine that the Court will see it that way.  Both CJ Roberts and J Kennedy have shown themselves unreliable defenders of the Constitution, and the four Liberal Justices are a rock-solid bloc.

Against Their Own Interest

Fast food workers began protesting yesterday, demanding higher wages and the right to join a union.  Ashley Cathey, a 29-year-old Memphis fast food person, had this:

Fast-food cooks and cashiers like me are fighting for higher pay and union rights, the same things striking sanitation workers fought for 50 years ago.  We’re not striking and marching just to commemorate what they did—we’re carrying their fight forward. And we won’t stop until everyone in this country can be paid $15 an hour and has the right to join a union.

The work they do isn’t worth $15 per hour.  They’re just looking to price themselves out of their jobs, to be replaced by automated kiosks, as so many fast food restaurants already are doing.  Worse, if their unions, through strikes, force those higher wages, that will end with two outcomes: higher food prices for consumers, and from that, lessened demand for those restaurants’ fast food.  That, in turn, will result in fast food restaurants accelerating the move to kiosks or going out of business.  That last will cost not only the demanders their jobs, it’ll cost everyone in those restaurants their jobs.

And the right to join a union?  They already have that.  These folks should know that; they’re being misled by union leadership and the SJWs in the mix.

Deep States, Bureaucrats, and Incumbency

Whether the current idea of a Deep State plotting against the current administration is accurate or not, it has been clear for some period of years that bureaucrats who have been in Federal employ for too long become entrenched and begin working at cross purposes with those of their agency bosses.  The latter, being political appointees, are, at least indirectly, selected by the Federal government’s employer, us citizens.

While we can cure the overt incumbency problem of our politicians by electing others in their stead, the incumbency of bureaucrats, none of them elected, is both generally unseen and harder to correct.

There are, though, a couple of things we can do to correct this.

One is to limit the power of public unions by barring them from collecting “dues” or any other fees from non-members.  After all, rather tautologically, they don’t—can’t—represent anyone other than their members.  Non-members should be free to negotiate their own government employment contracts, and if those contracts happen to look like union contracts, that’s just a happy—or unhappy—side effect of those separate negotiations.  The wage competition also would apply downward pressure on government labor costs, to the benefit of us taxpayers who are the ones paying those wages, anyway.

It’s also important to take the government side out of the labor negotiations; although likely this is just pie in the sky.  Currently unions, when they make political donations, are donating to the politicians nominally negotiating those contracts on behalf of us taxpayers.  One possibility is to have a third-party negotiator represent us rather than those politicians, albeit this is even more pie in the sky.  Then put the union employment contracts up for final approval/rejection by plebiscite in the jurisdiction in which the contract is proposed.

Another measure is to change via legislation the nature of the employment contracts that are allowed.  Civil servant employment contracts should be limited to a five-year period with automatic expiration unless each house of Congress positively renews the contract.  Moreover, those contracts should be renewable only in three-year increments, and each renewal should be justified first by the agency for which the employee works and then by each house of Congress.

Additionally, transfers between agencies, whether permanent or temporary, should not be allowed unless the receiving agency eliminates a job position for each transfer in.  Such transfers should be for the expertise gained, not simply to increase headcount.

Finally, every five years, the public service union of relevance should be recertified, first by secret ballot vote of the union members, and then by roll-call vote in each house of Congress.

Five years is long enough to get useful work out of a new hire, and having to justify the continuation of the employment contract can help to hold down the disruptive power of bureaucrat incumbency by increasing turnover.  Requiring the public service union to recertify also can help to hold down the ability of the union to bloat off us taxpayers.

Yes, that will increase the work load of Congress.  That’s beneficial, too.  Working on this sort of thing will contribute to Congress not working on foolishness.